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Preface
In an age of explosive worldwide growth of electronic data storage and 
communications, effective protection of information has become a critical 
requirement. Especially when used in coordinationwith other tools for information
security, cryptography in all of its applications, including data confidentiality, 
data integrity, and user authentication, is the most powerful tool for protecting 
information. While the importance of cryptographic technique (i.e., encryption) 
in protecting sensitive and critical information and resources cannot be
overemphasized, an examination of technical evolutionwithin several industries
reveals an approaching precipice of scientific change. The glacially paced but
inevitable convergence of quantum mechanics, nanotechnology, computer science, 
and applied mathematics will revolutionize modern technology. The implications
of such changes will be far reaching, with one of its greatest impacts affecting 
information security. More specifically, that of modern cryptography.
With the exponential growth of wireless communications, the Internet of Things, 
and Cloud Computing, along with the increasingly dominant roles played by
electronic commerce in every major industry, safeguarding the information in
storage and the information travelling over communication networks is a critical 
challenge for technology innovators. The key prerequisite for the sustained 
development and successful exploitation of information technology and other
related industries is the notion of information security and assurance that includes
operations for protecting information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, information confidentiality, and 
privacy.
While it is true that cryptography has failed to provide its users the real security it
promised, the reasons for its failure do not have much to dowith cryptography as
a mathematical science. Rather, poor implementation of protocols and algorithms
has been the major source of the problem. Cryptographywill continue to play lead 
roles in developing new security solutions that will be in great demand with the
increasing bandwidth and data rate of next-generation communication systems and 
networks. New cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and tools must follow up in
order to adapt to the new communication and computing technologies. Computing 
systems and communication protocols, like IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.15, have
become targets of attacks because their underlying radio communication medium
contains security loopholes. New security mechanisms should be designed to
defend against the increasingly complex and sophisticated attacks launched on
networks and web-based applications. In addition to classical cryptographic
algorithms, approaches like chaos-based cryptography, DNA-based cryptography, 
and quantum cryptographywill increasingly play important roles.
However, one must not forget that the fundamental problems in security are
not new. What has changed over the decades, however, is the exponential 
growth in the number of connected devices, evolution of networks with data
communication speeds as high as terabits/second, massive increase in the volume
of data communication, availability of high-performance hardware, and massively
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parallel architecture for computing and intelligent software. As security systems 
design becomes more and more complex to meet these challenges, a common 
mistake made most often by security specialists is not comprehensively analyzing 
the system to be secured before making a choice about which security mechanism 
to deploy. On many occasions, the security mechanism chosen turns out to be 
either incompatible with or inadequate for handling the complexities of the 
system. This, however, does not vitiate the ideas, algorithms, and protocols of 
the security mechanisms. While the same old security mechanism, even with 
appropriate extensions and enhancements, may not be strong enough to secure the 
multiplicity of complex systems today, the underlying principles will continue to 
work on the next-generation systems, and indeed, for next era of computing and 
communications.
About the book
This book discusses some of the critical security challenges being faced by today’s 
computing world, as well as mechanisms to defend against them using classical and 
modern techniques of cryptography. With this goal, the book presents a collection 
of research work from experts in the field of cryptography and network security.
The book is organized into two sections. Section 1 contains six chapters that focus 
on various aspects of network security. Section 2 consists of three chapters dealing 
with various mechanisms of cryptography. In Chapter 1, “Introductory Chapter: 
Machine Learning in Misuse and Anomaly Detection,” Sen and Mehtab examine 
how various machine learning approaches can be gainfully utilized in network 
security and intrusion detection systems. They illustrate systems exploiting 
supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and hybrid learning, and discuss 
their relative advantages and disadvantages. In Chapter 2, “A New Cross-Layer 
FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks,” Ekonde proposes a scheme 
for enforcing security in a cross-layer mode by using a coding technique in the 
physical layer in the communication protocol stack in a wireless environment. The 
coding scheme is implemented using residue number system (RNS) and non-linear 
convolution coding at the physical layer, and the RSA security protocol in the 
higher layer of the protocol stack, to achieve security in communication. The error 
correction ability is achieved using a non-linear convolution code. The chapter 
also presents details about an FPGA implementation of the proposed scheme. In 
Chapter 3, “Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System,” Jyothsna emphasizes the 
need for efficient and effective intrusion detection systems for defending against 
anomaly-based attacks, and then proposes some approach to detect anomaly-
based intrusions in a network using unsupervised learning methods. The chapter 
also presents a brief review of various intrusion detection approaches, such as 
statistical approaches, knowledge-based techniques, data mining-based methods, 
and approaches based on machine learning. The author discusses two specific 
methods of anomaly detection—feature correlation analysis and association impact 
scale (FCAAIS) and feature association impact scale (FAIS)—and analyzes their 
performance. In Chapter 4, “Security in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) ,” 
Singh and Sharma discusse various currently available security and authentication 
mechanisms for handoff, and confidentiality of messages in a wireless local area 
network (WLAN) environment. The authors argue that security protocols in a 
WLAN environment should be lightweight in computation and should not also 
involve heavy message communication. In this context, the authors propose 
two protocols—control and provisioning of wireless access points (CAPWAP) and  
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hand over keying (HOKEY)—for secure handoff in aWLAN. In Chapter 5, “Analysis
of Network Protocols: The Ability of Concealing the Information,” Noskov discusses
methods of hiding data in a network communication using various approaches
of steganography. The author compares performances of various schemes
including transcoding steganography (TransSteg), lost audio packets (LACK), 
hidden communication system for corrupted networks (HICCUPS), retransmission 
steganography (RSTEG), modifications in the headers of TCP and IP packets, 
modification in the data blocks in stream control transmission protocol (SCTP) 
protocols, hybrid SCTP protocol, and SCTP multi-homing method. In Chapter 6, 
“Multifactor Authentication Methods: A Framework for Their Comparison and 
Selection,” Velasquez et al. propose a detailed guideline for choosing various multi-
factor authentication systems for secure access to information. The guidelines have
been designed using an extensive action-research methodology in collaboration
with experts in the field of secure information system design. In Chapter 7, “Secure
Communication Using Cryptography and Covert Channel,” Fatayer proposes a
scheme of merging encryption, authentication, and covert channel to realize
a covert channel of communication that ensures integrity and confidentiality of
information communicated over the channel. This covert channel is also used for
generating keys for encrypting messages. The chapter also presents results of the
performance of the proposed scheme. In Chapter 8, “High-Speed Area-Efficient
Implementation of AES Algorithm on Reconfigurable Platform,” Mane and Mulani 
present a scheme of implementation of the advanced encryption standard (AES) of
a symmetric key encryption algorithm. The scheme uses Xilinx SysGen on Nexys4 
and simulates the encryption environment using Simulink. The experimental 
results show that the scheme produces an overall data throughput of 14.1125 GBPS 
while consuming 121 slice registers. In Chapter 9, “Hybrid Approaches to Block
Cipher,” Chitrakar et al. propose two schemes of DNA cryptography. The authors
first present aDNA hybridization scheme (DHES) in which DNA cryptography
is used for encryption and decryption using a onetime password (OTP)–based 
approach for key generation. In the second scheme the authors propose a
hybrid graphical encryption algorithm (HGEA) utilizing pattern recognition and 
transformation using mono-alphabetic or poly-alphabetic substitutionwith a range
of characters consisting of 256 possible values. The chapter presensts results of the
performance of both schemeswith plaintexts of different length and content using 
different key size.
We hope that the volumewill be useful for researchers, engineers, graduate and 
doctoral students, and faculty members of graduate schools and universities who
work in the field of cryptography and network security. However, since it is not an
introductory book on the subject, the subject matter does not deal with any basic
information. Rather, the chapters in the book present some in-depth cryptography
and network security-related theories, as well as some of the latest updates that
might be of interest to advanced students and researchers in identifying their
research problems and focussing on their solutions. It is assumed that readers have
knowledge of mathematical and theoretical backgrounds of cryptography and 
network security algorithms and protocols.
We express our sincere thanks to all authors for their valuable contributions. 
Without their cooperation and eagerness to contribute, this project would never
have been successfully completed. All the authors have been extremely cooperative
and punctual during the submission, editing, and publication processes. We
express our heartfelt thanks to Ms. Kristina Kardum, Publishing Process Manager
at IntechOpen Publishing, London, for support, encouragement, patience, and 
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3Chapter 1
Introductory Chapter: Machine 
Learning in Misuse and Anomaly 
Detection
Jaydip Sen and Sidra Mehtab
1. Introduction
Over the last 30 years, ubiquitous and networked computing has  increasingly 
gained importance in our life. With the increase in complexity of computer 
networks, cybersecurity threats have also manifested in a variety of which was 
unimaginable even a decade back. While the rule-based intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs) can accurately detect already known attacks on a cyberinfrastructure, these 
systems are not capable to detect novel, unknown, and polymorphic cyber threats. 
Moreover, the computational overheads including CPU cycles and memory over-
heads are unacceptably high for most of the detection systems. Hence, it has been a 
constant challenge for security researchers to design automated, fast, and yet accu-
rate IDSs for deployment in real-world cyberinfrastructures. From expert-crafted 
rules to sophisticated machine learning and deep learning algorithms, researchers 
have explored and attempted to push the boundary of the detection accuracy while 
minimizing the false alarm rates.
Applications of machine learning and data mining algorithms in both signature 
and anomaly detection systems have been widely proposed in the literature. In 
misuse detection systems, following approaches of machine learning are quite 
popular: (1) classification using association rules [1–3], (2) artificial neural networks 
[4], (3) support vector machines [5], (4) classification and regression trees [6, 7], 
(5) Bayesian network classifier [8–10], and (6) naïve Bayes method [11]. While the 
signature detection systems require labeled training data in order to learn the features 
of the attack and the normal traffic, anomaly detection systems are based on identi-
fying any significant changes in the system from its normal state. Various approaches 
to machine learning in anomaly detection have been proposed in the literature. Some 
of these approaches are as follows: (1) association rule mining [12–14], (2) fuzzy 
association rule mining [15], (3) artificial neural network [16–18], (4) support vector 
machines [19, 20], (5) nearest neighbor [21], (6) hidden Markov model [22–24],  
(7) Kalman filter [25], (8) clustering [26], and (9) random forest [27, 28]. Other 
machine learning methods have been proposed for learning the probability distribu-
tion of data and in applying statistical tests to detect outliers [29–35].
The hybrid detection approach combines the adaptability and the powerful 
detection ability of an anomaly detection system with the higher accuracy and reli-
ability of the misuse detection approach [28, 36–43]. The selection of misuse and 
anomaly detection systems for designing a hybrid detection system is dependent on 
the application in which the detection system is to be deployed. Following a com-
binational approach, the integration of an anomaly detection system with a misuse 
detection counterpart has been classified into four categories [28, 36]. These types 
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Applications of machine learning and data mining algorithms in both signature 
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misuse detection systems, following approaches of machine learning are quite 
popular: (1) classification using association rules [1–3], (2) artificial neural networks 
[4], (3) support vector machines [5], (4) classification and regression trees [6, 7], 
(5) Bayesian network classifier [8–10], and (6) naïve Bayes method [11]. While the 
signature detection systems require labeled training data in order to learn the features 
of the attack and the normal traffic, anomaly detection systems are based on identi-
fying any significant changes in the system from its normal state. Various approaches 
to machine learning in anomaly detection have been proposed in the literature. Some 
of these approaches are as follows: (1) association rule mining [12–14], (2) fuzzy 
association rule mining [15], (3) artificial neural network [16–18], (4) support vector 
machines [19, 20], (5) nearest neighbor [21], (6) hidden Markov model [22–24],  
(7) Kalman filter [25], (8) clustering [26], and (9) random forest [27, 28]. Other 
machine learning methods have been proposed for learning the probability distribu-
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The hybrid detection approach combines the adaptability and the powerful 
detection ability of an anomaly detection system with the higher accuracy and reli-
ability of the misuse detection approach [28, 36–43]. The selection of misuse and 
anomaly detection systems for designing a hybrid detection system is dependent on 
the application in which the detection system is to be deployed. Following a com-
binational approach, the integration of an anomaly detection system with a misuse 
detection counterpart has been classified into four categories [28, 36]. These types 
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are: (1) anomaly–misuse sequence detection, (2) misuse–anomaly sequence detec-
tion, (3) parallel detection, and (4) complex mixture detection. The complex mix-
ture model is highly application-specific. Figure 1 depicts the first three categories 
of hybrid detection systems. Complex detection systems are application-specific, 
and these systems cannot be represented by any generic architecture.
2. Conclusion
A fundamental challenge in designing an intrusion detection system is the 
limited availability of appropriate data for model building and testing. Generating 
data for intrusion detection is an extremely painstaking and complex task that 
mandates the generation of normal system data as well as anomalous and attack 
data. If a real-world network environment, generating normal traffic data is not 
a problem. However, the data may too privacy-sensitive to be made available for 
public research.
Classification-based methods require training data to be well balanced with 
normal traffic data and attack traffic data. Although it is desirable to have a good 
mix of a large variety of attack traffic data (including some novel attacks), it may 
not be feasible in practice. Moreover, the labeling of data is mandatory with attack 
and normal traffic data clearly distinguished by their respective labels.
Unlike classification-based approaches that are mostly used in misuse detection, 
unsupervised anomaly detection-based approaches do not require any prior label-
ing of the training data. In most of the cases, the attack traffic constitutes the sparse 
class, and hence, the smaller clusters are most likely to correspond to the attack traf-
fic data. Although unsupervised anomaly detection is a very interesting approach, 
the results produced by this method are unacceptably low in terms of their detec-
tion accuracies.
In a pure anomaly detection approach, the training data are assumed to be con-
sisting of only normal traffic. By training the detection model only on the normal 
traffic data, the detection accuracy of the system can be significantly improved. 
Anomalous states are indicated by only a significant state change from the normal 
state of the system.
Figure 1. 
Three categories of hybrid detection systems. (a) Anomaly–misuse sequence, (b) misuse–anomaly 
sequence, and (c) parallel detection system.
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In a real-world network that is connected to the Internet, an assumption of 
attack free traffic is utopian. A pure anomaly detection system can still be trained 
on a training data that include attack traffic. In that case, those attack traffic data 
will be considered as normal traffic, and the detection system will not raise an 
alert when such traffic is encountered in real-world operations. Hence, in order to 
increase the detection accuracy, attack traffic should be removed from the training 
data as much as possible. The removal of attack traffic from the training data can 
be done using updated misuse detection systems or by deploying multiple anomaly 
detection systems and combining their results by a voting mechanism.
For an intrusion detection system that is deployed in a real-world network, it 
is mandatory to have a real-time detection capability under a high-speed, high-
volume data environment. However, most of the cluster techniques used in unsu-
pervised detection require quadratic time. This renders their deployment infeasible 
in practical applications. Moreover, the cluster algorithms are not scalable, and they 
need the entire training data to reside in the memory during the training process. 
This requirement puts a restriction on the model size. The future direction of 
research may include studies on scalability and performance of anomaly detection 
algorithms in conjunction with the detection rate and false positive rate. Most of 
the currently existing propositions on intrusion detection have not paid adequate 
attention to these critical issues.
In this book, the following chapters deal with various aspects of network 
security and cryptography. While the chapters belonging to the network security 
section broadly discuss different aspects of applications and deployment of security 
protocols and secure system architecture, the cryptography section discusses vari-
ous theoretical algorithms and their complexities.
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Chapter 2
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based
Security Scheme for Wireless
Networks
Michael Ekonde Sone
Abstract
This chapter presents a new cross-layer security scheme which deploys efficient
coding techniques in the physical layer in an upper layer classical cryptographic
protocol system. The rationale in designing the new scheme is to enhance security-
throughput trade-off in wireless networks which is in contrast to existing schemes
which either enhances security at the detriment of data throughput or vice versa.
The new scheme is implemented using the residue number system (RNS), non-
linear convolutional coding and subband coding at the physical layer and RSA
cryptography at the upper layers. The RNS reduces the huge data obtained from
RSA cryptography into small parallel data. To increase the security level, iterated
wavelet-based subband coding splits the ciphertext into different levels of decom-
position. At subsequent levels of decomposition, the ciphertext from the preceding
level serves as data for encryption using convolutional codes. In addition, through-
put is enhanced by transmitting small parallel data and the bit error correction
capability of non-linear convolutional code. It is shown that, various passive and
active attacks common to wireless networks could be circumvented. An FPGA
implementation applied to CDMA could fit into a single Virtex-4 FPGA due to small
parallel data sizes employed.
Keywords: residue number system (RNS), RSA cryptography, field programmable
gate array (FPGA), subband coding, convolutional coding, CDMA
1. Introduction
Generally, wireless networks consist of low capacity links with nodes that rely
on batteries. An efficient communication scheme for such networks should mini-
mize both congestion in the links and control information in the nodes. Security is a
critical parameter in wireless applications and any efficient communication scheme
has to integrate security vulnerabilities of the system in its implementation. Unfor-
tunately, existing schemes have network security implemented at the upper layer
such as the application layer; meanwhile parameters such as congestion, which
affect data throughput, are the physical layer. Hence, any attempt to increase the
security level in a communication system greatly compromises data throughput. In
[1], the authors developed a metric to estimate a timeframe for cyberattacks using
the RSA public key cryptography. In the analysis, the authors estimated the
attacker’s human time in carrying out a successful attack based on the key length.
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Such an implementation at the upper layer will curb any security attack at the
prescribed time but will greatly compromise data throughput at the physical layer
due to the huge modular exponentiation involved in its implementation. In [2], the
authors developed a secure and efficient method for mutual authentication and key
agreement protocol with smart cards. The implementation, which is based on the
constant updating of the password, will involve a considerable amount of control
information, which is detrimental to the optimum functioning of the nodes.
Research work using different information-theoretic models to develop physical
layer security based on the characteristics of the wireless links has been carried out
[3, 4]. However, the existing methods for implementing physical layer security
under the different information-theoretic security models is expensive and requires
assumptions about the communication channels that may not be accurate in prac-
tice [5]. Hence any deployment of the physical-layer security protocol to supple-
ment a well-established upper layer security scheme will be a pragmatic approach
for robust data transmission and confidentiality [6]. It is in this light that, a new
cross-layer approach is presented in this research. Major research efforts have
targeted cross-layer implementation of security schemes in wireless networks [7–9].
In this research, the proposed cross-layer security scheme uses signal processing
techniques as well as efficient coding and well-established cryptographic algorithm
to implement a security scheme, which greatly enhances security-throughput trade-
off, and curb many security threats common to wireless networks.
The rest of the chapter is organized in eight subsequent sections. In Section 2, we
present the background knowledge required for the design and implementation of
the new cross layer security scheme. This will involve a review of the different
techniques used in the development of the new security scheme. The first subsec-
tion presents the implementation of the multi-level convolutional cryptosystem.
This implementation involves the combination of subband coding and a new non-
linear convolutional coding. Next, a review of the residue number system (RNS)
with brief description of the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) is presented. We
conclude the section with an overview of RSA public-key cryptography. Section 3
presents the protocol for the implementation of the new cross layer security
scheme. The FPGA-based implementation applied to CDMA using the new layered
security scheme will be presented in Section 4. In Section 5, cryptanalysis of the
cross-layer security scheme will be carried out in order to quantify the security.
Quantification of data throughput is performed in section 6 while different security
threats which could be circumvented by the cross-layer security scheme are
presented in Section 7. We end the chapter in Section 8 with conclusions of our
work.
2. Background
This section presents the background knowledge required for the design and
implementation of the new cross layer security scheme. It involves a review of the
different techniques used in the development of the new security scheme.
2.1 Multi-level convolutional cryptosystem
The multi-level convolutional cryptosystem constitutes the second stage of
implementation at the physical layer. It receives integers from the RNS
implemented at the first stage. The multi-level cryptosystem is implemented using
subband coding and non-linear convolutional cryptosystem.
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2.1.1 Subband coding
The integers from the RNS block are split into different levels of decomposition
based on subband coding. Subband coding is implemented using integer wavelet
lifting scheme [10, 11]. It is shown in [12] that, a judicious choice of filter banks
could result into an integer transform despite the fact that, wavelet transform is an
approximation process. A four-tap Daubechies polyphase matrix, which results into
integer transforms, is given as follows [12]:
Pnew zð Þ ¼ he zð Þ g
new
e zð Þ
ho zð Þ gnewo zð Þ
� �
(1)
where h and g are filter coefficients with suffix e and o denoting even and odd
coefficients. The factorization of the polyphase matrix is as follows [12–14].
P zð Þ ¼ ~P zð Þ ¼ 1 �
ffiffiffi
3
p
0 1
" # 1 0ffiffiffi
3
p
4
þ
ffiffiffi
3
p � 2
4
z�1 1
24 35 1 z
0 1
� � ffiffiffi3p þ 1ffiffi
2
p 0
0
ffiffiffi
3
p � 1ffiffi
2
p
26664
37775
(2)
(Eq. (2)) forms the basis of integer to integer wavelet transform which in effect
is progressive transmission. The factored coefficients h1 ¼ �
ffiffiffi
3
p
, h2 ¼
ffiffi
3
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4 , h3 ¼ffiffi
3
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p are used to compute the approximate and detail
sequences. In such transmission, the original data is split into two portions, namely
approximate and detail sequences. The detail sequence is transmitted while the
approximate sequence is further split into two halves. The process is repeated until
the final data point. Using (Eq. (2)), the approximate, an and the detail, dn
sequences could be computed as follows [12, 15]:
anj jmj ¼ x2l h1j jmj þ x2l‐1��� ���mj : h2���� ����mj þ x2l‐1����� �����mj
dnj jmj ¼ x2l h1j jmj þ x2l‐1��� ���mj þ an‐1���� ����mj (3)
where an and dn are the approximation and detail sequences of wavelet coeffi-
cients of the nth sample. The subsequent transmissions are fed into the non-linear
convolutional coding block as depicted in Figure 1 for the first level kth detail and
Figure 1.
Synopsis for the computation of the kth coefficients for the 1st and 2nd levels of decomposition.
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approximation sequences [12, 15]. The processing blocks (PEs) shown in the figure
depicts the computations of (Eq. (3)).
The final decomposition level which comprises one data point will give one
approximation coefficient and one detail coefficient.
At the destination, the inverse wavelet transform is performed to obtain the
successive approximation sequences. (Eq. (3)) is used to perform the inverse trans-
form by reversing the operations for the forward transform and flipping signs
[12, 15]. The process starts with the approximation and detail coefficients a0 and d0
respectively obtained at the final decomposition level of the forward transform. The
first stage of the inverse transform is shown in Figure 2 [12, 15].
The (↑2) symbol represents upsampling by 2, which means that zeros are
inserted between samples while H2 and H3 are the filter coefficients used in (Eq. (3)).
2.1.2 Nonlinear convolutional cryptosystem
A major advantage of symmetric cryptography is the ability of composing prim-
itives to produce stronger ciphers although on their own the primitives will be
weak. Hence, the vulnerable convolutional code block will be cascaded into differ-
ent stages using the product ciphers obtained from the S-box and P-box to form a
non-linear convolutional cryptosystem.
• Key generation: The specifications of the private keys used in the
implementation of the cascaded convolutional cryptosystem are as follows
[12, 15, 16]:
a. States of each transducer or convolutional code block in the cascade given
by the contents of the sub-matrices in the generator matrix;
b.The transition functions. These are mappings used to compare the input
bits and present state and switches to the appropriate next state;
c. n-bit S-boxes. They are used to shuffle the output bits.
d.n-bit P-boxes. They are used for the different permutations per level of
decomposition.
For illustrative purposes, an (8, 8, 2) convolutional encoder will be considered to
demonstrate the keys generation process.
Figure 2.
The first stage of the inverse transform.
14
Computer and Network Security
2.1.2.1 States of convolutional code block or transducer
For an 8 � 8 matrix, there are at least 216 ways or keys in which the connections
of a register to the modulo-2 adder could be made. A possible key which gives the
contents of the 8 � 8 matrix are shown in (Eq. (4))
ð4Þ
The generator matrix is used to specify the following set of 8 vectors.
X(7) := A1(7) ⊕ A3(7); X(6) := A1(7) ⊕ A1(6) ⊕ A3(6).
X(5) := A1(5) ⊕ A3(5) ⊕ A3(6); X(4) := A1(4) ⊕ A3(4) ⊕ A3(5).
X(3) := A1(3) ⊕ A3(3) ⊕ A3(4); X(2) := A1(2) ⊕ A3(2) ⊕ A3(3).
X(1) := A1(1) ⊕ A3(1); X(0) := A1(0) ⊕ A3(0).
It should be recalled that, for an (n,k,L) convolutional encoder, each vector
has Lk dimensions and contains the connections of the encoder to the modulo-2
adder.
The structure of the (8, 8, 2) convolutional encoder is shown in Figure 3 with
A2, A3 representing the registers M11,M
1
2 while A1 represents the input data.
2.1.2.2 The transition functions
For an (8,8,2) convolutional code, there are 28 = 256 mappings or keys. There are
two sets of transition functions denoted as f1 for the two possible states.
For example, a transition function that compares input data to state 1 and
remains in state 1 is given as follows:
f1 1; 00000000½ �; 00000001½ �; 00000010½ �; 00000011½ �; 00000100½ �;fð
00000101½ �; 00000110½ �; 00000111½ �gÞ ¼ 1f g (5)
In (Eq. (5)), if the input data is any of the sequences {[00000000],
[00000001], [00000010], [00000011], [00000100], [00000101], [00000110],
[00000111]}, the present state of the transducer which is state 1 is retained.
Figure 3.
Structure of an (8, 8, 2) convolutional encoder.
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00000101½ �; 00000110½ �; 00000111½ �gÞ ¼ 1f g (5)
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Figure 3.
Structure of an (8, 8, 2) convolutional encoder.
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A transition function that compares input data to state 1 and switches to state 2 is
given as follows:
f1 1; 00001000½ �; 00001001½ �; 00001010½ �; 00001011½ �; 00001100½ �;fð
00001101½ �; 00001110½ �; 00001111½ �gÞ ¼ 2f g, (6)
In (Eq. (6)), if the input data is any of the sequences {[00001000], [00001001],
[00001010], [00001011], [00001100], [00001101], [00001110], [00001111]}, the
present state of the transducer which is state 1 is changed to state 2.
At the destination, the transition functions are similar to those for the encoder at
the source but change roles. The transition functions are very critical in the imple-
mentation of convolutional cryptosystem since it accounts for its dynamic nature,
hence an increase in security level.
2.1.2.3 S-box entries
For an (8,8,2) convolutional code, using 2-bit shuffling boxes, there are 16 S-
boxes or keys. For higher n-bit shuffling boxes, the number of keys increases, for
example 8-bit shuffling boxes will give 28 keys. The four 2-bit S-boxes used to
illustrate the scheme are shown in Table 1. Given an 8-bit data sequence as [A7, A6,
A5, A4, A3, A2, A1, A0], the look-up S-box, Sub1,1 is used to shuffle the first pair of
bits, [A7, A6], Sub1,2 is used to shuffle the second pair [A5, A4], Sub1,3 is used to
shuffle the third pair [A3, A2], and Sub1,4 is used to shuffle the last pair [A1, A0].
2.1.2.4 P-box entries
The interconnections between inputs and outputs are implemented using a
permutation set look-up table. For an (8,8,2) code, the eight (08) inputs and out-
puts could be permuted or interconnected in at least 77 = 823,543 ways. A permissi-
ble permutation is shown in Table 2 [12, 15].
Table 1.
2-bit shuffle look-up-table.
Table 2.
Input–output interconnect look-up-table for encoder.
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After the specification of the keys, the vulnerable convolutional code block will
be cascaded into different stages using the product ciphers obtained from the S-box
and P-box. Using two (02) stages, a non-linear (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded is as shown in
Figure 4.
In Figure 4, Sub1,1, Sub1,2, Sub1,3 and Sub1,4 are S-boxes used for pairwise bit
shuffling and the input vector to the first transducer, {X7, X6, X5, X4, X3, X2, X1, X0}
is the output set from the subband encoding block while the output vector {Y7, Y6,
Y5, Y4, Y3, Y2, Y1, Y0} is the ciphertext from the second transducer stage.
It is worth noting that the security level could be greatly increased by increasing
the number of stages to be cascaded.
2.2 Residue number system (RNS)
The residue number system uses the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) to
compute unknown values from the remainders left or residues when unknown
values are divided by known numbers.
The modular Chinese remainder theorem states that [17, 18]:
Assume m1, m2, …, mN are positive integers, relatively prime pairs: (mi, mk) = 1
if i # k. Let {b1, b2, …, bN} be arbitrary integers, then the system of simultaneous
linear congruence
x1 ¼ b1 mod m1ð Þ � � � xN ¼ bN mod mNð Þ (7)
Figure 4.
Initial structure of the cascade before encoding.
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has exactly one solution modulo the product m1, m2, …, mN. The solution to the
simultaneous linear congruence is formally given as [15, 17, 18].
xj jM ¼ ∑
L
j¼1
m^j
xj
m^j
���� ����
mj
: xj
�����
�����
M
(8)
where m^j ¼ Mmj and M ¼
QN
j¼1
mj.
(Eq. (8)) establishes the uniqueness of the solution. In this research, the integers
Tj ¼ ∣ xjm^j ∣ often referred to as the multiplicative inverses of m^j are computed a priori
by solving the linear congruence in (Eq. (7)). In other words, if Mj = M/mj, then
the multiplicative inverses, Tj are computed by solving the congruence TjMj = 1
(mod mj).
2.3 RSA public-key cryptography
• Key creation◦ Choose secrete primes p and q and compute m = p.q◦ Choose encryption exponent, e◦ Compute d satisfying e.d � 1 mod ((p – 1). (q – 1)).◦ Public key: (m, e) and Private key: d
• Security services achieved using RSA cryptography are authentication and
non-repudiation based on digital signatures and confidentiality based on
encryption. Implementation of these services are summarized in Table 3
3. Protocol of implementation of cross-layer security scheme
The new scheme is implemented at the application and physical layers. The
detail operations of the application and physical layers at the source and destination
are as follows:
• Source:◦ Application layer:
a. Traditional RSA encryption◦ Physical layer:
a. Step 1: Residue number system (RNS) converts the message points into
residues based on the moduli set;
Authentication and non-repudiation Confidentiality
Choose plaintext X.
Compute Xs � Xd (mod m)
Send (X, Xs) to Alice. Xs is the RSA digital signature of
message, X
Choose plaintext X.
Use Bob’s public key (m, e) to
compute
C � Xe (mod m).
Send ciphertext, C to Bob
Table 3.
Summary of security services of RSA public-key cryptography.
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b.Step 2: RNS-based RSA ciphertext is converted into different levels of
decomposition using subband coding;
c. Step 3: Symmetric encryption using Convolutional cryptosystem;
At the destination, the entire process is reversed startingwith convolutional
decoding at the physical layer and endingwith RSA decryption at the application layer.
3.1 Illustrative example
Consider an arbitrary array of integers for plaintext as follows {398, 453, 876,
200, 356, 165, 265, 897}.
• Source◦ Application layer: Traditional RSA encryption
a. Primes, p = 13; q = 37) n = p. q = 481
b.Encryption key, e = 5
c. Decryption key: e. d � 1 mod (432)) d = 173
Array due to RSA encryption is given as {151, 293, 252, 135, 304, 315, 265, 182}◦ Physical layer:
a. Step 1: Moduli set of {107, 109, 113} is used to convert the RSA
ciphertext into 8-bit data point arrays. The residue set, r1 for m1 = 107 is
as follows:
r1 = {44, 79, 38, 28, 90, 101, 51, 75}
b.Step 2: Subband coding is performed to split residues obtained using
moduli set into three levels of decomposition since m = 8 = 23 data
points are used. Subband coding is basically down sampling by 2 using
(Eq. (3)). The corresponding arrays for the first level of decomposition
are as follows:
r11 = {�9, �48, �79, �27}; � r12 = {�9, �42, �75, �21}; � r13 = {�9, �30,
�67, �9}
Note that r11 refers to first level of decomposition array for modulus,
m1 = 107 and the first element is obtained using (Eq. (3)) with integer lifting
filter coefficients set, h = {2, 0, 0} as follows: r1(1) – 2 � r1(0) = 79–
2 � 44 = �9.
The same procedure is performed for the second and third levels of
decomposition.
c. Step 3: Table 4 summarizes the manual computation of the encryption
and decryption process of the convolutional cryptosystem for the data
r11(0) = �9 from the subband encoding stage based on the entries of
the product cipher and combinational logic of the non-linear (8,8,2)
2-cascaded convolutional transducer in Figure 4.
19
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82390
has exactly one solution modulo the product m1, m2, …, mN. The solution to the
simultaneous linear congruence is formally given as [15, 17, 18].
xj jM ¼ ∑
L
j¼1
m^j
xj
m^j
���� ����
mj
: xj
�����
�����
M
(8)
where m^j ¼ Mmj and M ¼
QN
j¼1
mj.
(Eq. (8)) establishes the uniqueness of the solution. In this research, the integers
Tj ¼ ∣ xjm^j ∣ often referred to as the multiplicative inverses of m^j are computed a priori
by solving the linear congruence in (Eq. (7)). In other words, if Mj = M/mj, then
the multiplicative inverses, Tj are computed by solving the congruence TjMj = 1
(mod mj).
2.3 RSA public-key cryptography
• Key creation◦ Choose secrete primes p and q and compute m = p.q◦ Choose encryption exponent, e◦ Compute d satisfying e.d � 1 mod ((p – 1). (q – 1)).◦ Public key: (m, e) and Private key: d
• Security services achieved using RSA cryptography are authentication and
non-repudiation based on digital signatures and confidentiality based on
encryption. Implementation of these services are summarized in Table 3
3. Protocol of implementation of cross-layer security scheme
The new scheme is implemented at the application and physical layers. The
detail operations of the application and physical layers at the source and destination
are as follows:
• Source:◦ Application layer:
a. Traditional RSA encryption◦ Physical layer:
a. Step 1: Residue number system (RNS) converts the message points into
residues based on the moduli set;
Authentication and non-repudiation Confidentiality
Choose plaintext X.
Compute Xs � Xd (mod m)
Send (X, Xs) to Alice. Xs is the RSA digital signature of
message, X
Choose plaintext X.
Use Bob’s public key (m, e) to
compute
C � Xe (mod m).
Send ciphertext, C to Bob
Table 3.
Summary of security services of RSA public-key cryptography.
18
Computer and Network Security
b.Step 2: RNS-based RSA ciphertext is converted into different levels of
decomposition using subband coding;
c. Step 3: Symmetric encryption using Convolutional cryptosystem;
At the destination, the entire process is reversed startingwith convolutional
decoding at the physical layer and endingwith RSA decryption at the application layer.
3.1 Illustrative example
Consider an arbitrary array of integers for plaintext as follows {398, 453, 876,
200, 356, 165, 265, 897}.
• Source◦ Application layer: Traditional RSA encryption
a. Primes, p = 13; q = 37) n = p. q = 481
b.Encryption key, e = 5
c. Decryption key: e. d � 1 mod (432)) d = 173
Array due to RSA encryption is given as {151, 293, 252, 135, 304, 315, 265, 182}◦ Physical layer:
a. Step 1: Moduli set of {107, 109, 113} is used to convert the RSA
ciphertext into 8-bit data point arrays. The residue set, r1 for m1 = 107 is
as follows:
r1 = {44, 79, 38, 28, 90, 101, 51, 75}
b.Step 2: Subband coding is performed to split residues obtained using
moduli set into three levels of decomposition since m = 8 = 23 data
points are used. Subband coding is basically down sampling by 2 using
(Eq. (3)). The corresponding arrays for the first level of decomposition
are as follows:
r11 = {�9, �48, �79, �27}; � r12 = {�9, �42, �75, �21}; � r13 = {�9, �30,
�67, �9}
Note that r11 refers to first level of decomposition array for modulus,
m1 = 107 and the first element is obtained using (Eq. (3)) with integer lifting
filter coefficients set, h = {2, 0, 0} as follows: r1(1) – 2 � r1(0) = 79–
2 � 44 = �9.
The same procedure is performed for the second and third levels of
decomposition.
c. Step 3: Table 4 summarizes the manual computation of the encryption
and decryption process of the convolutional cryptosystem for the data
r11(0) = �9 from the subband encoding stage based on the entries of
the product cipher and combinational logic of the non-linear (8,8,2)
2-cascaded convolutional transducer in Figure 4.
19
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82390
• Destination◦ Physical layer:
The entire process is reversed starting with convolutional decoding at the physical
layer which was illustrated in Table 4.
a. Subband decoding: It involves upsampling and the use of quadrature
mirror filter (QMF) bank as depicted in Figure 5 [12, 13]
The (↑2) symbol represents upsampling by 2, which means that zeros are
inserted between samples. The QMF bank are the coefficients derived from the
4-tap Daubechies filter bank [12, 13, 19]. Hence, using upsampling and the QMF
bank coefficients the residue sets r1, r2 and r3 are retrieved.
Figure 5 will be used to perform a numerical illustration of subband decoding
for the first level of decomposition of the array of modulus m1 = 107 to obtain
approximation coefficients a1.
The moduli sets obtained from subband encoding for the three levels of decom-
position for m1 = 107 are as follows:
- Level 3: r31 = {2, 44};  Level 2: r21 = {50, 20};  Level 1: r11 = {9, 48,
79, 27}.
For subband decoding, the entire process is reversed with level 3 of encoding
becoming level 1 for decoding.
Table 4.
Manual computation for the first sample of first level of decomposition for modulus 107.
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r31 from subband encoding namely a0 = 2 and d0 = 44 is used. From Figure 5,
upsampling performed on the approximation, a0 and detail, d0 data points gives the
sets y_1 = {2, 0} and z_1 = {44, 0} respectively. Using 4-tap Daubechies integer
lifting filter coefficients set, h = {2, 0, 0} we have.
w_1(0) = z_1(0) – h(2)*y_1(0) – h(3)*y_1(1) = 44–0 – 0 = 44
w_1(1) = z_1(1) – h(2)*y_1(0) – h(3)*y_1(1) = 0–0 – 0 = 0
a_1(0) = y_1(0) – h(1)*w_1(0) = 2–2*44 = �86
a_1(1) = y_1(1) – h(1)*w_1(1) = 0–2*0 = 0
Hence the first level approximation data points, a1 are obtained as follows.
a1(0) = w_1(0) = 44 and a1(1) = w_1(1) + z_1(0) = 0–86 = �86
) a1 = {44, �86}.
The process is repeated to obtain the second and third levels approximation
data points. The third level approximation data points, a3 should be equal to
residue set, r1 obtained from the RNS-based RSA ciphertext using the modulus,
m1 = 107.
b.RNS-based Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT): It is applied to the residue sets
r1, r2 and r3.
(Eq. (8))will be used to retrieve the RSA ciphertext from the residue sets. Using
(Eq. (8)) and moduli set, m = {107, 109, 113} to compute the first data point of the
ciphertext set we have.
X � r11 � m^1 � T1ð Þ r21 � m^2 � T2ð Þ r31 � m^3 � T3ð Þ mod Mð Þ
� 44� 12; 317 � 9ð Þ þ 42� 12;091� 68ð Þ þ 38� 11; 663� 33ð Þð Þ mod 1; 317; 919ð Þ
) X ¼ 151
The same process is repeated to obtain all the other data points of the RSA
ciphertext set. The RSA ciphertext set is fed to the RSA decryption block at the
application layer.◦ Application layer: RSA decryption
Decryption of the first data point is given as M = 151d mod n = 151173 mod
481 = 398 which represents the original data which was sent at the source.
The same process is repeated to obtain all the other data points of the
plaintext set.
Figure 5.
The first two stages of the wavelet inverse transform.
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4. FPGA implementation of security scheme applied to CDMA
In this section, FPGA implementation of new scheme applied to CDMA, the new
VHDL code package to implement A mod n operations, synthesis report and
behavioral simulation results will be presented.
4.1 FPGA implementation of new scheme applied to CDMA
Code division multiple access (CDMA) enables several users to transmit mes-
sages simultaneously over the same channel bandwidth in such a way that each
transmitter/ receiver user pair has its own distinct signature code for transmitting
over the common channel bandwidth. This distinct signature is ensured by using
spread spectrum techniques whereby the message from each user is transmitted
using orthogonal waveforms. In orthogonal signaling, the residues are mapped to
orthogonal waveforms which constitute the CDMA signal [20]. The orthogonal
waveforms used in this research are Walsh functions.
Considering an (8, 8, 2) multi-level cryptosystem for illustrative purposes, the
mapping process will involve M = 28 = 256 orthogonal waveforms. Using the
dynamic range of (�128, 126), a set of M = 28 = 256 orthogonal waveforms is
required to completely represent all the integers or symbols. Based on this, the
corresponding Hadamard matrix obtained from the procedure elaborated in [21] is
as follows:
H256 ¼ H128 ⊗ H128
¼
H128 H128
H128 H128
 !
The H256 matrix is a large matrix comprising of 256 rows and 256 columns. The
Hadamard matrix results into a multi–dimensional array. Multi–dimensional arrays
are arrays with more than one index. Multi–dimensional arrays are not allowed for
hardware synthesis. One way around this is to declare two one–dimensional array
types. This approach is easier to use and more representative of actual hardware.
The VHDL code used to declare the two one–dimensional array types is shown in
Figure 6 [22].
The other operations in the hardware Walsh function generator implementation
are trivial since they involve modulo–2 addition with built–in operators in VHDL
code to handle such operations.
4.2 New VHDL code package
In this research, a new algorithm is presented which implements modular expo-
nentiation without the use of the Montgomery algorithm. A package is developed in
the VHDL code to extract residues similarly to the X mod N operation for any
randomly generated data. Meanwhile, the large operand lengths which resulted
Figure 6.
VHDL code for synthesizable 256 � 256 Hadamard matrix.
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from the modular exponentiation are reduced using binary exponentiation and
the RNS.
The principle used to develop the package is as follows:
To perform the x = X mod N calculation where X has a large operand length of b
bits say b = 1024 bits and N is modulus of small operand length of b1 bits say b1 = 8
bits, the following steps are used:
1. X is converted to binary equivalent;
2. The b1 least significant bits of the b bits of X are chosen;
3. The integer equivalent, x1 of the chosen b1 bits is determined;
4. The residue, x = X mod N is obtained from the following equation;
x ¼ x1 þ 2b1�1 �N
 � X
2b1�1
(9)
5. If the residue, x is greater than the modulus, N the process is iterated until the
residue is less than the modulus.
(Eq. (9)) forms the basis for the x = X mod N calculation.
Based on this new algorithm which implements modular exponentiation without
the use of the Montgomery algorithm, the entire physical layer security scheme
could fit into a single FPGA chip.
4.3 Behavioral simulation and synthesis report
In order to verify the performance of the proposed architecture, a VHDL
programme was written and implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA chip (device:
xc4vlx 200, package: ff 1513, speed grade� 11) [22]. Sixteen (16) randomly generated
integers were fed into the FPGA. For this value, the number of bonded IOBs is 760 out
of 960 resulting to 79% resource used. The behavioral simulation results for array
{39,870, 45,378, 87,654, 20,087, 35,689, 16,592, 564, 276,509, 89,732, 56,287, 4527,
89,065, 4321, 7654, 5489, 512} using moduli set {111, 115, 119} are displayed in [15].
In [15], the complete synthesis report showing device utilization summary is
presented. Due to the additional implementation of orthogonal signaling compared
to the implementation in [15], the following parameters are different compared to
results displayed in [15]:
The device utilization summary is as follows:
• Number of slices: 5411 out of 89,088 6%
• Number of slice flip flops: 60 out of 178,176 0%
• Number of four input LUTs: 7452 out of 178,176 4%
• Total REAL time to Router completion: 24 min 7 s.
• Total REAL time to place and route (PAR) completion: 24 min 41 s.
• Pin delays less than 1.00 ns: 21928 out of 30,651 71.5%.
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sages simultaneously over the same channel bandwidth in such a way that each
transmitter/ receiver user pair has its own distinct signature code for transmitting
over the common channel bandwidth. This distinct signature is ensured by using
spread spectrum techniques whereby the message from each user is transmitted
using orthogonal waveforms. In orthogonal signaling, the residues are mapped to
orthogonal waveforms which constitute the CDMA signal [20]. The orthogonal
waveforms used in this research are Walsh functions.
Considering an (8, 8, 2) multi-level cryptosystem for illustrative purposes, the
mapping process will involve M = 28 = 256 orthogonal waveforms. Using the
dynamic range of (�128, 126), a set of M = 28 = 256 orthogonal waveforms is
required to completely represent all the integers or symbols. Based on this, the
corresponding Hadamard matrix obtained from the procedure elaborated in [21] is
as follows:
H256 ¼ H128 ⊗ H128
¼
H128 H128
H128 H128
 !
The H256 matrix is a large matrix comprising of 256 rows and 256 columns. The
Hadamard matrix results into a multi–dimensional array. Multi–dimensional arrays
are arrays with more than one index. Multi–dimensional arrays are not allowed for
hardware synthesis. One way around this is to declare two one–dimensional array
types. This approach is easier to use and more representative of actual hardware.
The VHDL code used to declare the two one–dimensional array types is shown in
Figure 6 [22].
The other operations in the hardware Walsh function generator implementation
are trivial since they involve modulo–2 addition with built–in operators in VHDL
code to handle such operations.
4.2 New VHDL code package
In this research, a new algorithm is presented which implements modular expo-
nentiation without the use of the Montgomery algorithm. A package is developed in
the VHDL code to extract residues similarly to the X mod N operation for any
randomly generated data. Meanwhile, the large operand lengths which resulted
Figure 6.
VHDL code for synthesizable 256 � 256 Hadamard matrix.
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from the modular exponentiation are reduced using binary exponentiation and
the RNS.
The principle used to develop the package is as follows:
To perform the x = X mod N calculation where X has a large operand length of b
bits say b = 1024 bits and N is modulus of small operand length of b1 bits say b1 = 8
bits, the following steps are used:
1. X is converted to binary equivalent;
2. The b1 least significant bits of the b bits of X are chosen;
3. The integer equivalent, x1 of the chosen b1 bits is determined;
4. The residue, x = X mod N is obtained from the following equation;
x ¼ x1 þ 2b1�1 �N
 � X
2b1�1
(9)
5. If the residue, x is greater than the modulus, N the process is iterated until the
residue is less than the modulus.
(Eq. (9)) forms the basis for the x = X mod N calculation.
Based on this new algorithm which implements modular exponentiation without
the use of the Montgomery algorithm, the entire physical layer security scheme
could fit into a single FPGA chip.
4.3 Behavioral simulation and synthesis report
In order to verify the performance of the proposed architecture, a VHDL
programme was written and implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA chip (device:
xc4vlx 200, package: ff 1513, speed grade� 11) [22]. Sixteen (16) randomly generated
integers were fed into the FPGA. For this value, the number of bonded IOBs is 760 out
of 960 resulting to 79% resource used. The behavioral simulation results for array
{39,870, 45,378, 87,654, 20,087, 35,689, 16,592, 564, 276,509, 89,732, 56,287, 4527,
89,065, 4321, 7654, 5489, 512} using moduli set {111, 115, 119} are displayed in [15].
In [15], the complete synthesis report showing device utilization summary is
presented. Due to the additional implementation of orthogonal signaling compared
to the implementation in [15], the following parameters are different compared to
results displayed in [15]:
The device utilization summary is as follows:
• Number of slices: 5411 out of 89,088 6%
• Number of slice flip flops: 60 out of 178,176 0%
• Number of four input LUTs: 7452 out of 178,176 4%
• Total REAL time to Router completion: 24 min 7 s.
• Total REAL time to place and route (PAR) completion: 24 min 41 s.
• Pin delays less than 1.00 ns: 21928 out of 30,651 71.5%.
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5. Cryptanalysis of cross-layer scheme
The cryptanalysis will be performed separately at the application and physical
layers and later combined in the cross-layer scheme to demonstrate the high secu-
rity level of the new scheme compared to separate implementations.
5.1 Cryptanalysis at the application layer
The RSA public key cryptography is implemented at the application layer. The
most successful method to break the RSA cryptosystem is the Number Field Sieve
(NFS) method used for partial key exposure attacks. The NFS is based on a method
known as “Fermat Factorization”: one tries to find integers x, y, such that x2 � y2
mod n but x 6¼ � y mod n [12]. We assume that the two primes p and q should be
close and approximately equal to the square root of n, where n = p.q. If one of the
integers could be written as x = (p + q)/2 then number of steps, S1 required to
determine the other integer, y could be computed as follows [23].
S1 ¼ pþ q2 �
ffiffiffi
n
p ¼
ffiffiffiqp � ffiffiffipp� �2
2
¼
ffiffiffi
n
p � pð Þ2
2 p
(10)
It is partial key exposure attack since the number of steps, S1 required for the
attack depends on one of the primes.
Table 5 gives a summary of the number of steps required to break the traditional
RSA cryptography implemented at the application layer using Fermat Factorization.
5.2 Cryptanalysis at the physical layer
Security at the physical layer is ensured by the multi-level convolutional cryp-
tosystem which encrypts already encrypted data emanating from the RNS-based
RSA. The cryptanalysis of the multi-level convolutional cryptosystem will be based
on the ciphertext-only attack whereby, it is assumed that the attacker knows
ciphertext of several messages encrypted with the same key and/or several keys.
The keys used in the encryption are those mentioned in Section 2.1.2 for the non-
linear (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded convolutional cryptosystem.
It is shown in [12] that, for an (n, k, L) convolutional code, each generator
matrix reveals at most p – k – 1 values of a private parameter, using Gaussian
elimination for p blocks of input data. Hence, if q is the number of states, then to
completely break the (k, k, L) N-cascaded cryptosystem, the minimum number of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs (u, v) required is [12].
Operand key length Total number of steps
16-bit 1
32-bit 1
64-bit 1.8 � 108
128-bit 8.0 � 1017
256-bit 1.26 � 1025
512-bit 2.53 � 1063
1024-bit 3.3 � 10140
Table 5.
Number of steps required to break the traditional RSA.
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S2 ¼ p: q:2
k
p� k� 1�
q:2k
p
� k!
p
� 1
p
� k
2
� �2
� 22
& ’" #N8<:
9=; (11)
For an (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded cryptosystem, k = 8 and the least number of
plaintext-ciphertext blocks required is p = 10 due to the number of rows and
columns in the generator matrix. Assuming q = 2 states, S2 could be as
S2 ¼ 10: 2:2
8
10� 8� 1�
2:28
10
� 8!
10
� 1
10
� 8
2
� �2
� 22
& ’" #28<:
9=; ¼ 7:8� 1034 (12)
Table 6 gives a summary of the number of steps required to break the (8, 8, 2)
2-cascaded cryptosystem using ciphertext-only attack.
5.3 Cryptanalysis of the new cross-layer security scheme
At the upper layer, huge key lengths such as 1024 bits and 2048 bits are used to
implement the RSA. Such implementations will greatly compromise throughput at
the physical layer due to modular exponentiation. Hence, the main objective of the
new cross-layer security scheme is to increase security level at the physical layer
despite the small valued data points transmitted derived from the RNS-based RSA
in order to enhance throughput. Cryptanalysis is performed on the small residue
RSA encrypted values. The analysis will be based on partial key exposure and
ciphertext-only attacks at the physical layer for eavesdropper who could wiretap the
transmitted data. The number of steps, S required to break the new cross-layer
security scheme should be a product of S1 and S2 given as [12].
S ¼ S1: p: q:2
k
p� k� 1�
q:2k
p
� k!
p
� 1
p
� k
2
� �2
� 22
& ’" #N8<:
9=; (13)
Table 7 gives a summary of the number of steps required to break the new
cross-layer security scheme by using partial key exposure attack and ciphertext-
only attacks for different cascaded stages.
Comparing Tables 5–7, it can be seen that high security levels comparable to the
traditional 1024-bit RSA implemented at the upper layer could be attained using
short operand key lengths of 128 bits and 256 bits for cross-layer security
Operand key length Total number of steps
8-bit 7.8 � 1034
16-bit 2.1 � 1057
32-bit 1.4 � 1057
64-bit 1.5 � 1062
128-bit 6.1 � 1071
256-bit 9.87 � 1087
512-bit 2.68 � 10112
1024-bit 1.42 � 10134
Table 6.
Number of steps required to break the (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded cryptosystem.
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At the upper layer, huge key lengths such as 1024 bits and 2048 bits are used to
implement the RSA. Such implementations will greatly compromise throughput at
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ciphertext-only attacks at the physical layer for eavesdropper who could wiretap the
transmitted data. The number of steps, S required to break the new cross-layer
security scheme should be a product of S1 and S2 given as [12].
S ¼ S1: p: q:2
k
p� k� 1�
q:2k
p
� k!
p
� 1
p
� k
2
� �2
� 22
& ’" #N8<:
9=; (13)
Table 7 gives a summary of the number of steps required to break the new
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only attacks for different cascaded stages.
Comparing Tables 5–7, it can be seen that high security levels comparable to the
traditional 1024-bit RSA implemented at the upper layer could be attained using
short operand key lengths of 128 bits and 256 bits for cross-layer security
Operand key length Total number of steps
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implemented at the physical layer. It is worth noting that, the security level could be
much higher compared to the values displayed in Table 7 if the S-boxes were
implemented using 4-bit and 8-bit shuffling instead of the aforementioned 2-bit
shuffling.
6. Data throughput quantification
The data throughput, T could be given as [24].
T ¼ R 1–Peð ÞN (14)
where Pe is the bit error probability, N is the number of bits in the block length
and R is a fixed transmission rate for the frames. For Pe << 1, the throughput could
approximate to
T ffi R 1–NPeð Þ (15)
From (Eq. (15)) it could be seen that, for a fixed transmission rate, R the
throughput, T could be increased by either minimizing N or Pe. In this section, it
will be shown how convolutional coding could be used to achieve both conditions
through orthogonal signaling and forward error correction respectively.
6.1 Coded orthogonal signaling
It is shown in [16, 25] that, for coded orthogonal signaling, the bit error
probability to transmit k-bit symbols is as follows:
Pb≤
2k‐1
2k � 1
� �
∑
2k
3
ad
4 1þ kL γb
� �
2þ kL γb
� �2
" #L
(16)
where ad denotes the number of paths of distance d from the all-zero path which
merge with the all-zero path for the first time and dfree = 3 in this case, is the
minimum distance of the code. dfree is also equal to the diversity, L. γb is the average
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) per bit [25]. For each convolutional code, the transfer
function is obtained and the sum of the coefficients {ad} calculated.
Operand key length Total number of steps
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4
16-bit 2.1 � 1057 9.6 � 1085 4.4 � 10114
32-bit 1.4 � 1057 5.2 � 1085 1.9 � 10114
64-bit 1.5 � 1062 1.8 � 1093 2.3 � 10124
128-bit 6.1 � 1071 4.8 � 10107 3.7 � 10143
256-bit 9.87 � 1087 9.8 � 10131 9.7 � 10175
512-bit 2.68 � 10112 4.4 � 10168 7.2 � 10224
Table 7.
Number of steps required to break the cross-layer security scheme.
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For illustrative purposes, the transfer function, T(D) of smaller convolutional
codes such as (2, 2, 2) and (4, 4, 2) will be used.
The transfer function T(D) for the (2, 2, 2) code is given as follows [16]:
T Dð Þ ¼ D3 þ 2 D4 þ��� (17)
The transfer function for the (4, 4, 2) code is given as follows [16]:
T Dð Þ ¼ D3 þ 2D4 þ 3D5 þ 5D6 þ 9D7 þ 16D8 þ 28D9 þ 49D10 þ 85D11 þ���
(18)
For both the (2, 2, 2) code and the (4, 4, 2) code, dfree = L = 3. Using the values of
L and {ad}, the probability of a binary digit error, Pb as a function of the SNR per bit,
γb is shown in Figure 7 for k = 2 and 4 [16].
The curves illustrate that, the error probability increases with an increase in k
for the same value of SNR. Hence, better performance for wireless transmission
should involve lower order codes and many independent parallel channels rather
than higher order codes with fewer independent parallel channels. Hence, high data
throughput could be attained by using small number of bits in the block length, N.
6.2 Forward error correction (FEC) code
The Viterbi algorithm [25] is the most extensively decoding algorithm for
Convolutional codes and has been widely deployed for forward error correction in
wireless communication systems. In this sub-section Viterbi algorithm will be
applied to the non-linear convolutional code. The constraint length, L for a (n,k,m)
convolutional code is given as L = k(m-1). The constraint length is very essential in
convolutional encoding since a Trellis diagram which gives the best encoding rep-
resentation populates after L bits. Hence to encode blocks of n bits, each block has
to be terminated by L zeros (0 s) before encoding.
Figure 7.
Performance of coded orthogonal signaling for k = 2 and k = 4.
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For illustrative purposes, a non-linear (4,2,3) convolutional code will be used
to demonstrate encoding and Viterbi decoding. A possible non-linear (4,2,3)
convolutional code showing mod-2 connections and the product cipher is shown
in Figure 8.
6.2.1 Example: encode/decode the message M = 10,011
• Encoding process
The constraint length, L = k(m-1) = 2(3–1) = 4.
Hence 4 zeros will be appended to message M before encoding. The modified
message becomes M’ = 10110000. Transition tables in appendix are used to encode
the modified message.
a. Using transition tables in appendix, the transmitted sequence from the 1st
stage is given as Tin = 10 01 01 11
b.S-box output is given as S = 00 11 11 01
c. P-box output is given as P = 00 11 11 10
d.Transmitted sequence into the 2nd stage is given as P = 00 11 11 10
e. Using transition tables in appendix, the final transmitted sequence which is the
output bits from the 2nd stage is given as Tout = 0000 1111 0101 1001
• Viterbi decoding process
In performing the Viterbi algorithm, a bit in the sequence Tout will be altered. Let
the received sequence be TR = 1000 1111 0101 1001 instead of Tout = 0000 1111 0101
1001. The Viterbi algorithm applied to the 2nd stage is summarized in Table 8.
Figure 8.
2-stage non-linear (4,2,3) convolutional code.
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The bits above the arrows will constitute the retrieved sequence from the 2nd
stage. Hence, the retrieved sequence is given as, R1 = 00 11 11 10. This sequence is
fed to the P-box.
• P-box output is given as P1 = 00 11 11 01. Sequence, P1 is fed to the S-box
• S-box output is given as S1 = 10 01 01 11
Sequence, S1 is fed into the 1st stage to retrieve the final correct message. The
Viterbi algorithm applied to the 1st stage is summarized in Table 9.
For a good trellis, the final state is the all-zero state as seen in the winning path in
Table 9. The final received sequence is identical to the original transmitted message
of M’ = Rfinal = 10110000 despite the first bit error. Hence, using the non-linear
convolutional code, the error bit was identified and corrected. The forward error
correction capability will therefore enhance throughput, since the bit error rate, Pe
is reduced.
Table 8.
Viterbi algorithm applied to 2nd stage of (4,2,3) code.
Table 9.
Viterbi algorithm applied to 1st stage of (4,2,3) code.
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7. Security attacks in wireless networks
Most attacks in wireless networks are classified into two categories: passive and
active. Passive attacks such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis do not interfere
with normal network operations as opposed to active attacks. Some of the attacks
could be circumvented by the cross-layer security scheme presented in this research
due to the following characteristics inherent in its implementation:
• RSA cryptographic algorithm at the upper layer: Table 3 summarized the
security services, which could be achieved by implementing RSA cryptography
such as authentication, non-repudiation and confidentiality. These services are
essential network security requirements which are vital in curbing attacks such
as eavesdropping, masquerade attack and information disclosure since there
will be a possibility of not attaining the final all-zero state if message is
modified.
• Convolutional cryptosystem at the physical layer: The different keys generated
are essential in ensuring confidentiality while the forward error correction
capability is essential in curbing message modification attack.
Other attacks such as denial of service and replay attack could be circumvented
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phy at the upper layers. By using RSA cryptography, the scheme could be used in
encryption, authentication and non-repudiation with efficient key management as
opposed to existing schemes, which had poor key management for large wireless
networks since their implementation, was based on symmetric encryption tech-
niques. Results show that, the new algorithm exhibits high security level for key
sizes of 64, 128 and 256 bits when using three or more convolutional-cascaded
stages. The security level is far above the traditional 1024-bit RSA which is already
vulnerable. The vulnerability of 1024-bit RSA has led to the proposal of
implementing higher levels such as 2048-bit and 4096-bit. These high level RSA
schemes when implemented will greatly compromise throughput due to modular
exponentiation. Hence the usefulness of a scheme such as the one presented in this
chapter. In addition, Viterbi algorithm was performed for the new non-linear
convolutional code in order to highlight the error correction capability. It was
shown that, by using error correction codes on many small block lengths compared
to one huge block length, throughput increases. Hence non-linear convolutional
code is very critical in the implementation of the new scheme, since it contributes in
enhancing both security and throughput. The entire scheme could be implemented
at different access points in a wireless network since it fits in a single FPGA. Finally,
the new cross-layer security scheme is essential in circumventing some attacks in
wireless and computer networks.
30
Computer and Network Security
A. Appendix: transition tables
Author details
Michael Ekonde Sone
College of Technology, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon
*Address all correspondence to: michael.sone@ubuea.cm
©2018 TheAuthor(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms
of theCreativeCommonsAttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0),which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in anymedium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
31
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82390
7. Security attacks in wireless networks
Most attacks in wireless networks are classified into two categories: passive and
active. Passive attacks such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis do not interfere
with normal network operations as opposed to active attacks. Some of the attacks
could be circumvented by the cross-layer security scheme presented in this research
due to the following characteristics inherent in its implementation:
• RSA cryptographic algorithm at the upper layer: Table 3 summarized the
security services, which could be achieved by implementing RSA cryptography
such as authentication, non-repudiation and confidentiality. These services are
essential network security requirements which are vital in curbing attacks such
as eavesdropping, masquerade attack and information disclosure since there
will be a possibility of not attaining the final all-zero state if message is
modified.
• Convolutional cryptosystem at the physical layer: The different keys generated
are essential in ensuring confidentiality while the forward error correction
capability is essential in curbing message modification attack.
Other attacks such as denial of service and replay attack could be circumvented
if the cross-layer security scheme is associated with Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP).
8. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have described a new cross-layer security scheme which has
the advantage of enhancing both security and throughput as opposed to existing
schemes which either enhances security or throughput but not both. The new
scheme is implemented using the residue number system (RNS), non-linear
convolutional coding and subband coding at the physical layer and RSA cryptogra-
phy at the upper layers. By using RSA cryptography, the scheme could be used in
encryption, authentication and non-repudiation with efficient key management as
opposed to existing schemes, which had poor key management for large wireless
networks since their implementation, was based on symmetric encryption tech-
niques. Results show that, the new algorithm exhibits high security level for key
sizes of 64, 128 and 256 bits when using three or more convolutional-cascaded
stages. The security level is far above the traditional 1024-bit RSA which is already
vulnerable. The vulnerability of 1024-bit RSA has led to the proposal of
implementing higher levels such as 2048-bit and 4096-bit. These high level RSA
schemes when implemented will greatly compromise throughput due to modular
exponentiation. Hence the usefulness of a scheme such as the one presented in this
chapter. In addition, Viterbi algorithm was performed for the new non-linear
convolutional code in order to highlight the error correction capability. It was
shown that, by using error correction codes on many small block lengths compared
to one huge block length, throughput increases. Hence non-linear convolutional
code is very critical in the implementation of the new scheme, since it contributes in
enhancing both security and throughput. The entire scheme could be implemented
at different access points in a wireless network since it fits in a single FPGA. Finally,
the new cross-layer security scheme is essential in circumventing some attacks in
wireless and computer networks.
30
Computer and Network Security
A. Appendix: transition tables
Author details
Michael Ekonde Sone
College of Technology, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon
*Address all correspondence to: michael.sone@ubuea.cm
©2018 TheAuthor(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms
of theCreativeCommonsAttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0),which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in anymedium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
31
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82390
References
[1] Patterson W, Sone ME. A metric to
assess cyberattacks. In: Proceedings of
the AHFE 2018 International
Conference on Human Factors in
Cybersecurity; AISC 782; Florida, USA.
2018. pp. 33-43
[2] Guo C, Chang C-C, Chang S-C.
A secure and effcient mutual
authentication and key agreement
protocol with smart cards for wireless
communications. International Journal
of Network Security. 2018;20(02):
323-331
[3] Bloch M et al. Wireless information-
theoretic security. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory. 2008:2515-2534
[4] Wyner AD. The wire-tap channel.
Bell System Technical Journal. October
1975;54(8):1355-1387
[5] Lin F, Oggier F. Coding for wiretap
channels. In: Physical Layer Security in
Wireless Communications. Auerbach
Publications, CRC Press, Taylor &
Francis Group. 2013
[6] Shui Y-S, Cheng SY, Wu H-C, Huang
SC-H, Chen H-H. Physical Layer
Security in Wireless Networks:
A Tutorial. IEEE Wireless
Communications; April 2011
[7] Rosario BBD, Rajaram A. CDMA
based secure cross layer framework for
authentication and scheduling in
MANET. Journal of Theoretical and
Applied Information Technology.
November 2014
[8] Babu KS, Chandrasekharaiah K.
Cross layer based security in MANET.
International Journal of Advanced
Research in Computer Science. May
2013;4(5) Special issue
[9] Rajaram A, Palaniswami S. A trust-
based cross-layer security protocol for
Mobile ad hoc networks. (IJCSIS)
International Journal of Computer
Science and Information Security. 2009;
6(1)
[10] Uytterhoeven G, Van Wulpen F,
Jansen M, Roose D, Bultheel A. WAILLI:
Wavelets with integer lifting. In:
Technical Report TW 262. Leuven:
Department of Computer Science,
Kaththolieke Universiteit Leuven; 1997
[11] Sweldens W. The lifting scheme:
A construction of second generation
wavelets. SIAM Journal on Mathematical
Analysis. 1997;29(2). Preprint 1996
[12] Sone ME. Efficient key management
scheme to enhance security-throughput
trade-off performance in wireless
networks. In: Proceeding of Science and
Information Conference (SAI); July
28-30 2015; London, UK. 2015.
pp. 1249-1256
[13] Daubechies I, Sweldens W.
Factoring wavelet transforms into
lifting steps. Journal of Fourier
Analysis and Applications. 1998;4(3).
Preprint
[14] Mashen MJ. Factoring wavelet
transforms into lifting steps. In: 1997
Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2004),
vol. 2; University of Australia. 2004.
pp. 667-700
[15] Ningo NN, Sone ME. Efficient key
management FPGA-based cryptosystem
using the RNS and iterative coding.
International Journal of Information and
Communication Technology. 2010;2(4):
302-322
[16] Sone ME, Ningo NN. A simple
FPGA-based wireless transmitter/
receiver convolutional cryptosystem.
International Journal of Computers and
Applications;33, 2:2011
[17] Yang LL, Hanzo L. Redundant
residue number system based error
32
Computer and Network Security
correction codes. In: Proceedings of
IEEE VTC’01 (Fall); October; Atlantic
City, NJ. 2001. pp. 1472-1476
[18] Soderstrand M, Jenkins W, Jullien
GA, Taylor FJ. Residue Number System
Arithmetic: Modern Applications in
Digital Signal Processing, IEEE Press
Reprint Series. IEEE Press; 1986
[19] Mashen MJ. Factoring wavelet
transforms into lifting steps. In: 1997
Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2004),
vol. 2; University of Australia. 2004.
pp. 667-700
[20] Yang L-L, Hanzo L. Performance
analysis of coded M-ary orthogonal
signaling using errors-and-erasures
decoding over frequency selective
fading channels. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications. Feb.
2001;19:211-221
[21] Geadah YA, Corinthios MJG.
Natural, dyadic, and sequency order
algorithms and processors for the
Walsh-Hadamard transforms. IEEE
Transactions on Computers. May 1977;
26(5):435-442
[22] Cohen B. VHDL coding styles and
methodologies. In: An In-Depth
Tutorial. 2nd ed. Massachusetts, USA:
Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2001
[23] Lenstra A, Lenstra HW Jr . The
Development of the Number Field
Sieve. Lecture Notes in Mathematics,
vol. 1554. Springer-Verlag; 1994
[24] Haleem MA, Mathur CN,
Chandramouli R, Subbalakshmi KP.
Opportunistic encryption: A trade-off
between security and throughput in
wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing.
October-December 2007;4(4)
[25] Proakis J. Digital Communications.
4th ed. NewYork:McGraw-Hill; 2001
33
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82390
References
[1] Patterson W, Sone ME. A metric to
assess cyberattacks. In: Proceedings of
the AHFE 2018 International
Conference on Human Factors in
Cybersecurity; AISC 782; Florida, USA.
2018. pp. 33-43
[2] Guo C, Chang C-C, Chang S-C.
A secure and effcient mutual
authentication and key agreement
protocol with smart cards for wireless
communications. International Journal
of Network Security. 2018;20(02):
323-331
[3] Bloch M et al. Wireless information-
theoretic security. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory. 2008:2515-2534
[4] Wyner AD. The wire-tap channel.
Bell System Technical Journal. October
1975;54(8):1355-1387
[5] Lin F, Oggier F. Coding for wiretap
channels. In: Physical Layer Security in
Wireless Communications. Auerbach
Publications, CRC Press, Taylor &
Francis Group. 2013
[6] Shui Y-S, Cheng SY, Wu H-C, Huang
SC-H, Chen H-H. Physical Layer
Security in Wireless Networks:
A Tutorial. IEEE Wireless
Communications; April 2011
[7] Rosario BBD, Rajaram A. CDMA
based secure cross layer framework for
authentication and scheduling in
MANET. Journal of Theoretical and
Applied Information Technology.
November 2014
[8] Babu KS, Chandrasekharaiah K.
Cross layer based security in MANET.
International Journal of Advanced
Research in Computer Science. May
2013;4(5) Special issue
[9] Rajaram A, Palaniswami S. A trust-
based cross-layer security protocol for
Mobile ad hoc networks. (IJCSIS)
International Journal of Computer
Science and Information Security. 2009;
6(1)
[10] Uytterhoeven G, Van Wulpen F,
Jansen M, Roose D, Bultheel A. WAILLI:
Wavelets with integer lifting. In:
Technical Report TW 262. Leuven:
Department of Computer Science,
Kaththolieke Universiteit Leuven; 1997
[11] Sweldens W. The lifting scheme:
A construction of second generation
wavelets. SIAM Journal on Mathematical
Analysis. 1997;29(2). Preprint 1996
[12] Sone ME. Efficient key management
scheme to enhance security-throughput
trade-off performance in wireless
networks. In: Proceeding of Science and
Information Conference (SAI); July
28-30 2015; London, UK. 2015.
pp. 1249-1256
[13] Daubechies I, Sweldens W.
Factoring wavelet transforms into
lifting steps. Journal of Fourier
Analysis and Applications. 1998;4(3).
Preprint
[14] Mashen MJ. Factoring wavelet
transforms into lifting steps. In: 1997
Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2004),
vol. 2; University of Australia. 2004.
pp. 667-700
[15] Ningo NN, Sone ME. Efficient key
management FPGA-based cryptosystem
using the RNS and iterative coding.
International Journal of Information and
Communication Technology. 2010;2(4):
302-322
[16] Sone ME, Ningo NN. A simple
FPGA-based wireless transmitter/
receiver convolutional cryptosystem.
International Journal of Computers and
Applications;33, 2:2011
[17] Yang LL, Hanzo L. Redundant
residue number system based error
32
Computer and Network Security
correction codes. In: Proceedings of
IEEE VTC’01 (Fall); October; Atlantic
City, NJ. 2001. pp. 1472-1476
[18] Soderstrand M, Jenkins W, Jullien
GA, Taylor FJ. Residue Number System
Arithmetic: Modern Applications in
Digital Signal Processing, IEEE Press
Reprint Series. IEEE Press; 1986
[19] Mashen MJ. Factoring wavelet
transforms into lifting steps. In: 1997
Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2004),
vol. 2; University of Australia. 2004.
pp. 667-700
[20] Yang L-L, Hanzo L. Performance
analysis of coded M-ary orthogonal
signaling using errors-and-erasures
decoding over frequency selective
fading channels. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications. Feb.
2001;19:211-221
[21] Geadah YA, Corinthios MJG.
Natural, dyadic, and sequency order
algorithms and processors for the
Walsh-Hadamard transforms. IEEE
Transactions on Computers. May 1977;
26(5):435-442
[22] Cohen B. VHDL coding styles and
methodologies. In: An In-Depth
Tutorial. 2nd ed. Massachusetts, USA:
Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2001
[23] Lenstra A, Lenstra HW Jr . The
Development of the Number Field
Sieve. Lecture Notes in Mathematics,
vol. 1554. Springer-Verlag; 1994
[24] Haleem MA, Mathur CN,
Chandramouli R, Subbalakshmi KP.
Opportunistic encryption: A trade-off
between security and throughput in
wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing.
October-December 2007;4(4)
[25] Proakis J. Digital Communications.
4th ed. NewYork:McGraw-Hill; 2001
33
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82390
Chapter 3
Anomaly-Based Intrusion
Detection System
Veeramreddy Jyothsna and Koneti Munivara Prasad
Abstract
Anomaly-based network intrusion detection plays a vital role in protecting net-
works against malicious activities. In recent years, data mining techniques have
gained importance in addressing security issues in network. Intrusion detection
systems (IDS) aim to identify intrusions with a low false alarm rate and a high
detection rate. Although classification-based data mining techniques are popular,
they are not effective to detect unknown attacks. Unsupervised learning methods
have been given a closer look for network IDS, which are insignificant to detect
dynamic intrusion activities. The recent contributions in literature focus on
machine learning techniques to build anomaly-based intrusion detection systems,
which extract the knowledge from training phase. Though existing intrusion detec-
tion techniques address the latest types of attacks like DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L,
reducing false alarm rate is a challenging issue. Most network IDS depend on the
deployed environment. Hence, developing a system which is independent of the
deployed environment with fast and appropriate feature selection method is a
challenging issue. The exponential growth of zero-day attacks emphasizing the
need of security mechanisms which can accurately detect previously unknown
attacks is another challenging task. In this work, an attempt is made to develop
generic meta-heuristic scale for both known and unknown attacks with a high
detection rate and low false alarm rate by adopting efficient feature optimization
techniques.
Keywords: intrusion detection, data mining, classification based, DoS, Probe, U2R,
R2L, false alarm rate, zero-day attacks
1. Introduction
1.1 Internet security
Today, the world has numerous inventions and technological developments with
proliferation of the Internet. Advances in business forced the organizations and
governments worldwide to invent and use sophisticated and modern networks.
These networks mix a variety of security aspects such as encryption, data integrity,
authentication, and technologies like distributed storage systems, voice over Inter-
net protocol (VoIP), wireless access, and web services.
Enterprises are more available to these systems. For instance, numerous business
associations enable access to their administration on the system through intranet
and web to their partners; endeavors empower clients to connect with the systems
by means of web-based business exchanges that enable representatives to get to
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data by methods for virtual private systems. This usage makes it more vulnerable to
attacks and intrusions. A security threat comes not only from the external intruders
but also from internal user in the form of abuse and misuse. A firewall simply blocks
the network but cannot protect against intrusion attempts. In contrast, intrusion
detection system (IDS) can monitor the abnormal activities on the network.
1.2 Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
Intrusion detection systems play a vital role in research and development with
an increase in attacks on computers and networks [1]. Intrusion detection systems
monitor the events occurring in a computer system or networks for analyzing the
patterns of intrusions. IDS examine a host or network to spot the potential intru-
sions. Host-based systems explore the system calls and process identifiers mainly
related to the operating system data. On the other hand, network-based systems
analyze network-related events like traffic volume, IP address, service ports, and
protocol used. Intrusion detection systems will
i. analyze and monitor the system and user activities;
ii. assess the integrity of critical system and data files; and
iii. provide statistical analysis of activity patterns.
1.3 Taxonomy of intrusion detection systems
The intrusion detection systems are broadly classified as
i. misuse detection systems and
ii. anomaly-based detection systems.
1.3.1 Misuse detection systems
A misuse detection system is also called as signature-based detection that uses
recognized patterns [2]. These patterns describe suspect, collection of sequences of
activities or operations that can be possibly be harmful and stored in database. It
uses well-defined patterns of the attack that exploits the weaknesses in system. The
time taken to match with the patterns stored in the database is minimal. A key
benefit of these systems is that the patterns or signatures can easily develop and
understand the network behavior if familiar. It is more efficient to handle the
attacks whose patterns are already maintained in the database.
The major restriction of these signature-based approaches is that they can only
detect the intrusions whose attack patterns are already stored in the database. For
every attack, its signature is to be created. Attacks whose patterns are not present in
the database cannot be detected. Such technique can be easily deceived as they are
dependent on a specific set of expressions and string matching. In addition, the
signature works well only against fixed behavioral patterns; they fail to handle the
attacks with human interference or attacks with inherent self-modifying behavioral
characteristics.
These detection systems are also ineffective in cases where client works on new
technology platforms such as no operation (NoP) generators, encoding, and
decoding payloads. The efficiency of the signature-based systems decreases due to
the need of creating dynamic signatures for different variations. With growing
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volume of signatures, the performance of the engine also might lose the momen-
tum. Because of this, intrusion detection frameworks are conducted on multipro-
cessors and Gigabit cards. IDS developers develop new signatures before the
attackers develop solutions, in order to prevent any new kind of attacks on the
system.
1.3.2 Anomaly-based detection systems
Network behavior is the major parameter on which the anomaly detection sys-
tems rely upon. If the network behavior is within the predefined behavior, then the
network transaction is accepted or else it triggers the alert in the anomaly detection
system [3]. Acceptable network performance can be either predetermined or
learned through specifications or conditions defined by the network administrator.
The crucial stage of behavior determination is regarding the ability of detection
system engine toward multiple protocols at each level. The IDS engine must be able
to understand the process of protocols and its goal. Despite the fact that the protocol
analysis is very expensive in terms of computation, the benefits like increasing rule
set assist in lesser levels of false-positive alarms.
Defining the rule sets is one of the key drawbacks of anomaly-based detection.
The efficiency of the system depends on the effective implementation and testing of
rule sets on all the protocols. In addition, a variety of protocols that are used by
different vendors impact the rule defining the process.
In addition to the aforesaid, custom protocols also add complexity to the
process of rule defining. For accurate detection, the administration should clearly
understand the acceptable network behavior. However, with strong incorporation
of rules and protocol, the anomaly detection procedure would likely to perform
more efficiently.
However, if the malicious behavior falls under the accepted behavior, in such
conditions it might get unnoticed. The major benefit of the anomaly-based detec-
tion system is about the scope for detection of novel attacks. This type of intrusion
detection approach could also be feasible, even if the lack of signature patterns
matches and also works in the condition that is beyond regular patterns of traffic.
2. Network intrusion detection systems framework
In Figure 1, common intrusion detection framework (CIDF) integrated with
Internet Engineering Tasks Force (IETF) and Intrusion Detection Working Group
(IDWG) has successfully achieved efficient performance in representing the
framework. This group defines a basic IDS structural design based on four func-
tional modules.
Event modules (E-Modules) are defined as a combination of sensing elements and
are engaged in continuous monitoring of the end system. In addition, these modules
are also involved in processing the information events to the bottom three modules
for further analysis.
Analysis modules (A-Modules) analyze the events and detect probable aggressive
behavior, in order to ensure that some kind of alarm generated in essential
conditions.
Data storage modules (D-modules) store the data from the E-Modules for further
processing by the other modules.
Response modules (R-Modules) are used to provide the response to the transac-
tions based on the information obtained from the analysis module.
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Figure 2 represent the Common anomaly-based network IDS. The functional
stages normally adopted in the anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems
(ANIDS) are as follows:
Formation of attributes: In this stage, preprocessing of the attributes is done based
on the target system.
Observation stage: A model that is built on the basis of behavioral features of the
specified system where observations of intrusions can be carried out either through
automatically or by manual detection procedure.
Functional stage: It is also called as detection stage. If the characterizing system
model is available, it will match with the observed traffic.
3. Anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques
Figure 3 represents the taxonomy of anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques.
They are statistical based, cognitive based or knowledge based,machine learning or soft
Figure 1.
Common intrusion detection framework architecture.
Figure 2.
Common anomaly-based network IDS.
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computing based, data mining based, user intention identification, and computer
immunology.
3.1 Statistical-based techniques
Statistical-based techniques use statistical properties such as mean and variance
on normal transaction to build the normal profile [4]. The statistical tests are
employed to determine whether the observed transaction deviates from the normal
profile. The IDS assigns a score to the transactions whose profile deviates from the
normal. If the score reaches the threshold, alarm is raised. The threshold value is set
based on count of events that occur over a period of time.
Statistical-based techniques are further classified into operational model or
threshold metric, time series model, Markov process model or Marker model, para-
metric approaches, statistical moments or mean and standard deviation model,
multivariate model, and nonparametric approaches.
The main advantages of statistical-based techniques are as follows:
i. They do not require any prior knowledge about the signatures of the attacks.
So, they can detect zero-day attacks.
ii. As the system is not depended on any of the signatures, updating is not
required. Hence it is easy to maintain.
iii. The intrusion activities that were occurred over extended period of time can
be identified accurately and are good at detecting DoS attacks.
The disadvantages of statistical-based techniques are as follows:
i. They need accurate statistical distributions.
ii. The learning process of statistical-based techniques takes days or weeks to
become accurate and effective.
Figure 3.
Classification of anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques.
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3.2 Cognitive-based or knowledge-based techniques
Knowledge-based techniques are used to extract the knowledge from the spe-
cific attacks and system vulnerabilities. This knowledge can be further used to
identify the intrusions or attacks happening in the network or system. They gener-
ate alarm as soon as an attack is detected. They can be used for both misuse and
anomaly-based detection [5].
The knowledge-based techniques are broadly classified as state transition analy-
sis, expert systems, and signature analysis.
The knowledge-based techniques possess good accuracy and very low false
alarm rates. The knowledge gathered makes security analyst easier to take preven-
tive or corrective action.
The knowledge-based techniques are maintaining the knowledge of each attack
based on the careful and detailed analysis performed; it is a time-consuming task. A
prior knowledge to update the each attack is a difficult task.
3.3 Data mining-based techniques
The knowledge-based IDS can detect the attacks whose patterns are known, but
it is difficult to detect the inside attacks. One of the solutions is data mining
techniques. The core idea is to extract the useful patterns and also the previously
ignored patterns from the dataset [6].
The data mining-based techniques are further classified into clustering, associa-
tion rule discovery, classification, K-nearest neighbor, and decision tree methods.
The key advantages of data mining-based techniques are as follows:
i. They can handle high dimensional data.
ii. As the precomputed models are designed in the training phase, comparing
each instance at the testing phase can be done in faster way.
iii. They can generate the patterns in unsupervised mode.
The key disadvantages of data mining-based techniques are as follows:
i. These methods identify abnormalities as a by-product of clustering and as
are not optimized for anomaly detection.
ii. They require high storage and are slow in classifying due to high
dimensionality.
3.4 Machine learning or soft computing-based techniques
Machine learning can be characterized as the capacity of a program or poten-
tially a framework to learn and improve their performance on a specific task or
group of tasks over a time [7]. Machine learning strategies emphasize on building a
framework that enhances its execution based on previous results, that is, it can
change their execution strategy based on recently acquired data.
Machine learning-based techniques are broadly classified as Bayesian
approaches, support vector machines, neural networks, fuzzy logic, and genetic
algorithms. Their key advantage is flexibility, adaptability, and capture of
interdependencies. The disadvantage is high algorithmic complexity and long
training times.
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3.5 User intention identification
Intrusion detection system can be built based on the features that categorize the
user or the system usage, to distinguish the abnormal activities from normal activ-
ities. During the early investigation of anomaly detection, the main emphasis was
on profiling system or user behavior from monitored system log or accounting log
data. The log data or system log may contain UNIX shell commands, system calls,
key strokes, audit events, and network packages used.
3.6 Computer immunology
Computer immunology is a field of science that includes high-throughput geno-
mic and bioinformatics approaches to immunology. The main objective is to con-
vert immunological data into computational problems, solve these problems using
statistical and computational approaches, and then convert the results into immu-
nologically meaningful interpretations.
4. NSL-KDD dataset
The NSL-KDD [8] dataset is a refined version of its predecessor KDD99 dataset.
NSL-KDD dataset comprises close to 4,900,000 unique connection vectors, where
every connection vector consists of 41 features of which 34 are continuous features
and 07 are discrete features. Each vector is labeled as either normal or attack. There
are four major categories of attacks labeled in NSL-KDD: denial of service attack,
probing attack, users-to-root attack, and remote-to-local attack.
i. Denial of service attack (DoS): Denial of service is an attack category, which
exhausts the victim’s assets, thereby making it unable to handle legitimate
requests. Examples of DoS attacks are “teardrop,” “neptune,” “ping of death
(pod),” “mail bomb,” “back,” “smurf,” and “land.”
ii. Probing attack (PROBE): Objective of surveillance and other probing
attacks is to gain information about the remote victim. Examples of probing
attacks are “nmap,” “satan,” “ipsweep,” and “portsweep.”
iii. Users-to-root attack (U2R): The attacker enters into the local system by
using the authorized credentials of the victim user and tries to exploit the
vulnerabilities to gain the administrator privileges. Examples of U2R attacks
are “load module,” “buffer overflow,” “rootkit,” and “perl.”
iv. Remote-to-local attack (R2L): The attackers access the targeted system or
network from the remote machine and try to gain the local access of the
victim machine. Examples of R2L attacks are “phf,” “warezmaster,”
“warezclient,” “spy,” “imap,” “ftp write,” “multihop,” and “guess passwd.”
5. Issues and challenges in anomaly-based intrusion detection systems
Although many methods and systems have been developed by the research
community, there are still a number of open research issues and challenges. Some of
the research issues and challenges of AIDS are as follows:
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i. A network anomaly-based IDS should reduce the false alarm rate. But, totally
mitigating the false alarm is not possible. Developing an intrusion detection
system independent of the environment is another challenge task for the
network anomaly-based intrusion detection system development
community [9–13].
ii. Developing a general methodology or a set of parameters that can be used to
evaluate the intrusion detection system is another challenging task [12, 13].
iii. When new patterns are identified in ANIDS, updating the database without
compromise of performance is another challenging task [9, 13].
iv. Another task to be addressed is to reduce the computational complexities of
data preprocessing in the training phase and also in the deployment phase
[9, 10].
v. Developing a suitable method for selecting the attributes for each category of
attack is another important task [9–11].
vi. Identifying a best classifier from a group of classifiers that is nonassociated
and unbiased to build an effective ensemble approach for anomaly detection
is another challenge [9–11].
6. Feature optimization using canonical correlation analysis
The preprocessed set of network transactions are partitioned based on its label-
ing (“normal” transactions as one set, “DoS” transactions as the other set and
similar other range of sets). Unique values of each feature value set f iv NTSð Þ in the
resultant normal transactions set (NTS) and its percentage of coverage are:
f iv ¼ f i v1; c1ð Þ; f i v2; c2ð Þ; f i v3; c3ð Þ; f i v4; c4ð Þ; ::…………; f i vj; cj
  
(1)
The procedure for feature optimization for each attack Ak is as follows:
i. Consider the transactions set ts Akð Þ denoting attack type Ak (as an example
considers DoS as an attack).
ii. For every feature f i Akð Þ, consider all the values as a set f iv Akð Þ. An empty set
f iv of size ∣f iv Akð Þ∣ is created and fills it based on its coverage as
∣f iv Akð Þ∣ ffi ∣f iv∣, in which ∣f iv Akð Þ∣ denotes the size of the feature values set
off i Akð Þ.
iii. The process is used to generate the feature values vector f iv of the NTS, such
that f iv is compatible to the “f iv Akð Þ” toward size and that also represents
the coverage ratio of the values in f iv NTSð Þ.
iv. The process is applied for all feature values set in network transactions of
attack Ak.
v. Find the canonical correlation between f iv Akð Þ and f iv. If the resultant
canonical correlation is less than the threshold or zero, then the feature
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f i Akð Þ can be considered as optimal toward assessing the scale of intrusion
scope.
It is imperative from the implementation of the above procedure that optimal
features of a specific attack Ak can be identified. Further, the optimal features are
ordered using the canonical correlation values. The values with lower than thresh-
old are considered as optional set of features. Reducing the features leads to lesser
computational complexities to the minimal level. The optimal features shall be used
for further assessing the impact scale intrusion of type Ak.
7. Feature association impact scale (FAIS)
The approach for measuring the proposed feature association support fasð Þ met-
ric considers the network transaction of the training dataset. The feature categorical
values used in the network transactions are in the form of two independent sets.
These values are used to develop a duplex graph between them.
7.1 Assumptions
Let f1; f2; f3; :……fn∀f i ¼ f iv1; f iv2; :………; f ivm

be the set of categorical fea-
tures values used for forming the set of network transactions T. Here T is a set of
network transaction records of the given training set such as:
T ¼ t1; t2; t3; :……tn∀ti ¼ val f 1
 
, val f 2
 
, ::…val f i
 
, val f iþ1
 
,……val f n
 gg
(2)
Categorical values of the set of features related to every network transaction
shall be considered as transaction value set tvs and all transaction value sets are
treated as “STVS.”
In the description above in Eq. 2, val f i
 
can be expressed as
val f i
 
∈ f iv1; f iv2;……; f ivm

. The term “feature” refers to the current categorical
value of the feature. The two features “val f i
 
” and “val f j
 
,” “val f i
 
” are
connected with “val f j
 
” if and only if val f i
 
; val f j
  
∈ tvsk.
7.2 Algorithm for FAIS technique
Step 1: The edge weight between the features val f 1
 
and val f 2
 
is estimated as:
w val f 1
 $ val f 2   ¼ ctvs∣STVS∣ (3)
Step 2: The edge weight between transaction value sets and its corresponding
set of feature categorical values can be measured as:
E ¼ tvsi; valj
 
: valj ∈ tvsi; tvsi ∈ STVS; valj ∈ v
 
(4)
Step 3: Further assuming the transaction value sets of the given duplex graph as
pivots and the feature categorical values as pure prerogatives, the pivot and
prerogative values are measured.
Step 3.1: Consider matrix u, which denotes pivot initial value as 1.
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prerogative values are measured.
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Step 3.2: Transpose the matrix A as A0.
Step 3.3: Calculate prerogative weights by multiplying A0 with u.
Step 3.4: Calculate original pivot weights using matrix multiplication between
A and V.
Step 4: Calculate the feature categorical value fas of f ivj as:
fas f ivj
� � ¼ ∑∣STVS∣k¼1 u tvskð Þ : f ivj ! tvsk� � 6¼ 0� �
∑∣STVS∣k¼1 u tvskð Þ
(5)
Step 5: the Feature Association Impact Scale fais for every transaction value set
tvsi is estimated as:
fais tvsið Þ ¼ 1�
∑mj¼1 fas valj∃valj ∈V
� �� �
: valj⊂tvsi
� �� �
∣tvsi∣
(6)
Step 6: The Feature Association Impact Scale threshold faist can be measured as:
faist ¼ ∑
∣STVS∣
i¼1 fais tvsið Þ
∣STVS∣
(7)
Step 7: Calculate the standard deviation as:
sdvfaist ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑∣STVS∣i¼1 fais tvsið Þ � faist2
� �
jSTVSj � 1ð Þ
vuut
(8)
Step 8: The Feature Association Impact Scale range can be explored as Step 8.1
and Step 8.2:
Step 8.1: Calculate lower threshold of faist as faistl ¼ faist� sdvfaist.
Step 8.2: Calculate higher threshold of faist as faisth ¼ faistþ sdvfaist.
8. Analysis of experimental results
The total number of records chosen for the test is 25% of the actual dataset, that
is, 34,361. The combination of test records chosen is from various categories such as
Probe, DoS, U2R, R2L, and Normal. The difference between CC average and stan-
dard deviation of CC is called as lower bound of CC threshold. The sum of CC
average and standard deviation of CC is called as upper bound of CC threshold.
The records that identified to be normal are 19.8% of the total test data records,
with observations of 4.7% of it as “false negatives” and 15.1% of it as “true nega-
tives.” The cumulative number of records that are detected as “intruded transac-
tions” is 80.2%, with 75.3% of them being “truly intruded transactions” of test data
records and the “false positive” percentage of 4.9% of test data records.
As per the results obtained, the proposed model is found to be accurate up to
90.4%. The experiments are conducted on the same dataset using “anomaly-based
network intrusion detection through assessing Feature Association Impact Scale
(FAIS)” [14]. The results depict that the proposed model is also scalable and
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effective for detecting the scope of intrusion from a network transaction. Despite
the fact that the FAIS model proposed shows 88% accuracy, the major limitation is
process complexity in training the system. Such process complexities of designing
the scale using FAIS are due to the number of features selected for assessing the
scale. The issue of selecting the optimal features for training the Intrusion
Detection System using Association Impact Scale is significantly addressed in the
FCAAIS [15] model.
Table 1 indicates the comparison of performance metrics such as precision,
recall/sensitivity, specificity, accuracy, and F-measure of FCAAIS over FAIS.
Figure 4 indicates that the accuracy of FCAAIS with optimal features is 91%,
whereas the FAIS accuracy with all features is 88%. The precision of the FCAAIS
model with optimal features and FAIS with all features is 92%. The other perfor-
mance metrics such as sensitivity, specificity, and F-measure is calculated on
FCAAIS over FAIS. The sensitivity, specificity, and F-measure are 96, 49, and 95%,
respectively, for FCAAIS, whereas sensitivity, specificity, and F-measure are 95, 46,
and 91%, respectively, for FAIS.
FCAAIS FAIS
Total number of records tested 34,361 34,361
TP (true positive) The number of transactions identified as normal,
which are actually normal
29,379 27,889
FP (false positive) The number of transactions identified as normal,
which are actually intruded
1968 2752
TN (true negative) The number of transactions identified as
intruded, which are actually intruded
1901 2375
FN (false negative) The number of transactions identified as
intruded, which are actually normal
1113 1345
Precision TP/(TP + FP) 0.937218873 0.910185699
Recall/sensitivity TP/(TP + FN) 0.963498623 0.953991927
Specificity TN/(FP + TN) 0.491341432 0.46323386
Accuracy (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN) 0.910334391 0.880765985
F-measure 2  (PRECISION  RECALL)/
(PRECISION + RECALL)
0.951646837 0.91131588
Table 1.
Comparison of performance metrics of FCAAIS and FAIS.
Figure 4.
The performance metrics observed for FCAAIS over FAIS.
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∑∣STVS∣i¼1 fais tvsið Þ � faist2
� �
jSTVSj � 1ð Þ
vuut
(8)
Step 8: The Feature Association Impact Scale range can be explored as Step 8.1
and Step 8.2:
Step 8.1: Calculate lower threshold of faist as faistl ¼ faist� sdvfaist.
Step 8.2: Calculate higher threshold of faist as faisth ¼ faistþ sdvfaist.
8. Analysis of experimental results
The total number of records chosen for the test is 25% of the actual dataset, that
is, 34,361. The combination of test records chosen is from various categories such as
Probe, DoS, U2R, R2L, and Normal. The difference between CC average and stan-
dard deviation of CC is called as lower bound of CC threshold. The sum of CC
average and standard deviation of CC is called as upper bound of CC threshold.
The records that identified to be normal are 19.8% of the total test data records,
with observations of 4.7% of it as “false negatives” and 15.1% of it as “true nega-
tives.” The cumulative number of records that are detected as “intruded transac-
tions” is 80.2%, with 75.3% of them being “truly intruded transactions” of test data
records and the “false positive” percentage of 4.9% of test data records.
As per the results obtained, the proposed model is found to be accurate up to
90.4%. The experiments are conducted on the same dataset using “anomaly-based
network intrusion detection through assessing Feature Association Impact Scale
(FAIS)” [14]. The results depict that the proposed model is also scalable and
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effective for detecting the scope of intrusion from a network transaction. Despite
the fact that the FAIS model proposed shows 88% accuracy, the major limitation is
process complexity in training the system. Such process complexities of designing
the scale using FAIS are due to the number of features selected for assessing the
scale. The issue of selecting the optimal features for training the Intrusion
Detection System using Association Impact Scale is significantly addressed in the
FCAAIS [15] model.
Table 1 indicates the comparison of performance metrics such as precision,
recall/sensitivity, specificity, accuracy, and F-measure of FCAAIS over FAIS.
Figure 4 indicates that the accuracy of FCAAIS with optimal features is 91%,
whereas the FAIS accuracy with all features is 88%. The precision of the FCAAIS
model with optimal features and FAIS with all features is 92%. The other perfor-
mance metrics such as sensitivity, specificity, and F-measure is calculated on
FCAAIS over FAIS. The sensitivity, specificity, and F-measure are 96, 49, and 95%,
respectively, for FCAAIS, whereas sensitivity, specificity, and F-measure are 95, 46,
and 91%, respectively, for FAIS.
FCAAIS FAIS
Total number of records tested 34,361 34,361
TP (true positive) The number of transactions identified as normal,
which are actually normal
29,379 27,889
FP (false positive) The number of transactions identified as normal,
which are actually intruded
1968 2752
TN (true negative) The number of transactions identified as
intruded, which are actually intruded
1901 2375
FN (false negative) The number of transactions identified as
intruded, which are actually normal
1113 1345
Precision TP/(TP + FP) 0.937218873 0.910185699
Recall/sensitivity TP/(TP + FN) 0.963498623 0.953991927
Specificity TN/(FP + TN) 0.491341432 0.46323386
Accuracy (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN) 0.910334391 0.880765985
F-measure 2  (PRECISION  RECALL)/
(PRECISION + RECALL)
0.951646837 0.91131588
Table 1.
Comparison of performance metrics of FCAAIS and FAIS.
Figure 4.
The performance metrics observed for FCAAIS over FAIS.
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According to the results, the accuracy of FCAAIS (selected feature set using
canonical correlation) minimized the process complexity of designing the scale
using FAIS (Figure 5 and Table 2).
The observed time complexity is adaptable, as the completion time is not
directly related to the ratio of features count, which is due to the higher CC thresh-
old as shown in Figure 6. Hence it is obvious to conclude that the applying canon-
ical correlation toward optimized attribute selection is significant improvement to
the FAIS model (shown in Figure 6).
It is observed that applying canonical correlation toward optimized attribute
selection results in 3% improvement in the accuracy of FAIS [14]. Table 3 indicates
precision, recall, and F-measure values calculated under divergent canonical corre-
lation threshold values (Figure 7).
Figure 5.
The process computational time observed for FCAAIS over FAIS.
Number of transactions FCAAIS (s) FAIS (s)
500 0.397 0.527
1000 0.611 0.714
2000 0.723 0.882
4000 1.012 1.139
8000 1.275 1.439
16,000 1.578 1.703
25,000 1.891 2.031
Table 2.
Process computational time of FCAAIS and FAIS.
Figure 6.
The FCAAIS consumption of time under divergent canonical correlation thresholds.
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9. Conclusion
It is desirable for anomaly-based network intrusion detection system to achieve
high classification accuracy and reduce the process complexity of extracting the
rules from training data. In this chapter, a canonical correlation analysis is proposed
to optimize the features toward designing the scale to detect the intrusions. The
selection of optimal features simplifies the process of FAIS. The experiments were
conducted using a benchmark NSL-KDD dataset. The results indicate that the
accuracy of FCAAIS with optimal features is 91%, whereas the FAIS accuracy with
all features is 88%. The precision of the FCAAIS model with optimal features and
FAIS with all features is almost close to 92%. It is observed that applying canonical
correlation toward optimized attribute selection has 3% improvement in the accu-
racy of FAIS. The other performance metrics such as sensitivity, specificity, and F-
measure is calculated on FCAAIS over FAIS. The sensitivity, specificity, and F-
measure are 96, 49, and 95%, respectively, for FCAAIS, whereas they are 95, 46,
and 91%, respectively, for FAIS.
Precision F-measure Recall
Less than the upper bound of CC threshold 0.989 0.987998988 0.987
Less than the lower bound of CC threshold 0.98 0.984974619 0.99
Less than the CC threshold 0.985 0.985 0.985
Table 3.
Precision, recall, and F-measure values calculated under divergent canonical correlation threshold.
Figure 7.
Performance analysis of the prediction accuracy of FCAAIS under divergent canonical correlation threshold
value.
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Chapter 4
Security in Wireless Local Area 
Networks (WLANs)
Rajeev Singh and Teek Parval Sharma
Abstract
Major research domains in the WLAN security include: access control & data 
frame protection, lightweight authentication and secure handoff. Access control 
standard like IEEE 802.11i provides flexibility in user authentication but on the 
other hand fell prey to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. For Protecting the data 
communication between two communicating devices—three standard protocols 
i.e., WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) 
and AES-CCMP (Advanced Encryption Standard—Counter mode with CBC-MAC 
protocol) are used. Out of these, AES-CCMP protocol is secure enough and mostly 
used in enterprises. In WLAN environment lightweight authentication is an asset, 
provided it also satisfies other security properties like protecting the authentication 
stream or token along with securing the transmitted message. CAPWAP (Control 
and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points), HOKEY (Hand Over Keying) and 
IEEE 802.11r are major protocols for executing the secure handoff. In WLANs, 
handoff should not only be performed within time limits as required by the real 
time applications but should also be used to transfer safely the keying material for 
further communication. In this chapter, a comparative study of the security mecha-
nisms under the above-mentioned research domains is provided.
Keywords: WLAN security, WEP, WPA, 802.11i, denial of service (DoS),  
lightweight authentication, secure handoff
1. Introduction
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) provide an extension to the wired net-
work. The wireless stations (STAs) connect to an Access Point (AP) for communica-
tion. The messages involved in the communication between STA and AP are visible 
to other STAs lying in the communication range. This makes WLANs insecure and 
hence WLANs requires protection.
As with any other computer network, the major security goals in WLANs are: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (termed as CIA triad). Prominent tech-
niques that help in attaining these goals include: access control, authentication, 
encryption, message authentication codes (MAC). Under Access control domain, 
the entity authentication is performed initially. Depending upon the entity authen-
tication results, access into the WLAN network is controlled. For controlling access 
into the WLANs IEEE 802.11i (WPA2) is the main standard [1]. This standard 
though provides flexibility in user authentication but has several issues under 
the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [2]. For providing protection to individual 
WLAN data frames encryption mechanisms like WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), 
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TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) and AES-CCMP (Advanced Encryption 
Standard—Counter mode with CBC-MAC protocol) are used. Lepaja et al. [3] have 
demonstrated through experiment that WPA with AES provides high TCP through-
put. Also, AES-CCMP protocol provides strong security properties, and hence is 
mostly used in the enterprises [3]. In WLANs, sometimes handoff by the STA is 
required to maintain communication continuity. There exist several protocols like 
CAPWAP (Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points), HOKEY (Hand 
Over Keying) and IEEE 802.11r that claim safe and continuous handoff by the STAs 
[4]. These protocols transfer safely the keying material to STA for further com-
munication. The time limit constraint is imposed on such handoff as the handoff 
should be performed within short interval required by the real time applications.
This chapter is further divided into four sections. Section2 discusses access 
control methodologies in WLANs while section3 provides understanding of frame 
authentication methodologies. Section 4 explains secure handoff methods along 
with the requirements of secure handoff in WLAN environment. Each of these 
sections also provides comparative analysis among various methodologies. Section5 
provides conclusions and future directions.
2. Access control
Traditionally, the entity authentication and access control is provided by the 
legacy authentication standard i.e., WEP. It has proved insufficient [2] and is 
hence, deprecated. Currently, IEEE 802.11i (WPA2) [1] security standard is used 
as an entity authentication and access control mechanism. This security standard 
is used to secure data communication over 802.11 wireless LANs. The IEEE 802.11i 
authentication specifies 802.1X authentication mechanism for large networks. The 
4-way handshake follows an 802.1X authentication process to confirm the shared 
keys on Wireless Station (STA) and AP, evolving alongside the Pairwise Transient 
Key (PTK). This key is used to secure the data sessions between STA and AP using 
either Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) in counter mode with a Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code 
(CBC-MAC) Protocol (CCMP). As per the findings of Asante and Akomea-Agyin, 
use of simple passwords/passphrases makes CCMP susceptible to dictionary attacks 
[5]. The authentication and 4-way handshake are performed sequentially in 802.11i. 
Once STAs are authenticated, the standard evolves fresh secret keys to secure data 
communication over 802.11 wireless LANs. A large numbers of packets are used in 
these processes [2], which results in an increased process length, communication 
overhead and network overhead. The authentication and 4-way handshake both are 
prone to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This is due to the lack of proper authenti-
cation and insecure message communications between wireless devices [2, 6].
In 802.11i based Networks, 4-way handshake is used for evolving and sharing 
the keys between the two communicating partners. This 4-way handshake is one of 
the major concerns in WPA2/802.11i because of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and 
therefore researchers target to reduce the 4-way handshake latency. Some suggested 
to make it 3-way while other suggested to make it 2-way [7]. One such improvement 
is proposed by Singh and Sharma [7]. In their proposal, the authors try to eliminate 
the entire 4-way handshake while maintaining the security and key refreshing 
requirements. For their purpose, they have utilized frame sequence numbers and 
the striking feature of the proposal is that the key freshness is maintained for each 
communicating frame. The key refreshed is used for fulfilling the security aspects 
like frame encryption and integrity management. The overheads in the proposal 
are bare minimum and it is lightweight as no changes in the existing MAC frame 
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are done. Also, no extra messages are required. Their improvement is more useful 
under frequent key refreshing situations where users are joining and leaving the 
wireless environment frequently like in a short duration conference/workshop or 
in lounge of railway station/airport. The improved technique provides a secure 
authentication mechanism and no explicit synchronization is required in case of 
loss of frames. The timings analysis done in the work shows that this technique is 
effective while security analysis shows that it enjoys almost equivalent security as 
compared with 4-way handshake of 802.11i. Removal of handshake ensures that the 
attacks conducted in the 4-way handshake are also removed.
Another improvement in the 802.11i standard is proposed by Singh and Sharma 
[8] wherein a novel sequence number based scheme is proposed to reduce the MIC 
field overhead in the WLANs. The existing security frameworks (WPA, 802.11i) 
provide MIC for maintaining the integrity and authentication for each data frame. 
MIC is kept in separate field in the frame, and hence adds to the communication 
overhead. The scheme of Singh and Sharma [8] introduces the notion of authentica-
tion token (AT). This AT is calculated based upon the existing sequence number 
of the WLAN frame. The AT serves both frame integrity and frame authentica-
tion purposes. After calculation, it is placed instead of sequence number in the 
sequence number field of the WLAN frame which means no extra bit or field 
overhead involvements. As MIC field is removed and AT placement requires no 
overheads, the scheme is effective as far as WLAN communication overheads and 
space managements are considered. In addition, the authors have shown that their 
method is resistant against replay attacks and also provided details on how to attain 
synchronization in case of frame loss.
In October 2017, a new and major weakness was documented in WPA2 WLAN 
standard termed as Key Reinstallation AttaCK or KRACK [9]. It was noted that 
this affected all kinds of WLAN security and hence the reputation of WPA2 got 
decreased. The WPA2 standard also suffered under DoS attacks. Hence, Wi-Fi 
Alliance comes up with the improvement. The improvement is termed as WPA3. 
Its main features involve: (1) ease of use (2) natural password selection (3) an 
improved and robust handshake and, (4) forward secrecy. The WPA3 is backward 
compatible with WPA2 which means the upgraded devices can work in WPA2 or 
WPA3 modes [10]. The market adoption of this standard is now picking and it will 
take some more time for getting stabilized. Thus, this work on WLAN security 
considers the present widespread standard i.e., WPA2.
Li et al. proposed an initial entity authentication scheme termed as fast WLAN 
initial access authentication protocol (FLAP) [11]. FLAP is targeted towards making 
access authentication faster by reducing the number of initial authentication mes-
sages. It is assumed in the protocol that STA and AS share common secret key which 
simplifies the entire mechanism. Overall, this method involves 6 messages (approx. 
Two round trip times, Figure 1), proves STA authentication at the AS via shared key, 
has key hierarchy equivalent to 802.11i and protects the messages by MIC. Through 
practical measurements it is shown that FLAP can improve the efficiency of EAP-TLS 
by 94.7 percent. It is suggested that this method is compatible with 802.11i and can 
coexist with existing 802.11i standard. Depending upon circumstances either 802.11i 
or FLAP can be chosen from suite selector. Like standard 802.11i security protocol, 
FLAP scheme also depends upon MIC for frame integrity and authentication despite 
of the fact that MIC verification is computation intensive. This protocol hence may 
fall an easy prey to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks wherein the attacker may send 
large number of frames having incorrect MICs. The successive MIC failures on the 
receiver results in a kind of DoS attack termed as computation DoS attack [12].
Singh and Sharma [13] proposed an access control authentication scheme—
SWAS (Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme). The scheme introduces the concept 
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4-way handshake follows an 802.1X authentication process to confirm the shared 
keys on Wireless Station (STA) and AP, evolving alongside the Pairwise Transient 
Key (PTK). This key is used to secure the data sessions between STA and AP using 
either Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) in counter mode with a Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code 
(CBC-MAC) Protocol (CCMP). As per the findings of Asante and Akomea-Agyin, 
use of simple passwords/passphrases makes CCMP susceptible to dictionary attacks 
[5]. The authentication and 4-way handshake are performed sequentially in 802.11i. 
Once STAs are authenticated, the standard evolves fresh secret keys to secure data 
communication over 802.11 wireless LANs. A large numbers of packets are used in 
these processes [2], which results in an increased process length, communication 
overhead and network overhead. The authentication and 4-way handshake both are 
prone to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This is due to the lack of proper authenti-
cation and insecure message communications between wireless devices [2, 6].
In 802.11i based Networks, 4-way handshake is used for evolving and sharing 
the keys between the two communicating partners. This 4-way handshake is one of 
the major concerns in WPA2/802.11i because of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and 
therefore researchers target to reduce the 4-way handshake latency. Some suggested 
to make it 3-way while other suggested to make it 2-way [7]. One such improvement 
is proposed by Singh and Sharma [7]. In their proposal, the authors try to eliminate 
the entire 4-way handshake while maintaining the security and key refreshing 
requirements. For their purpose, they have utilized frame sequence numbers and 
the striking feature of the proposal is that the key freshness is maintained for each 
communicating frame. The key refreshed is used for fulfilling the security aspects 
like frame encryption and integrity management. The overheads in the proposal 
are bare minimum and it is lightweight as no changes in the existing MAC frame 
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are done. Also, no extra messages are required. Their improvement is more useful 
under frequent key refreshing situations where users are joining and leaving the 
wireless environment frequently like in a short duration conference/workshop or 
in lounge of railway station/airport. The improved technique provides a secure 
authentication mechanism and no explicit synchronization is required in case of 
loss of frames. The timings analysis done in the work shows that this technique is 
effective while security analysis shows that it enjoys almost equivalent security as 
compared with 4-way handshake of 802.11i. Removal of handshake ensures that the 
attacks conducted in the 4-way handshake are also removed.
Another improvement in the 802.11i standard is proposed by Singh and Sharma 
[8] wherein a novel sequence number based scheme is proposed to reduce the MIC 
field overhead in the WLANs. The existing security frameworks (WPA, 802.11i) 
provide MIC for maintaining the integrity and authentication for each data frame. 
MIC is kept in separate field in the frame, and hence adds to the communication 
overhead. The scheme of Singh and Sharma [8] introduces the notion of authentica-
tion token (AT). This AT is calculated based upon the existing sequence number 
of the WLAN frame. The AT serves both frame integrity and frame authentica-
tion purposes. After calculation, it is placed instead of sequence number in the 
sequence number field of the WLAN frame which means no extra bit or field 
overhead involvements. As MIC field is removed and AT placement requires no 
overheads, the scheme is effective as far as WLAN communication overheads and 
space managements are considered. In addition, the authors have shown that their 
method is resistant against replay attacks and also provided details on how to attain 
synchronization in case of frame loss.
In October 2017, a new and major weakness was documented in WPA2 WLAN 
standard termed as Key Reinstallation AttaCK or KRACK [9]. It was noted that 
this affected all kinds of WLAN security and hence the reputation of WPA2 got 
decreased. The WPA2 standard also suffered under DoS attacks. Hence, Wi-Fi 
Alliance comes up with the improvement. The improvement is termed as WPA3. 
Its main features involve: (1) ease of use (2) natural password selection (3) an 
improved and robust handshake and, (4) forward secrecy. The WPA3 is backward 
compatible with WPA2 which means the upgraded devices can work in WPA2 or 
WPA3 modes [10]. The market adoption of this standard is now picking and it will 
take some more time for getting stabilized. Thus, this work on WLAN security 
considers the present widespread standard i.e., WPA2.
Li et al. proposed an initial entity authentication scheme termed as fast WLAN 
initial access authentication protocol (FLAP) [11]. FLAP is targeted towards making 
access authentication faster by reducing the number of initial authentication mes-
sages. It is assumed in the protocol that STA and AS share common secret key which 
simplifies the entire mechanism. Overall, this method involves 6 messages (approx. 
Two round trip times, Figure 1), proves STA authentication at the AS via shared key, 
has key hierarchy equivalent to 802.11i and protects the messages by MIC. Through 
practical measurements it is shown that FLAP can improve the efficiency of EAP-TLS 
by 94.7 percent. It is suggested that this method is compatible with 802.11i and can 
coexist with existing 802.11i standard. Depending upon circumstances either 802.11i 
or FLAP can be chosen from suite selector. Like standard 802.11i security protocol, 
FLAP scheme also depends upon MIC for frame integrity and authentication despite 
of the fact that MIC verification is computation intensive. This protocol hence may 
fall an easy prey to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks wherein the attacker may send 
large number of frames having incorrect MICs. The successive MIC failures on the 
receiver results in a kind of DoS attack termed as computation DoS attack [12].
Singh and Sharma [13] proposed an access control authentication scheme—
SWAS (Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme). The scheme introduces the concept 
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of delegation in WLANs and provides access to clients only upon authentication. 
SWAS provides authentication of all parties (STA, AP and AS) and evolves a fresh 
key for securing the data sessions. In addition, it provides security to all messages 
by utilizing cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and Message Integrity 
Code (MIC). The proposed scheme reduces the length and complexity compared 
to IEEE 802.11i authentication and key deriving process. The use of cryptographic 
techniques does not increase the authentication time of the proposed method. The 
scheme reduces the communication cost, network overhead and is also resilient 
against DoS attacks. Therefore, the main contribution of SWAS is to provide a secure 
and efficient authentication mechanism that evolves fresh communication keys.
The SWAS scheme involves three parties: STA, AP and AS. It has three phases: 
registration phase, request phase and authentication phase. Initially, STA registra-
tion is performed at AS and is required only once in a given network. In registra-
tion, AS utilizes delegation concept, and generates shared secret key ( σ ) for AS 
and STA [14]. The registration phase is followed by the request phase, where the 
existing 802.11 probe requests, and the probe response messages are utilized by the 
STA to request the network connection and access. After the request phase, SWAS 
authentication is performed for authentication and to derive a new communication 
key that is used to protect the data packets in subsequent sessions.
Both online and offline authentications are used in the SWAS scheme. Online 
authentication provides authentication and security to all messages among STA, 
AP and AS. The online authentication utilizes three random numbers (r1, r2, r3) 
and a sequence number (s1) to ensure proper encryption, authentication and key 
freshness. In addition, it maintains a key hierarchy similar in purpose to 802.11i 
with a Master Session Key (MSK), Pairwise Master Key (PMK) and Pairwise 
Transient Key (PTK). The PTK evolved on the STA and AP during the authentica-
tion process is used to encrypt the data packets between them. A simplified view of 
the SWAS online authentication message exchanges (M1, M2, M3 and M4) is shown 
in Figure 2. In this figure it is clearly visible that each one among STA, AP and AS 
authenticates each other through various passcode/digital signature verification. 
The passcode is nothing but protected information (secured through cryptographic 
means) for the other party. Offline authentication is required whenever a new 
session key between the same STA and AP is required. This does not involve AS for 
authentication rather it uses prior stored information at STA and AP. The offline 
authentication is done via a re-association request and utilizes loosely synchronized 
sequence number scheme [15].
The salient features of SWAS include: (1) Resistance to DoS attacks in almost 
all the phases, (2) Less communication and computation time as compared with 
Figure 1. 
A simplified overview of initial access authentication protocol (FLAP).
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IEEE 802.11i standard, (3) authentication of all the associated parties i.e., STA, AP 
and AS by each other and, (4) authentication of all the messages used during all 
the protocol communication phases. The shortcomings include: (1) lack of practi-
cal demonstration of the protocol and (2) no extension of the scheme under the 
handoff situations is provided till date.
Authentication per frame and symmetric key based encryption is an implicit 
necessity for security in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Singh and Sharma 
[16] proposed a novel symmetric key based Access Control and per frame authen-
tication scheme for WLANs termed as Key Hiding Communication (KHC) scheme. 
KHC scheme has two phases: initial phase and communication phase. Former is 
utilized for sharing and evolving the master key (MK) between STA and AP whereas 
latter is utilized for onwards data frame communication using the (refreshed) 
keys. The major establishment of this scheme is the introduction of novel concepts 
of refreshing the key, protecting the key and initial vector (IV) using different 
counters and then mixing the bytes of protected key and IV together for each com-
municating frame. The mixing is based upon the shared secret key and hence only 
the two communicating parties i.e., STA and AP can mix and separate the bytes of 
key and IV. The protected mixed bytes are termed as codeword while the concept 
of mixing the protected key and IV bytes is termed as key hiding. The codeword is 
added in the WLAN frame. This addition of codeword to the existing WLAN frame 
occupies extra space and hence the scheme has extra space overheads. Integrity 
to the frame is provided via MIC. A new key and new IV for the new frame to be 
transmitted is evaluated based upon existing secret key and existing IV. Evaluation 
of new key and new IV is termed as key and IV refreshing. The refreshed new key 
and new IV are first protected using incremented values of counters and then mixed 
together to form new codeword. The verification and separation of the key and IV 
from the transmitted codeword provides frame authentication. Once the frame is 
authenticated, its integrity is verified through MIC verification involving key. The 
frame authentication is lightweight in KHC as it involves trivial increment, XOR and 
modulus operations. Thus, KHC follows the notion of frame authentication first and 
then checking the frame integrity for protection against computation DoS attacks. 
The separated key and IV are used to decrypt the frame contents and are also used to 
confirm the frame integrity via MIC. The simplified overview of KHC communica-
tion process is shown stepwise in Figure 3.
Figure 2. 
A simplified overview of online authentication phase of SWAS scheme.
Computer and Network Security
54
of delegation in WLANs and provides access to clients only upon authentication. 
SWAS provides authentication of all parties (STA, AP and AS) and evolves a fresh 
key for securing the data sessions. In addition, it provides security to all messages 
by utilizing cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and Message Integrity 
Code (MIC). The proposed scheme reduces the length and complexity compared 
to IEEE 802.11i authentication and key deriving process. The use of cryptographic 
techniques does not increase the authentication time of the proposed method. The 
scheme reduces the communication cost, network overhead and is also resilient 
against DoS attacks. Therefore, the main contribution of SWAS is to provide a secure 
and efficient authentication mechanism that evolves fresh communication keys.
The SWAS scheme involves three parties: STA, AP and AS. It has three phases: 
registration phase, request phase and authentication phase. Initially, STA registra-
tion is performed at AS and is required only once in a given network. In registra-
tion, AS utilizes delegation concept, and generates shared secret key ( σ ) for AS 
and STA [14]. The registration phase is followed by the request phase, where the 
existing 802.11 probe requests, and the probe response messages are utilized by the 
STA to request the network connection and access. After the request phase, SWAS 
authentication is performed for authentication and to derive a new communication 
key that is used to protect the data packets in subsequent sessions.
Both online and offline authentications are used in the SWAS scheme. Online 
authentication provides authentication and security to all messages among STA, 
AP and AS. The online authentication utilizes three random numbers (r1, r2, r3) 
and a sequence number (s1) to ensure proper encryption, authentication and key 
freshness. In addition, it maintains a key hierarchy similar in purpose to 802.11i 
with a Master Session Key (MSK), Pairwise Master Key (PMK) and Pairwise 
Transient Key (PTK). The PTK evolved on the STA and AP during the authentica-
tion process is used to encrypt the data packets between them. A simplified view of 
the SWAS online authentication message exchanges (M1, M2, M3 and M4) is shown 
in Figure 2. In this figure it is clearly visible that each one among STA, AP and AS 
authenticates each other through various passcode/digital signature verification. 
The passcode is nothing but protected information (secured through cryptographic 
means) for the other party. Offline authentication is required whenever a new 
session key between the same STA and AP is required. This does not involve AS for 
authentication rather it uses prior stored information at STA and AP. The offline 
authentication is done via a re-association request and utilizes loosely synchronized 
sequence number scheme [15].
The salient features of SWAS include: (1) Resistance to DoS attacks in almost 
all the phases, (2) Less communication and computation time as compared with 
Figure 1. 
A simplified overview of initial access authentication protocol (FLAP).
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IEEE 802.11i standard, (3) authentication of all the associated parties i.e., STA, AP 
and AS by each other and, (4) authentication of all the messages used during all 
the protocol communication phases. The shortcomings include: (1) lack of practi-
cal demonstration of the protocol and (2) no extension of the scheme under the 
handoff situations is provided till date.
Authentication per frame and symmetric key based encryption is an implicit 
necessity for security in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Singh and Sharma 
[16] proposed a novel symmetric key based Access Control and per frame authen-
tication scheme for WLANs termed as Key Hiding Communication (KHC) scheme. 
KHC scheme has two phases: initial phase and communication phase. Former is 
utilized for sharing and evolving the master key (MK) between STA and AP whereas 
latter is utilized for onwards data frame communication using the (refreshed) 
keys. The major establishment of this scheme is the introduction of novel concepts 
of refreshing the key, protecting the key and initial vector (IV) using different 
counters and then mixing the bytes of protected key and IV together for each com-
municating frame. The mixing is based upon the shared secret key and hence only 
the two communicating parties i.e., STA and AP can mix and separate the bytes of 
key and IV. The protected mixed bytes are termed as codeword while the concept 
of mixing the protected key and IV bytes is termed as key hiding. The codeword is 
added in the WLAN frame. This addition of codeword to the existing WLAN frame 
occupies extra space and hence the scheme has extra space overheads. Integrity 
to the frame is provided via MIC. A new key and new IV for the new frame to be 
transmitted is evaluated based upon existing secret key and existing IV. Evaluation 
of new key and new IV is termed as key and IV refreshing. The refreshed new key 
and new IV are first protected using incremented values of counters and then mixed 
together to form new codeword. The verification and separation of the key and IV 
from the transmitted codeword provides frame authentication. Once the frame is 
authenticated, its integrity is verified through MIC verification involving key. The 
frame authentication is lightweight in KHC as it involves trivial increment, XOR and 
modulus operations. Thus, KHC follows the notion of frame authentication first and 
then checking the frame integrity for protection against computation DoS attacks. 
The separated key and IV are used to decrypt the frame contents and are also used to 
confirm the frame integrity via MIC. The simplified overview of KHC communica-
tion process is shown stepwise in Figure 3.
Figure 2. 
A simplified overview of online authentication phase of SWAS scheme.
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In nutshell, KHC introduces the concept of key hiding which involves protecting 
the key using counters followed by mixing of refreshed key & IV i.e., mapping of 
refreshed key & IV. Through this process of formation of the codeword, the secret 
symmetric key remains concealed from the attacker. The recipient extracts the key 
from the codeword, compares it with its own evaluated key, thereby authenticating 
the sender. Key along with IV, is then used to decrypt the data frame of the sender. 
Thus, KHC is a useful WLAN communication scheme that is not only secure but is 
also efficient. The major contributions made by KHC are: (1) lightweight WLAN 
communication methodology, (2) utilization of symmetric key based encryption/
decryption, (3) Per frame Key refreshment, (4) protection against computation 
DoS attacks and, (5) comparable security as that of 802.11i.
2.1. Comparisons of various WLAN access control mechanisms
A property wise comparison between prominent WLAN access control security 
mechanism is presented in Table 1. WEP is though deprecated but mentioned here 
for the sake of completeness. It can be noted that WEP provides weak authentica-
tion, integrity and encryption support. Further, WEP does not consider key and 
IV refreshing. IEEE 802.11i is a strong protocol as it maintains strong authentica-
tion, integrity and encryption. It involves large number of messages and hence 
consumes times during initial authentication. For key refreshing, it involves 
4-way handshake having 4 message exchanges between STA and AP. This 4-way 
handshake is the major concern in 802.11i. It is prone to DoS attacks and KRACK 
attacks. FLAP and SWAS both enjoys features similar to that of 802.11i with a dif-
ference that the messages exchanged for symmetric key evaluation are less in FLAP 
and SWAS. In FLAP, very few i.e., approx. 6 messages are exchanged for the key 
evaluation (including those between STA and AP). In SWAS, only four (4) initial 
messages are required during online authentication (including those between STA 
and AP) for sharing the PTK. During offline authentication for refreshing the 
shared symmetric key only two messages are required. The KHC scheme adopts an 
interesting methodology which is different from the other access control protocol. 
Figure 3. 
A simplified overview of communication phase of KHC scheme.
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It does not use any third party like AS in the authentication process and hence 
involves less number of messages. It provides an implicit key hiding per frame 
authentication procedure that is capable of communicating the key to the other 
entity and is able to refresh not only the shared key but also the IV for encrypting 
each frame. Thus, least messages are required for key refreshing among all the 
access control WLAN security mechanisms. Also, the adopted methodology of 
key refreshing, protection and mapping makes the cracking of key difficult for 
the attacker. In contrast to WEP, IV is hidden and not visible to the attacker. Other 
access protocols do not have the notion of IV.
As shown in Table 2, memory requirements of WEP is least. 802.11i has more 
memory requirements than WEP but less than others. Among others, SWAS has 
highest while FLAP has lowest memory requirements. Communication overhead 
analysis shows that (1) KHC and WEP involves per frame overheads whereas in 
others it is done implicitly and, (2) KHC is efficient in key refreshing as com-
pared to others. For key refreshing each of 802.11i and FLAP requires 4 frames, 
WLAN access control—Security mechanisms
Property WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS [13] KHC [16]
Authentication Yes, weak Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
continuous, 
lightweight per 
frame auth.
Integrity 
support
Yes, 
weak, 
CRC 
based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Encryption 
support for 
confidentiality, 
strength of 
encryption
Yes, low, 
RC4 
algorithm
Yes, high, TKIP 
and AES based
Yes, high, 
TKIP and AES 
based
Yes, high 
(Once shared 
key is evolved, 
rest process is 
same as that 
of 802.11i)
Yes, high,
any one of 
RC4/ TKIP/ 
AES can be 
used
Synchronization 
Algorithm
No No No No Yes
Initial message 
Exchange for 
symmetric key 
exchange
No, done 
manually
Yes, large Yes, few – 06 
messages (two 
round trip 
times)
Yes, few -only 
four (4) initial 
messages 
during online 
authentication
Yes, few
Key freshness No Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV freshness No N.A.* N.A.* N.A.* Yes
Messages 
exchange for key 
renewal
N.A.* Yes, four, 
explicitly
Yes, four 
(between 
STA and AP), 
explicitly
Yes, two 
using offline 
authentication
No, done 
implicitly
*Not Applicable in this mechanism.
Table 1. 
Property wise comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms [16].
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In nutshell, KHC introduces the concept of key hiding which involves protecting 
the key using counters followed by mixing of refreshed key & IV i.e., mapping of 
refreshed key & IV. Through this process of formation of the codeword, the secret 
symmetric key remains concealed from the attacker. The recipient extracts the key 
from the codeword, compares it with its own evaluated key, thereby authenticating 
the sender. Key along with IV, is then used to decrypt the data frame of the sender. 
Thus, KHC is a useful WLAN communication scheme that is not only secure but is 
also efficient. The major contributions made by KHC are: (1) lightweight WLAN 
communication methodology, (2) utilization of symmetric key based encryption/
decryption, (3) Per frame Key refreshment, (4) protection against computation 
DoS attacks and, (5) comparable security as that of 802.11i.
2.1. Comparisons of various WLAN access control mechanisms
A property wise comparison between prominent WLAN access control security 
mechanism is presented in Table 1. WEP is though deprecated but mentioned here 
for the sake of completeness. It can be noted that WEP provides weak authentica-
tion, integrity and encryption support. Further, WEP does not consider key and 
IV refreshing. IEEE 802.11i is a strong protocol as it maintains strong authentica-
tion, integrity and encryption. It involves large number of messages and hence 
consumes times during initial authentication. For key refreshing, it involves 
4-way handshake having 4 message exchanges between STA and AP. This 4-way 
handshake is the major concern in 802.11i. It is prone to DoS attacks and KRACK 
attacks. FLAP and SWAS both enjoys features similar to that of 802.11i with a dif-
ference that the messages exchanged for symmetric key evaluation are less in FLAP 
and SWAS. In FLAP, very few i.e., approx. 6 messages are exchanged for the key 
evaluation (including those between STA and AP). In SWAS, only four (4) initial 
messages are required during online authentication (including those between STA 
and AP) for sharing the PTK. During offline authentication for refreshing the 
shared symmetric key only two messages are required. The KHC scheme adopts an 
interesting methodology which is different from the other access control protocol. 
Figure 3. 
A simplified overview of communication phase of KHC scheme.
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It does not use any third party like AS in the authentication process and hence 
involves less number of messages. It provides an implicit key hiding per frame 
authentication procedure that is capable of communicating the key to the other 
entity and is able to refresh not only the shared key but also the IV for encrypting 
each frame. Thus, least messages are required for key refreshing among all the 
access control WLAN security mechanisms. Also, the adopted methodology of 
key refreshing, protection and mapping makes the cracking of key difficult for 
the attacker. In contrast to WEP, IV is hidden and not visible to the attacker. Other 
access protocols do not have the notion of IV.
As shown in Table 2, memory requirements of WEP is least. 802.11i has more 
memory requirements than WEP but less than others. Among others, SWAS has 
highest while FLAP has lowest memory requirements. Communication overhead 
analysis shows that (1) KHC and WEP involves per frame overheads whereas in 
others it is done implicitly and, (2) KHC is efficient in key refreshing as com-
pared to others. For key refreshing each of 802.11i and FLAP requires 4 frames, 
WLAN access control—Security mechanisms
Property WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS [13] KHC [16]
Authentication Yes, weak Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
continuous, 
lightweight per 
frame auth.
Integrity 
support
Yes, 
weak, 
CRC 
based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Encryption 
support for 
confidentiality, 
strength of 
encryption
Yes, low, 
RC4 
algorithm
Yes, high, TKIP 
and AES based
Yes, high, 
TKIP and AES 
based
Yes, high 
(Once shared 
key is evolved, 
rest process is 
same as that 
of 802.11i)
Yes, high,
any one of 
RC4/ TKIP/ 
AES can be 
used
Synchronization 
Algorithm
No No No No Yes
Initial message 
Exchange for 
symmetric key 
exchange
No, done 
manually
Yes, large Yes, few – 06 
messages (two 
round trip 
times)
Yes, few -only 
four (4) initial 
messages 
during online 
authentication
Yes, few
Key freshness No Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV freshness No N.A.* N.A.* N.A.* Yes
Messages 
exchange for key 
renewal
N.A.* Yes, four, 
explicitly
Yes, four 
(between 
STA and AP), 
explicitly
Yes, two 
using offline 
authentication
No, done 
implicitly
*Not Applicable in this mechanism.
Table 1. 
Property wise comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms [16].
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SWAS requires 2 frames whereas it is handled implicitly in KHC. In [11], the 
average authentication delays of the EAP-TLS and FLAP are evaluated as 260.253 
and 13.884 ms, respectively. In [13], the total time for SWAS authentication is 
found to be of the order of 26.46 ms (including time for DoS protection). In 
[16] Key refreshing timings of 802.11i and KHC are shown as 13.5 ms and 7.5 ms, 
respectively.
The security comparison shown in Table 3 clearly indicates that SWAS and 
KHC scheme provides almost equivalent and better security. 802.11i is prone to DoS 
attacks whereas FLAP is prone to replay and man-in-middle attacks. Obviously, 
security of FLAP is least and hence it is not much used presently.
In most of the WLAN access control mechanisms (except KHC), authenticity to 
the data frame is usually provided by MIC. The MIC based per frame authentication 
may lead to computation DoS. Hence, lightweight per frame authentication solution 
is required. It is discussed next.
Attacks WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS[13] KHC [16]
Possibility of frame 
contents overwritten by 
attacker
Yes No No No No
Possibility of modification 
of authentication bits
N.A. as 
authentication 
is implicit
No No N.A.* No
Man-in-middle attack Yes No Yes No No
Replay attack Yes No Yes No No
Reduce DoS attacks No No No Yes Yes
*Not applicable in this mechanism.
Table 3. 
Comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms under attacks [16].
WLAN access control—Security mechanisms
Overheads WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS[13] KHC[16]
Memory 
requirements**
Storing 
key 
and IV
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key and 
counter
Storing delegation 
key, public key pairs, 
Symmetric keys: MK, 
PMK, MSK, PTK, two 
counters, one sequence 
number. (Also pool 
of random numbers 
at AP)
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key, IV 
and two 
counters
Communication overheads
For per frame 
authentication
IV (128 
bits) 
per 
frame
Implicitly 
by MIC
Implicitly 
by MIC
Implicitly by MIC/
authentication 
information
256 bits 
per frame
For key refreshing N.A.* 4 data 
frames
4 data 
frames
2 data frames implicit
*Not Applicable in the scheme.
**Considered per participating node.
Table 2. 
Performance comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms [16].
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3. Frame authentication
In WLANs, a two layer redundant security exists. One at the Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer while other at the higher layer dealing with End to End security. 
In former, 802.11i provides security while in latter, higher layer protocols like IPSec, 
SSL-TLS etc. provides security. Hence, it is suggestive that lightweight authentication 
and symmetric key based cryptographic measures per frame should be used.
For providing individual frame level protection, two kinds of per frame authen-
tication exist in WLANs: MIC based authentication and lightweight authentication. 
MIC based frame authentication for data frames is utilized by standard WLAN 
protocols like IEEE 802.11i, FLAP etc. In these protocols, each frame is accompanied 
by a unique MIC calculated using sender’s shared secret key. The receiver verifies 
it by recalculating and matching using its share secret key. The MIC calculations 
and verification consume computation time of the order of 1.5 ms and as shown in 
Section 2 for FLAP protocol, computation DoS attacks are a possibility [12, 17, 18]. 
Main reason for computation DoS attack is attributed to the fact that MIC is serv-
ing two purposes: authentication and message integrity. Instead, first lightweight 
authentication should be used. If it succeeds, frame integrity (MIC) should be 
checked only for those frames whose authentication has succeeded. This will reduce 
the DoS attacker chances. Thus, lightweight authentication techniques which uses 
less computation time may prove useful.
The lightweight authentication schemes [19–25] generate the random authenti-
cation bits at sender and receiver using random bit generator with commonly shared 
secret seed as input. These authentication bits are inserted into the WLAN frames. 
Upon verification of the authentication bits, the frame is accepted at the receiver. 
Though such schemes provides authentication but they usually lack other security 
measures like key freshness, secrecy and integrity. A brief tabulation of these 
schemes is presentation in Table 4, showing advantage and disadvantage of each.
3.1 Comparisons of various lightweight authentication mechanisms
All the schemes considered in Table 4 provide per frame continuous authentica-
tion. Schemes of Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] supports integrity. 
Former supports CRC based weak integrity while latter supports MIC based strong 
integrity. Schemes of Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] supports 
encryption. Former supports RC4 based weak encryption while latter supports 
TKIP/AES based strong encryption. All the schemes considered use their own 
synchronization algorithm, in fact scheme by Wang et al. [22] uses three different 
synchronization algorithms. Schemes by Ren et al. [23], Lee et al. [24], Pepyne et al. 
[25] and Singh and Sharma [26] involves initial message exchanges. Key freshness 
is incorporated by Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26]. None of these 
involves extra messages for evolving new symmetric key (key renewal).
Considering the memory requirements of these schemes Singh and Sharma 
[26] has the greatest (912 bits) while Lee et al. [24] has the lowest (24 bits). Others 
except Pepyne et al. [25] have 256 bits memory requirements. Pepyne et al. [25] has 
384 bits memory requirements. As far as communication overheads are concern, 
Johnson et al. [19, 20] and Ren et al. [23] have requirements of 3 bits per frame and 
7 bits per ACK frame for counter. Wang et al. [21, 22] has no extra bit requirements 
as these keep the authentication bits in the unused type and subtype fields of 802.11 
frame. Lee et al. [24] requires four extra frames, each having 3 authentication 
bits. Pepyne et al. [25] has requirements of keeping 128 bits per frame for keeping 
counter. ASN based scheme by Singh and Sharma [26] has no explicit requirements 
but requires 48 bits per ACK for synchronization.
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SWAS requires 2 frames whereas it is handled implicitly in KHC. In [11], the 
average authentication delays of the EAP-TLS and FLAP are evaluated as 260.253 
and 13.884 ms, respectively. In [13], the total time for SWAS authentication is 
found to be of the order of 26.46 ms (including time for DoS protection). In 
[16] Key refreshing timings of 802.11i and KHC are shown as 13.5 ms and 7.5 ms, 
respectively.
The security comparison shown in Table 3 clearly indicates that SWAS and 
KHC scheme provides almost equivalent and better security. 802.11i is prone to DoS 
attacks whereas FLAP is prone to replay and man-in-middle attacks. Obviously, 
security of FLAP is least and hence it is not much used presently.
In most of the WLAN access control mechanisms (except KHC), authenticity to 
the data frame is usually provided by MIC. The MIC based per frame authentication 
may lead to computation DoS. Hence, lightweight per frame authentication solution 
is required. It is discussed next.
Attacks WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS[13] KHC [16]
Possibility of frame 
contents overwritten by 
attacker
Yes No No No No
Possibility of modification 
of authentication bits
N.A. as 
authentication 
is implicit
No No N.A.* No
Man-in-middle attack Yes No Yes No No
Replay attack Yes No Yes No No
Reduce DoS attacks No No No Yes Yes
*Not applicable in this mechanism.
Table 3. 
Comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms under attacks [16].
WLAN access control—Security mechanisms
Overheads WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS[13] KHC[16]
Memory 
requirements**
Storing 
key 
and IV
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key and 
counter
Storing delegation 
key, public key pairs, 
Symmetric keys: MK, 
PMK, MSK, PTK, two 
counters, one sequence 
number. (Also pool 
of random numbers 
at AP)
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key, IV 
and two 
counters
Communication overheads
For per frame 
authentication
IV (128 
bits) 
per 
frame
Implicitly 
by MIC
Implicitly 
by MIC
Implicitly by MIC/
authentication 
information
256 bits 
per frame
For key refreshing N.A.* 4 data 
frames
4 data 
frames
2 data frames implicit
*Not Applicable in the scheme.
**Considered per participating node.
Table 2. 
Performance comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms [16].
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3. Frame authentication
In WLANs, a two layer redundant security exists. One at the Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer while other at the higher layer dealing with End to End security. 
In former, 802.11i provides security while in latter, higher layer protocols like IPSec, 
SSL-TLS etc. provides security. Hence, it is suggestive that lightweight authentication 
and symmetric key based cryptographic measures per frame should be used.
For providing individual frame level protection, two kinds of per frame authen-
tication exist in WLANs: MIC based authentication and lightweight authentication. 
MIC based frame authentication for data frames is utilized by standard WLAN 
protocols like IEEE 802.11i, FLAP etc. In these protocols, each frame is accompanied 
by a unique MIC calculated using sender’s shared secret key. The receiver verifies 
it by recalculating and matching using its share secret key. The MIC calculations 
and verification consume computation time of the order of 1.5 ms and as shown in 
Section 2 for FLAP protocol, computation DoS attacks are a possibility [12, 17, 18]. 
Main reason for computation DoS attack is attributed to the fact that MIC is serv-
ing two purposes: authentication and message integrity. Instead, first lightweight 
authentication should be used. If it succeeds, frame integrity (MIC) should be 
checked only for those frames whose authentication has succeeded. This will reduce 
the DoS attacker chances. Thus, lightweight authentication techniques which uses 
less computation time may prove useful.
The lightweight authentication schemes [19–25] generate the random authenti-
cation bits at sender and receiver using random bit generator with commonly shared 
secret seed as input. These authentication bits are inserted into the WLAN frames. 
Upon verification of the authentication bits, the frame is accepted at the receiver. 
Though such schemes provides authentication but they usually lack other security 
measures like key freshness, secrecy and integrity. A brief tabulation of these 
schemes is presentation in Table 4, showing advantage and disadvantage of each.
3.1 Comparisons of various lightweight authentication mechanisms
All the schemes considered in Table 4 provide per frame continuous authentica-
tion. Schemes of Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] supports integrity. 
Former supports CRC based weak integrity while latter supports MIC based strong 
integrity. Schemes of Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] supports 
encryption. Former supports RC4 based weak encryption while latter supports 
TKIP/AES based strong encryption. All the schemes considered use their own 
synchronization algorithm, in fact scheme by Wang et al. [22] uses three different 
synchronization algorithms. Schemes by Ren et al. [23], Lee et al. [24], Pepyne et al. 
[25] and Singh and Sharma [26] involves initial message exchanges. Key freshness 
is incorporated by Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26]. None of these 
involves extra messages for evolving new symmetric key (key renewal).
Considering the memory requirements of these schemes Singh and Sharma 
[26] has the greatest (912 bits) while Lee et al. [24] has the lowest (24 bits). Others 
except Pepyne et al. [25] have 256 bits memory requirements. Pepyne et al. [25] has 
384 bits memory requirements. As far as communication overheads are concern, 
Johnson et al. [19, 20] and Ren et al. [23] have requirements of 3 bits per frame and 
7 bits per ACK frame for counter. Wang et al. [21, 22] has no extra bit requirements 
as these keep the authentication bits in the unused type and subtype fields of 802.11 
frame. Lee et al. [24] requires four extra frames, each having 3 authentication 
bits. Pepyne et al. [25] has requirements of keeping 128 bits per frame for keeping 
counter. ASN based scheme by Singh and Sharma [26] has no explicit requirements 
but requires 48 bits per ACK for synchronization.
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Light weight 
authentication 
schemes
Features Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
Johnson et al. 
[19]
Wu et al. [20]
Only one bit from the 
authentication stream 
generator is placed in 
the link layer data frame
• scheme provides 
originator 
sender identity 
authentication
• has low communica-
tion overhead
• as one bit can 
easily be damaged, 
synchronization 
algorithm is also 
proposed
• attack leading to non-
synchronization can easily 
be launched via successive 
frame authentication 
failures
• The number of bits used 
for authentication purpose 
is too less due to which 
attacker has 50% chances
• the data packets are not 
encrypted in SOLA nor 
MIC per frame is provided, 
hence payload may be 
changed (overwrite attack)
Wang et al. [21] • the sender and the 
receiver generates an 
authentication stream 
using same seed value
• The bit from the 
authentication stream 
is put in the frames 
by the sender and 
are verified by the 
receiver using its 
authentication stream
lightweight protocol 
with synchronization 
algorithm and low 
communication 
overhead
• The authentication bits 
are not bound to the frame 
contents
• synchronization process is 
affected by flooding DoS 
attack where the attacker 
confuses the sender via 
unauthenticated ACK 
frames
• long authentication bits 
of continuous 0’s or 1’s by 
attackers in the frames can 
cause confusion
Wang, et al. 
[22]
• single bit lightweight 
authentication 
solution
• Concept of dis-
crimination among 
legitimate STAs and 
attacker nodes is used
efficient in terms of 
computation cost, 
communication cost 
and synchronization 
efficiency
Possibility of authentication 
bit manipulation by attacker 
exists
Ren et al. [23] 3 bit authentication 
solution
Has synchronization 
algorithm that uses 7 
bit counter value put in 
the ACK frame by the 
receiver for attaining 
synchronization
still utilizes less number 
of bits and therefore high 
probability of attacks
Lee et al. [24] Scheme selects 3 bits 
for authentication of 
management frames
Protection from DoS 
attack performed 
by unauthenticated 
management frames
• scheme protects only 
the management frame 
whereas the data frame are 
not protected
• DoS attack is still possible 
by using frames other than 
the management frames
Pepyne et al. 
[25]
• based upon improvis-
ing the WEP protocol
• uses random stream 
generator for generat-
ing the authenticator 
variables and fresh 
encryption keys
Frame counter 
‘k’ is used for 
synchronization 
purpose
attacker can easily modify ‘k’ 
and launch the attack leading 
to non-synchronization and 
Denial of Service
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On comparing the computational performance of the lightweight authentication 
schemes mentioned in Table 4, it is found that Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and 
Sharma [26] take more computational time as compared with others. Singh and 
Sharma [26] takes more computational time due to the fact that it involves MIC 
evaluation and encryption of frame for enhancing the security. It is shown in [26] 
that considering only the authentication the time taken for computational cost for is 
0.5 micro seconds which implies that it is same as that of other lightweight solutions.
Except, Pepyne et al. [25], the chances of Brute Force attacks on authentication 
bits embedded in the frames are quite high in these schemes. Except Pepyne et al. 
[25] and Singh and Sharma [26] the possibilities of frame contents modification, 
man-in-the middle attack, replay attacks and DoS attacks are quite high. Pepyne 
et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] do not allow frame contents modifications 
and DoS attacks. Pepyne et al. [25] suffers under man-in-the middle attack and 
replay attacks.
Though KHC is considered in this chapter initially under the Access control 
mechanisms, it involves lightweight per frame authentication also and needs a 
special mention in this sub-section. In comparison with the schemes mentioned in 
Table 4, KHC has longer initial entity authentication process. KHC also has raised 
memory requirements but meets important security features like forward secrecy, 
key refreshing, lightweight per frame authentication, per frame encryption etc. 
required by any WLAN security protocol.
Apart from the two main authentication types i.e., MIC based authentication 
and lightweight authentication, the others are password key exchange mechanisms 
and layered authentication. The password key exchange mechanisms [27, 28] 
provide mutual authentication between client and authentication server (AS), 
identity privacy, half forward secrecy and low computation cost for a client. These 
mechanisms lack some of the mandatory and recommended requirements for the 
key exchange methods [29]. Also, these schemes provide authentication at the AS 
level only while ignoring the authentication at the AP level. The layered authentica-
tion achieved by EAP which acts as basis for higher layer authentication protocols, 
contains certain vulnerabilities e.g. no identity protection, no protected cipher suite 
negotiation, and no fast reconnection capability [29].
Light weight 
authentication 
schemes
Features Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
Singh and 
Sharma [26]
• utilizes sequence 
number of the 
frame along with 
the authentication 
stream generators for 
authentication
• provides authentica-
tion by modifying 
sequence number of 
the frame by trivial 
math operations by 
sender such that the 
modification is veri-
fied at the receiver
• it requires no extra 
bits or messages 
for authentication 
purpose and also no 
change in the existing 
frame format is 
required
• lightweight 
authentication
• helps in protecting 
against computation 
DoS attacks
• prohibits replays 
and maintains the 
synchronization
AP maintains sequence 
numbers per STA
Table 4. 
Comparison of per frame WLAN authentication solutions.
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Light weight 
authentication 
schemes
Features Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
Johnson et al. 
[19]
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Only one bit from the 
authentication stream 
generator is placed in 
the link layer data frame
• scheme provides 
originator 
sender identity 
authentication
• has low communica-
tion overhead
• as one bit can 
easily be damaged, 
synchronization 
algorithm is also 
proposed
• attack leading to non-
synchronization can easily 
be launched via successive 
frame authentication 
failures
• The number of bits used 
for authentication purpose 
is too less due to which 
attacker has 50% chances
• the data packets are not 
encrypted in SOLA nor 
MIC per frame is provided, 
hence payload may be 
changed (overwrite attack)
Wang et al. [21] • the sender and the 
receiver generates an 
authentication stream 
using same seed value
• The bit from the 
authentication stream 
is put in the frames 
by the sender and 
are verified by the 
receiver using its 
authentication stream
lightweight protocol 
with synchronization 
algorithm and low 
communication 
overhead
• The authentication bits 
are not bound to the frame 
contents
• synchronization process is 
affected by flooding DoS 
attack where the attacker 
confuses the sender via 
unauthenticated ACK 
frames
• long authentication bits 
of continuous 0’s or 1’s by 
attackers in the frames can 
cause confusion
Wang, et al. 
[22]
• single bit lightweight 
authentication 
solution
• Concept of dis-
crimination among 
legitimate STAs and 
attacker nodes is used
efficient in terms of 
computation cost, 
communication cost 
and synchronization 
efficiency
Possibility of authentication 
bit manipulation by attacker 
exists
Ren et al. [23] 3 bit authentication 
solution
Has synchronization 
algorithm that uses 7 
bit counter value put in 
the ACK frame by the 
receiver for attaining 
synchronization
still utilizes less number 
of bits and therefore high 
probability of attacks
Lee et al. [24] Scheme selects 3 bits 
for authentication of 
management frames
Protection from DoS 
attack performed 
by unauthenticated 
management frames
• scheme protects only 
the management frame 
whereas the data frame are 
not protected
• DoS attack is still possible 
by using frames other than 
the management frames
Pepyne et al. 
[25]
• based upon improvis-
ing the WEP protocol
• uses random stream 
generator for generat-
ing the authenticator 
variables and fresh 
encryption keys
Frame counter 
‘k’ is used for 
synchronization 
purpose
attacker can easily modify ‘k’ 
and launch the attack leading 
to non-synchronization and 
Denial of Service
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On comparing the computational performance of the lightweight authentication 
schemes mentioned in Table 4, it is found that Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and 
Sharma [26] take more computational time as compared with others. Singh and 
Sharma [26] takes more computational time due to the fact that it involves MIC 
evaluation and encryption of frame for enhancing the security. It is shown in [26] 
that considering only the authentication the time taken for computational cost for is 
0.5 micro seconds which implies that it is same as that of other lightweight solutions.
Except, Pepyne et al. [25], the chances of Brute Force attacks on authentication 
bits embedded in the frames are quite high in these schemes. Except Pepyne et al. 
[25] and Singh and Sharma [26] the possibilities of frame contents modification, 
man-in-the middle attack, replay attacks and DoS attacks are quite high. Pepyne 
et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] do not allow frame contents modifications 
and DoS attacks. Pepyne et al. [25] suffers under man-in-the middle attack and 
replay attacks.
Though KHC is considered in this chapter initially under the Access control 
mechanisms, it involves lightweight per frame authentication also and needs a 
special mention in this sub-section. In comparison with the schemes mentioned in 
Table 4, KHC has longer initial entity authentication process. KHC also has raised 
memory requirements but meets important security features like forward secrecy, 
key refreshing, lightweight per frame authentication, per frame encryption etc. 
required by any WLAN security protocol.
Apart from the two main authentication types i.e., MIC based authentication 
and lightweight authentication, the others are password key exchange mechanisms 
and layered authentication. The password key exchange mechanisms [27, 28] 
provide mutual authentication between client and authentication server (AS), 
identity privacy, half forward secrecy and low computation cost for a client. These 
mechanisms lack some of the mandatory and recommended requirements for the 
key exchange methods [29]. Also, these schemes provide authentication at the AS 
level only while ignoring the authentication at the AP level. The layered authentica-
tion achieved by EAP which acts as basis for higher layer authentication protocols, 
contains certain vulnerabilities e.g. no identity protection, no protected cipher suite 
negotiation, and no fast reconnection capability [29].
Light weight 
authentication 
schemes
Features Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
Singh and 
Sharma [26]
• utilizes sequence 
number of the 
frame along with 
the authentication 
stream generators for 
authentication
• provides authentica-
tion by modifying 
sequence number of 
the frame by trivial 
math operations by 
sender such that the 
modification is veri-
fied at the receiver
• it requires no extra 
bits or messages 
for authentication 
purpose and also no 
change in the existing 
frame format is 
required
• lightweight 
authentication
• helps in protecting 
against computation 
DoS attacks
• prohibits replays 
and maintains the 
synchronization
AP maintains sequence 
numbers per STA
Table 4. 
Comparison of per frame WLAN authentication solutions.
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4. Secure handoff
WLANs handoffs are essential for providing continuous mobility to a wireless 
Station in an Enterprise LAN. Two important requirements of the handoff are: (1) 
establishment of a secure connection of the roaming STA with new access point 
(AP) and (2) completion of handoff within time limits such that the undergoing 
communication remains unaffected. The time limit on handoff for multimedia 
and real time WLAN applications is approximately 50 ms [30]. During this period 
no data packets transfer occurs. As per the 802.11i WLAN security standard, the 
complete secure STA authentication (default Full EAP/TLS) via AS evolving shared 
secret key between STA and AP takes time of the order of 300 ms to 4 s [12] and 
hence is unfit for the handoffs. For reducing this time, notion of pre-authentication 
is introduced wherein full 802.1X authentication involving AS is done utilizing old 
AP and candidate AP (new AP). Hence, at the time of handoff only 4-way hand-
shake is required between STA and candidate AP. In this pre-authentication process, 
an inaccurate candidate AP prediction has associated resource wastage issues as full 
802.1X will again be required [31]. Researchers have considered predictive authen-
tication and proactive key distribution for reducing the handoff times. Former 
involves predicting the candidate AP whereas latter involves locating a group of 
candidate APs. Thus, in former the problem of inaccurate candidate AP prediction 
exists whereas in latter the problem of extra communication overhead for authenti-
cation with group of APs exists.
Researchers have also worked towards reactive solutions wherein the candidate 
AP is selected by STA and then the security context is transferred to this AP. In such 
solutions, STA requests to AS via old AP, then AS transfer security context and 
material to the candidate AP. Singh and Sharma [32] proposed one such novel secure 
handoff scheme that maintains security properties while evolving and transferring 
the security context (key and initial vector) to the candidate AP. The scheme is light-
weight and uses reactive method for handoff. Two kinds of APs are defined in the 
scheme: normal AP and Domain Controller AP (DCAP). STA request DCAP through 
AP by putting ID of the candidate AP. DCAP in turn distributes the STA context 
(key and initial vector) to the candidate AP. Thus, when STA roams into the area of 
candidate AP, less time is involved in the STA authentication at the candidate AP.
For providing fast and secure handoff for the mobile STA in WLANs, standard 
bodies IEEE and IETF have defined protocols like Control and Provisioning of 
Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP), HandOver Keying (HOKEY) and IEEE 802.11r 
(Task group r) [5]. CAPWAP supports centralized management of APs. HOKEY 
extends the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) architecture 
to support key deriving and distribution with involving full EAP authentication. 
802.11r depends upon passing credentials directly between APs for handover. 
Though CAPWAP takes very less time, it is more or less re-authentication with 
centralized Access Controller (AC), followed by key transfer to new Wireless 
Termination Points (WTP). HOKEY is successful in multidomains but it takes more 
communication time. Among these three (CAPWAP, HOKEY and 802.11r), 802.11r 
is more efficient in terms of communication overheads. It still has issues concerning 
the safe transfer of key between APs.
4.1 Comparisons of various handoff mechanisms
CAPWAP and HOKEY does not change the existing 802.11 frame structure. 
802.11r is a separate protocol and hence has different frame structure. All except 
CAPWAP scheme generates fresh session keys. Fresh traffic keys are generated by 
all the schemes. Communication overhead of KHC based handoff scheme is less as 
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compared to any other scheme. This handoff scheme shortens the handoff latency 
by initiating a key transfer process prior to moving to the new AP and performing 
handoff. It strengthens the security by (1) protecting STAs from re-associating to 
Malicious APs, (2) evolving fresh keys even during handshake, (3) authenticating 
all the frames during the handoff and, (4) safeguarding against DoS attacks and, 
(5) providing continuous authentication during communication.
5. Conclusions
This chapter discusses about the present WLAN security environment. It is 
clear that the WLAN security environment till date is dominated by WPA2 (IEEE 
802.11i) standard. Researchers have pointed out regarding length and complexity 
of the WPA2. The major point of concern in WPA2 is key refreshing mechanism 
i.e., 4-way handshake due to which the WLAN security is considered vulnerable. 
Researchers, hence target to reduce the length of this handshake while maintaining 
the security properties intact.
The chapter also studies other WLAN security mechanisms proposed by 
researchers and categories them into: (i) access control, (ii) per frame authentica-
tion and (iii) secure handoff mechanisms. It provides category wise comparative 
analysis of these mechanisms. Three mechanisms are considered in the access 
control category. Among them Key Hiding Communication (KHC) is the most 
attractive but it requires changes in the existing WLAN frame structure. Per frame 
category is further sub-categorized into: (a) per frame authentication mechanisms 
utilizing MIC and (b) lightweight per frame authentication mechanisms. For 
enhancing the security, most of the per frame authentication solutions rely on MIC 
for both authentication and integrity of frame. It is shown that this MIC verification 
involves computation time and large number of such verifications may result in 
computation DoS attack on the receiver. The researchers hence advocate separating 
the authentication and integrity parts in per frame authentication. The lightweight 
per frame authentication mechanism are though lightweight in nature but lacks 
security properties like key refreshing, secrecy and integrity. In this chapter, 
several handoff mechanisms for WLAN environment are also discussed and it is 
accomplished that none guarantees to maintain required level of security during the 
specified handoff time limits.
WLAN security is having a transformation from WPA2 to WPA3. WLAN 
security is strengthened in the upcoming standard i.e., WPA3. It is very early to 
comment on the effectiveness of WPA3 and it is evident that the existing WLAN 
devices will continue to use WPA2. The new upcoming WLAN devices will obvi-
ously follow the backward compatibility towards WPA2. Thus, researchers can still 
target to test the implementation of 802.11i with the novel ideas like MIC reduction, 
4-way handshake reduction and blockchain application in WLANs [33]. In wireless 
medium, per frame lightweight authentication mechanisms will prove an edge and 
in future, researchers may consider developing such solutions. For maintaining un-
interrupting communication quick, secure, accurate and secure handoff is the need 
of the hour. Hence, researchers in future may consider implementation of efficient 
and secure handoff mechanisms using WPA3.
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4. Secure handoff
WLANs handoffs are essential for providing continuous mobility to a wireless 
Station in an Enterprise LAN. Two important requirements of the handoff are: (1) 
establishment of a secure connection of the roaming STA with new access point 
(AP) and (2) completion of handoff within time limits such that the undergoing 
communication remains unaffected. The time limit on handoff for multimedia 
and real time WLAN applications is approximately 50 ms [30]. During this period 
no data packets transfer occurs. As per the 802.11i WLAN security standard, the 
complete secure STA authentication (default Full EAP/TLS) via AS evolving shared 
secret key between STA and AP takes time of the order of 300 ms to 4 s [12] and 
hence is unfit for the handoffs. For reducing this time, notion of pre-authentication 
is introduced wherein full 802.1X authentication involving AS is done utilizing old 
AP and candidate AP (new AP). Hence, at the time of handoff only 4-way hand-
shake is required between STA and candidate AP. In this pre-authentication process, 
an inaccurate candidate AP prediction has associated resource wastage issues as full 
802.1X will again be required [31]. Researchers have considered predictive authen-
tication and proactive key distribution for reducing the handoff times. Former 
involves predicting the candidate AP whereas latter involves locating a group of 
candidate APs. Thus, in former the problem of inaccurate candidate AP prediction 
exists whereas in latter the problem of extra communication overhead for authenti-
cation with group of APs exists.
Researchers have also worked towards reactive solutions wherein the candidate 
AP is selected by STA and then the security context is transferred to this AP. In such 
solutions, STA requests to AS via old AP, then AS transfer security context and 
material to the candidate AP. Singh and Sharma [32] proposed one such novel secure 
handoff scheme that maintains security properties while evolving and transferring 
the security context (key and initial vector) to the candidate AP. The scheme is light-
weight and uses reactive method for handoff. Two kinds of APs are defined in the 
scheme: normal AP and Domain Controller AP (DCAP). STA request DCAP through 
AP by putting ID of the candidate AP. DCAP in turn distributes the STA context 
(key and initial vector) to the candidate AP. Thus, when STA roams into the area of 
candidate AP, less time is involved in the STA authentication at the candidate AP.
For providing fast and secure handoff for the mobile STA in WLANs, standard 
bodies IEEE and IETF have defined protocols like Control and Provisioning of 
Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP), HandOver Keying (HOKEY) and IEEE 802.11r 
(Task group r) [5]. CAPWAP supports centralized management of APs. HOKEY 
extends the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) architecture 
to support key deriving and distribution with involving full EAP authentication. 
802.11r depends upon passing credentials directly between APs for handover. 
Though CAPWAP takes very less time, it is more or less re-authentication with 
centralized Access Controller (AC), followed by key transfer to new Wireless 
Termination Points (WTP). HOKEY is successful in multidomains but it takes more 
communication time. Among these three (CAPWAP, HOKEY and 802.11r), 802.11r 
is more efficient in terms of communication overheads. It still has issues concerning 
the safe transfer of key between APs.
4.1 Comparisons of various handoff mechanisms
CAPWAP and HOKEY does not change the existing 802.11 frame structure. 
802.11r is a separate protocol and hence has different frame structure. All except 
CAPWAP scheme generates fresh session keys. Fresh traffic keys are generated by 
all the schemes. Communication overhead of KHC based handoff scheme is less as 
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compared to any other scheme. This handoff scheme shortens the handoff latency 
by initiating a key transfer process prior to moving to the new AP and performing 
handoff. It strengthens the security by (1) protecting STAs from re-associating to 
Malicious APs, (2) evolving fresh keys even during handshake, (3) authenticating 
all the frames during the handoff and, (4) safeguarding against DoS attacks and, 
(5) providing continuous authentication during communication.
5. Conclusions
This chapter discusses about the present WLAN security environment. It is 
clear that the WLAN security environment till date is dominated by WPA2 (IEEE 
802.11i) standard. Researchers have pointed out regarding length and complexity 
of the WPA2. The major point of concern in WPA2 is key refreshing mechanism 
i.e., 4-way handshake due to which the WLAN security is considered vulnerable. 
Researchers, hence target to reduce the length of this handshake while maintaining 
the security properties intact.
The chapter also studies other WLAN security mechanisms proposed by 
researchers and categories them into: (i) access control, (ii) per frame authentica-
tion and (iii) secure handoff mechanisms. It provides category wise comparative 
analysis of these mechanisms. Three mechanisms are considered in the access 
control category. Among them Key Hiding Communication (KHC) is the most 
attractive but it requires changes in the existing WLAN frame structure. Per frame 
category is further sub-categorized into: (a) per frame authentication mechanisms 
utilizing MIC and (b) lightweight per frame authentication mechanisms. For 
enhancing the security, most of the per frame authentication solutions rely on MIC 
for both authentication and integrity of frame. It is shown that this MIC verification 
involves computation time and large number of such verifications may result in 
computation DoS attack on the receiver. The researchers hence advocate separating 
the authentication and integrity parts in per frame authentication. The lightweight 
per frame authentication mechanism are though lightweight in nature but lacks 
security properties like key refreshing, secrecy and integrity. In this chapter, 
several handoff mechanisms for WLAN environment are also discussed and it is 
accomplished that none guarantees to maintain required level of security during the 
specified handoff time limits.
WLAN security is having a transformation from WPA2 to WPA3. WLAN 
security is strengthened in the upcoming standard i.e., WPA3. It is very early to 
comment on the effectiveness of WPA3 and it is evident that the existing WLAN 
devices will continue to use WPA2. The new upcoming WLAN devices will obvi-
ously follow the backward compatibility towards WPA2. Thus, researchers can still 
target to test the implementation of 802.11i with the novel ideas like MIC reduction, 
4-way handshake reduction and blockchain application in WLANs [33]. In wireless 
medium, per frame lightweight authentication mechanisms will prove an edge and 
in future, researchers may consider developing such solutions. For maintaining un-
interrupting communication quick, secure, accurate and secure handoff is the need 
of the hour. Hence, researchers in future may consider implementation of efficient 
and secure handoff mechanisms using WPA3.
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Information
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Abstract
In this chapter, we consider the possibility of hidden data. Since today all net-
work services rely on the basic protocols, the use of untestable and redundant fields 
may become a big problem. All of the modern data protocols have vulnerabilities. 
An attacker can use the reserved fields or field use undocumented way. Depending 
on the data transmission method and detection mechanisms, the technology for 
assessing the possibility of transmitting hidden information is changing. The work 
is of great practical interest for the implementation of systems to detect and prevent 
intrusions and data leaks in it. The authors determine the possibility of transmis-
sion and detection sends using a comparative evaluation of the fields in the packet 
with the values recommended in the standard protocol.
Keywords: network protocols, transport protocols, network analyze, network 
security
1. Introduction
Network steganography—type of steganography, in which secret data carriers 
use the network protocols of the OSI reference model—the open systems intercon-
nection network model. In general, network steganography is a family of methods 
for modifying data in the headers of network protocols and in the payload fields 
of packets, changing the structure of packet transmission and hybrid methods in a 
particular network protocol (and sometimes several at once).
The transfer of hidden data in network steganography is carried out through hid-
den channels. The term “covert channel” introduced by Simmons in 1983 determined 
that the problem of information leakage is not limited to the use of software. A covert 
channel can exist in any open channel in which there is some redundancy. The hidden 
data is called steganogram. They are located in a specific carrier (carrier).
In network steganography, the role of the carrier is carried out by the packet 
transmitted over the network. The main parameters of network steganography 
are the bandwidth, covert channel, probability of detection, and steganographic 
cost. Bandwidth is the amount of secret data that can be sent per unit of time. The 
probability of detection is determined by the possibility of detecting a steganogram 
in a particular carrier. The most popular way to detect a steganogram is to analyze 
the statistical properties of the data obtained and compare them with typical values 
for this carrier. Steganographic cost characterizes the degree of change in the carrier 
after exposure to the steganographic method.
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1.1 Network steganography methods
Baseline data for consideration classifications of methods and means of net-
work steganography come from the materials of Polish scientists Mazurczyk and 
Szczypiorski and reports on the experiments of Canadian scientists Ahsan and Kundur, 
scientists Cauich and Gomez of the University of California at Irvine, and researchers 
Handel and Sandford at the National laboratory at Los Amos. All materials are freely 
available. Network steganography methods can be divided into three groups [1]:
• Steganography methods, whose essence is in changing data in the fields of the 
network protocol headers and in the packets payload fields.
• Steganography methods, in which the structure of packet transmission 
changes, for example, the sequence of packet transmission or the intentional 
introduction of packet loss during transmission.
• Mixed (hybrid) methods of steganography—when they are used, the contents 
of the packages, the delivery times of the packages, and the order of their 
transfer change.
Each of these methods is divided into several groups; for example, package 
modification methods include three different methods:
• Methods for changing data in protocol header fields: they are based on modify-
ing the IP, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), SCTP header fields, and so on.
• Packet payload modification methods; in this case, various watermark algo-
rithms, speech codecs, and other steganographic techniques for hiding data are 
used.
• Methods of mixed techniques.
Methods for modifying the structure of gears and packages include three 
guidelines:
• Methods in which the order of the sequence of packets is changed.
• Methods that change the delay between packets.
• Methods, the essence of which is to introduce intentional packet loss by 
 skipping sequence numbers at the sender.
Mixed (hybrid) methods of steganography use two approaches: methods of 
audio packet loss (LACK) [2] and packet retransmission (RSTEG) [1].
The main idea of methods for modifying header fields is to use some header 
fields to add steganogram to them [3, 4]. This is possible due to some redundancy in 
these fields, that is, there are certain conditions in which the values in these fields 
will not be used in the transmission of packets. The most commonly used header 
fields are IP and TCP protocols.
Consider an example of a similar method based on modifying unused IP proto-
col fields to create a hidden channel [4].
The value of the “Identification” field of the IP packet is generated to the sender 
side. This number contains a random number that is generated when a package 
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is created. The “Identification” field is used only when fragmentation is used. 
Therefore, to use this method, you need to know the MTU value in the transmitted 
network and not exceed it, so that the packet is not fragmented during transmis-
sion. In the absence of the need for packet fragmentation, a certain redundancy 
occurs in the “Flags” field, in the second bit, which is responsible for setting the 
Don’t Fragment (DF) flag. It is possible to specify a flag notifying the sender’s 
unwillingness to fragment a packet. If the steganogram package is not fragmented 
due to its size, you can hide the information in the “DoNotFragmentBit” flag field. 
Using this method provides bandwidth of 1 bit.
The advantage of this method is the transmission of unchanged information 
from the sender to the recipient, but it also limits the amount of information sent. 
Steganography based on this method is easily implemented; has a good bandwidth, 
since you can send a lot of IP packets with the changes; and is low cost due to the use 
of fields that do not violate the functionality of the packet. Among the shortcom-
ings it should be noted that the transmitted data is contained in the open form and 
can be easily read by the observer (although it is possible to strengthen the protec-
tion using additional cryptography).
Another method of modifying network packets that alters the payload of a VoIP 
packet can be widely used in practice with the popularity of programs that provide 
voice and video communications over the Internet. The network steganography method 
designed to hide VoIP messages is called Transcoding Steganography (TranSteg), a 
network steganography method that compresses the payload of a network packet 
by transcoding. TranSteg can be used in other applications or services (e.g., stream-
ing video), where there is a possibility of compression (with or without losses) of 
open data. In TranSteg, data compression is used to make room for the steganogram: 
transcoding (lossy compression) of voice data from a high bitrate to a lower bitrate 
occurs with minimal loss of voice quality, and after compression, data is added to the 
free space in the payload package [5]. In general, the method allows to obtain more or 
less good steganographic bandwidth of 32 kb/s with the smallest difference in packet 
delay. Experiments of Polish scientists have shown that the delay in transmitting a VoIP 
packet using TranSteg increases by 1 ms, in contrast to a packet without a steganogram. 
The complexity of detection directly depends on the choice of the scenario and the 
conditions of the outside observer (e.g., its location). Among the shortcomings worth 
mentioning is the fact that this method is difficult to implement. It is necessary to find 
out which codecs the program uses for voice communication, to choose codecs with the 
smallest difference in speech quality, while giving more space for embedding stegano-
grams. During compression, the quality of the transmitted speech information is lost.
Also interesting is the direction using the mechanisms of the SCTP protocol. 
Stream control transport protocol (SCTP) [6] is a packet-based transport protocol, 
a new-level transport protocol that will replace TCP and User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) in future networks. Today, this protocol is implemented in operating 
systems such as BSD, Linux, HP-UX, and SunSolaris, supports network devices of 
the Cisco IOS operating system, and can be used in Windows. SCTP steganography 
uses new features of this protocol, such as multi-threading and the use of multiple 
interfaces (multi-homing).
The methods of SCTP steganography can be divided into three groups [7]:
• Methods in which the contents of SCTP packets change.
• Methods in which the sequence of transmission of SCTP packets is changed.
• Methods that affect both the content of packages and their order when 
 transfer (hybrid method).
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1.1 Network steganography methods
Baseline data for consideration classifications of methods and means of net-
work steganography come from the materials of Polish scientists Mazurczyk and 
Szczypiorski and reports on the experiments of Canadian scientists Ahsan and Kundur, 
scientists Cauich and Gomez of the University of California at Irvine, and researchers 
Handel and Sandford at the National laboratory at Los Amos. All materials are freely 
available. Network steganography methods can be divided into three groups [1]:
• Steganography methods, whose essence is in changing data in the fields of the 
network protocol headers and in the packets payload fields.
• Steganography methods, in which the structure of packet transmission 
changes, for example, the sequence of packet transmission or the intentional 
introduction of packet loss during transmission.
• Mixed (hybrid) methods of steganography—when they are used, the contents 
of the packages, the delivery times of the packages, and the order of their 
transfer change.
Each of these methods is divided into several groups; for example, package 
modification methods include three different methods:
• Methods for changing data in protocol header fields: they are based on modify-
ing the IP, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), SCTP header fields, and so on.
• Packet payload modification methods; in this case, various watermark algo-
rithms, speech codecs, and other steganographic techniques for hiding data are 
used.
• Methods of mixed techniques.
Methods for modifying the structure of gears and packages include three 
guidelines:
• Methods in which the order of the sequence of packets is changed.
• Methods that change the delay between packets.
• Methods, the essence of which is to introduce intentional packet loss by 
 skipping sequence numbers at the sender.
Mixed (hybrid) methods of steganography use two approaches: methods of 
audio packet loss (LACK) [2] and packet retransmission (RSTEG) [1].
The main idea of methods for modifying header fields is to use some header 
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side. This number contains a random number that is generated when a package 
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is created. The “Identification” field is used only when fragmentation is used. 
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Methods for changing the contents of SCTP packets are based on the fact 
that each STCP packet is made up of parts and each of these parts can contain 
variable parameters. Regardless of the implementation, a statistical analysis 
of the addresses of the network cards used for the forwarded blocks can help 
in detecting hidden connections. Eliminating the possibility of applying this 
method, steganography can be achieved by changing the source and destina-
tion addresses in randomly selected packet, which is contained in the re-expel 
e PTO unit.
The essence of the hybrid method based on the SCTP protocol is to use certain 
protocol mechanisms that allow you to organize the intentional passing of packets 
in a stream without resending it. Later a steganogram is added to this packet, 
and it is resubmitted [7]. Modification of packages using a hybrid method can 
be presented on the Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks 
(HICCUPS), which uses the imperfections of data transmission in a network 
environment, such as interference and noise in a communication environment, as 
well as the usual susceptibility of data to distortion. HICCUPS is a steganographic 
system with bandwidth allocation in a public network environment. Wireless 
networks are more susceptible to data corruption than wired ones, so the use 
of noise and noise in the communication environment during system operation 
looks very tempting. “Listening” of all the frames with the transmitted data in the 
environment and the ability to send damaged frames with incorrectly corrected 
code values are two important network features necessary for the implementa-
tion of HICCUPS. In particular, wireless networks use an air connection with a 
variable bit error rate (BER), which makes it possible to introduce artificially 
damaged frames. This method has low bandwidth (network dependent), cumber-
some implementation, low steganographic cost, and high detection complexity. 
However, the frame analysis does not involve checksum may lead to the discovery 
of the use of Nogo given method.
The RSTEG method is based on the packet resending mechanism, the essence of 
which is as follows: when the sender sends a packet, the recipient does not respond 
with a confirmation flag; thus the packet resending mechanism should work, and 
the packet with the steganogram inside will be sent again, but confirmation does 
not come. The next time this mechanism is triggered, the original packet is sent 
without hidden attachments, to which the packet arrives with confirmation of 
successful receipt.
The performance of an RSTEG depends on many factors, such as the details of 
the communication procedures (in particular, the size of the packet payload, the 
frequency with which segments are generated, and so on).
The investigated method of steganography using packet retransmission RSTEG 
is a hybrid. Therefore, its steganographic bandwidth is approximately equal to the 
bandwidth of the methods with packet modification and at the same time higher 
than the methods of changing the order of packet transmission. The complexity 
of detection and throughput is directly related to the use of the implementation 
mechanism of the method. RSTEG based on RTO is characterized by high detec-
tion complexity and low bandwidth, while SACK has the maximum bandwidth for 
RSTEG, but is also more easily detected. The use RSTEG utilizing TCP protocol is 
a good choice for IP networks. Among the shortcomings, it should be noted that 
this method is difficult to implement, especially its scenarios, which are based on 
interception and correction of packets transmitted by ordinary users. Due to the 
dramatically increased frequency of retransmitted packets or the unusual occur-
rence of delays in the transmission of steganograms, a casual observer may be 
suspicious.
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Lost audio packets steganography (LACK)—steganography of deliber-
ate delay of audio packets [2]. This is another method implemented via 
VoIP. Communication over IP telephony consists of two parts: signaling (dialing) 
and conversational. Both parts of the traffic are transmitted in both directions. 
The signaling protocols used are SIP and RTP (with RTCP acting as the control 
protocol). This means that during the signaling phase of the call, the SIP end-
points (called user SIP agents) exchange some SIP messages. Usually SIP messages 
pass through SIP servers: proxy or redirected, which allows users to search and 
find each other. After this stage, the conversation phase begins, where the audio 
(RTP) stream goes to both directions between the caller and the callee. This 
method has certain advantages. The bandwidth is not less and sometimes higher 
than the other algorithms that use audio packets. But if you intentionally cause 
losses, the quality of the connection deteriorates, which can become suspicious 
for both ordinary users and listeners. Based on the presented steganalysis LACK 
methods, it can be concluded that the method has an average detection complex-
ity. The implementation of the method is too complex, but may not be possible 
within certain operating systems.
Table 1 shows a comparison of methods and their main characteristics 
and implementation. The position of each method in this table shows how 
much its characteristics are superior or inferior to the others. The higher the 
method displayed at the table, the more indicators of its characteristics. In the 
“Implementation” field, the simplicity of the organization of this method is 
considered. The less time and effort required by the implementation of this 
method, the higher its position in this title. Based on the data from Table 1, it can 
be concluded that the main characteristics are directly dependent on each other.
No Throughput ability 
steganography
Complexity 
discoveries
Steganography cost Implementation
1 TranSteg HICCUPS HICCUPS Modification header 
fields TCP and IP 
packets
2 LACK TranSteg LACK Modification data 
blocks in SCTP 
protocols
3 HICCUPS LACK RSTEG TranSteg
4 RSTEG RSTEG TranSteg Using SCTP 
multi-homing
5 Modification fields 
in TCP headers and 
IP packets
Using SCTP protocol 
(hybrid)
Protocol use SCTP 
(hybrid)
Using SCTP protocol 
(hybrid)
6 Modification data 
blocks in SCTP 
protocols
SCTP multi-homing Modification of 
blocks data in SCTP 
protocols
LACK
7 Using SCTP protocol 
(hybrid)
Modification fields in 
TCP headers and IP 
packets
SCTP multi-homing RSTEG
8 Using SCTP 
multi-homing
Modification data 
blocks in SCTP 
protocols
Modifying fields in 
TCP and IP headers 
packages
HICCUPS
Table 1. 
Comparison of network steganography methods.
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the communication procedures (in particular, the size of the packet payload, the 
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than the methods of changing the order of packet transmission. The complexity 
of detection and throughput is directly related to the use of the implementation 
mechanism of the method. RSTEG based on RTO is characterized by high detec-
tion complexity and low bandwidth, while SACK has the maximum bandwidth for 
RSTEG, but is also more easily detected. The use RSTEG utilizing TCP protocol is 
a good choice for IP networks. Among the shortcomings, it should be noted that 
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and conversational. Both parts of the traffic are transmitted in both directions. 
The signaling protocols used are SIP and RTP (with RTCP acting as the control 
protocol). This means that during the signaling phase of the call, the SIP end-
points (called user SIP agents) exchange some SIP messages. Usually SIP messages 
pass through SIP servers: proxy or redirected, which allows users to search and 
find each other. After this stage, the conversation phase begins, where the audio 
(RTP) stream goes to both directions between the caller and the callee. This 
method has certain advantages. The bandwidth is not less and sometimes higher 
than the other algorithms that use audio packets. But if you intentionally cause 
losses, the quality of the connection deteriorates, which can become suspicious 
for both ordinary users and listeners. Based on the presented steganalysis LACK 
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2. The combined method using modification of the fields IP and TCP
As mentioned earlier, the methods for modifying the IP and TCP header 
fields have certain features that make them stand out from the rest of the 
methods:
• The most common and standard protocols are used as carriers of the steganogram.
• Total gives bandwidth of 49 bits per 1 packet.
• Implemented on any operating system, the implementation does not require 
long adjustments and preparations.
• Changes in the package will not affect its behavior on the network, in case it 
will not be fragmented.
Despite the many advantages of both methods, there are some flaws, and the 
main one, to which attention is immediately drawn, is the obviousness of data 
transfer, i.e., any statistical analysis allows us to calculate both the hidden commu-
nication channel itself and the information transmitted in it.
The method proposed by Rowland [3] is as follows: to generate a value in the 
“Sequence Number” field, the plaintext character is encoded in accordance with 
the ASCII table, and the resulting value is multiplied by a certain number multiple 
of two. The resulting value is entered in the “Sequence Number” field and sent to 
the recipient. The recipient, knowing the key (divider), should check all incoming 
TCP packets for the subject of the steganogram, dividing the value of the “Sequence 
number” field by the key.
On the one hand, this method allows you to create a data channel through which 
you can transmit secret data in front of a passive observer. But the existence of a 
single key is a disadvantage, since, based on a dozen of such packages, it can be 
concluded that the sequence numbers of all packages have a common factor, which 
is the key. Thus, the proposed method is easy to detect.
Based on the source data and analysis of the disadvantages of network stegan-
ography methods with modification of the IP and TCP packet header fields, we can 
propose a modified method that will be based on the simultaneous use of the IP and 
TCP protocol header fields. The key needed to decrypt the transmitted message will 
also be transmitted as a steganogram, only in encrypted form in the “Identifier” 
field of the IP header, while the encrypted steganogram will be transmitted in the 
“Sequence number” field of the TCP header.
The implementation of this method is divided into two parts:
• Preparing data for the transfer, which includes generating the key k, convert-
ing the transmitted secret symbol or number into its corresponding code in the 
ASCII table, and calculating the value of the carrier C, which is an encrypted 
steganogram.
• Entering data into the corresponding TCP and IP header fields.
The first block consists of the following steps:
• Generation of the key k, which will be used in the future. The key can be any 
number that is a multiple of two. To generate a key, take two numbers x and y 
and raise the first to the power of the second.
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• The conversion of secret data—a character or number that must be transferred 
to the corresponding code in the ASCII table. The coded number is denoted 
by S, since it is our steganogram.
• Getting the media C as the product of the key value by the value of a secret 
character.
C = S*k10
• Checking the number C—it must meet the requirement 228 < C < 233. This con-
dition is necessary so that the value of the “Sequence number” field does not 
look suspicious. If the value of C does not meet the requirements, the numbers 
x and y need to be changed to others, and repeat steps 1–2. Further studies will 
be conducted on the automatic formation of x, y.
• The value of the numbers x and y is written together into the number z and is 
flipped so that the previous values can only be read from right to left.
Then the data is converted from decimal to hexadecimal. Thus, we get a three-
digit hexadecimal number inv. (z) 16.
Then, at the second stage, you need to put the obtained values  of the encrypted 
key and steganogram into the TCP and IP header fields.
We briefly describe the network steganography method with a modification 
of the fields in the TCP header, since in it we will transmit the secret message 
itself. For the purpose of steganography, the header of this protocol usually uses 
some fields that can be changed without losing the functionality of the package. 
For the purpose of our research, we will focus on the “Sequence Number” field 
(SN, SequenceNumber). This field performs two tasks. The first is the follow-
ing: if the SYN flag is set, then this initial value of the sequence number is ISN 
(InitialSequenceNumber), and the first byte of data that will be transmitted in the 
next packet will have a sequence number equal to ISN + 1. Otherwise, if SYN is not 
set, the first byte of data transmitted in this packet has this sequence number. For 
our case it is important to know that this value will not change during the path of 
the packet from the sender to the recipient.
The “Sequence Number” field allows you to create a 32-bit length sequence. 
According to the Rowland method, the transmitted message is encoded in accor-
dance with the ASCII table and multiplied by a certain number (the key), a multiple 
of two to reduce the detection probability, then entered into the generated TCP 
packet in the “Sequence number” field, and the packet is sent. When the packet 
reaches the destination address, the recipient must save all incoming TCP packets, 
from which he must remove the value in the “Sequence number” field and then 
divide by the key he knows in advance. But, as it was said before, this method is 
extremely easy to detect based on the analysis of a number of TCP packets due 
to a permanent key. In the proposed modification of the method, this key will be 
transmitted simultaneously with the TCP packet, in the IP header. This will increase 
the difficulty of detecting the steganogram.
The next step is to add the value of the C media in the “Sequence Number” field 
of the TCP header.
Next, you must enter the value of the encrypted key (inv (z)) 16 in the IP header 
field. To organize such an operation, you should return to the network steganogra-
phy method with modification of the IP header fields. During the packet path, only 
the “Identifier” field remains unchanged; its length is 16 bits and 1 bit in the “Flags” 
field, which is responsible for the DF flag. Changing these fields does not carry 
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set, the first byte of data transmitted in this packet has this sequence number. For 
our case it is important to know that this value will not change during the path of 
the packet from the sender to the recipient.
The “Sequence Number” field allows you to create a 32-bit length sequence. 
According to the Rowland method, the transmitted message is encoded in accor-
dance with the ASCII table and multiplied by a certain number (the key), a multiple 
of two to reduce the detection probability, then entered into the generated TCP 
packet in the “Sequence number” field, and the packet is sent. When the packet 
reaches the destination address, the recipient must save all incoming TCP packets, 
from which he must remove the value in the “Sequence number” field and then 
divide by the key he knows in advance. But, as it was said before, this method is 
extremely easy to detect based on the analysis of a number of TCP packets due 
to a permanent key. In the proposed modification of the method, this key will be 
transmitted simultaneously with the TCP packet, in the IP header. This will increase 
the difficulty of detecting the steganogram.
The next step is to add the value of the C media in the “Sequence Number” field 
of the TCP header.
Next, you must enter the value of the encrypted key (inv (z)) 16 in the IP header 
field. To organize such an operation, you should return to the network steganogra-
phy method with modification of the IP header fields. During the packet path, only 
the “Identifier” field remains unchanged; its length is 16 bits and 1 bit in the “Flags” 
field, which is responsible for the DF flag. Changing these fields does not carry 
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changes in the package, in case the package is not fragmented, but it should not be, 
since by condition we need to know the minimum MTU value and not exceed it 
when creating and sending the package.
At the “Identifier” field, 16 bits is available to us for adding a steganogram; the 
information in it is displayed in the form of four numbers in hexadecimal number 
system. Thus, we have 65,535 possible values that can be used both for transmitting 
the steganogram and for the key, which in turn is also a steganogram. In order not to 
transmit the key in such an explicit form, it is proposed to use only three numbers 
out of four, while reading them from right to left. In this case, the number can be 
odd with its standard reading from left to right. The fourth unused number can take 
any value. Thus, we can use only 16 of the 17 bits available in a packet. It is proposed 
to use the second bit in the “Flags” field—DF—as a specific label, the presence 
of which allows you to expand the key extraction algorithm: whether you need to 
read the value from the first or from the second number in the “Identifier” field to 
extract the key.
Thus, the next step is to enter (inv (z)) 16 in the “Identifier” field of the IP 
header. At the same time, we must set the value of “1” to the second bit in the 
“Flags” field if we enter the key in the first 12 bytes of the “Identifier” field or 
0 if we fill the first 4 bytes of the field with random values and in the remaining 
12 bytes our key.
Next, we send a packet with modified fields to the recipient, where he must 
carry out the procedure inversely described in the framework of this algorithm [8].
We calculate the bandwidth of the proposed method.
Since the “Identifier” field in the IP header can contain 16 bits of information, 1 bit 
is available in the “Flags” field, and in the “Sequence number” field, a 32-bit informa-
tion is available in the TCP header; we can conclude that the total throughput of steg-
anography is 49 bits. But it should be noted that in this method we use the “Identifier” 
field to transmit the encrypted key in the steganogram, which is used to extract secret 
information from the “Sequence number” field, and the bit in the “Flags” field is used 
as a label. Thus, to transfer the encrypted key, we allocate 12 bits of information avail-
able in the “Identifier” field, and in the remaining 4 bits, we enter a random number 
from 0 to 16 in the hexadecimal number system (from 1 to F) and use 1 bit as a label, 
necessary for more organization more flexible operation of the algorithm. Based on 
this, we can conclude that for transmitting specific information, we have 32 bits left 
in the “Sequence number” field, and 3 bits of secret information can be transmitted, 
which is encrypted in 32 bits of information hiding the secret.
2.1 Intercomputer exchange
The exchange of computer networks is based on the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) reference model.
Studying hidden information flows with computer interaction on networks of 
interest will include information about the services that are added to the network 
traffic data. As part of the protocol, headings are assessed at two levels: network 
and transport. We will address network protocols (IPv4 and IPv6) and transport 
protocols (TCP and UDP).
Further, we are considering the reports and the possibility of more detailed 
manipulation.
2.2 IPv4
IPv4 is the most popular protocol of network level; see more information in 
RFC791.
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The header size of IPv4 is 20 bytes; using specialized field in header—“Options” 
field—can increase it. When the amount of the header is less than 20 bytes, it is 
likely damaged and has to be discarded.
2.3 Header of IPv4
The format of IPv4 header is presented in Figure 1.
IPv4 header field analysis shows the following results:
1. “Internet Header Length” field. Ability to increase the size of the Internet 
Header Length field to extend the original header. This change allows you to 
add data to the next two “Options” and “Padding” fields.
2. “Type of Service” field
Bits from 0 to 2 are set for priority and 6 to 7 set to reserved.
-0-2:
 The value “111” should not appear on the networks of provider; it could be 
appearing only for local networks, which leads to the point that the capture of 
this value in the network provider is a mark of malicious information injection.
-6-7:
 By default, these bits are reserved and must be set to 0; the result is that the 
other value is possible injection information.
3. “Identification” field
 You can change the value of the identification field. The point is that the field 
is used to build correctly after fragmentation, but there is a DF flag that rejects 
fragment packets, so if the flag is set to “1” this ID is not required, and this field 
could be used to pass hidden information.
4. “Flags” field
 As the standard requires, the first bit is reserved and should be set to “0”; 
if the result is different, it is mark of injection information.
Figure 1. 
Header of IPv4.
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changes in the package, in case the package is not fragmented, but it should not be, 
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information in it is displayed in the form of four numbers in hexadecimal number 
system. Thus, we have 65,535 possible values that can be used both for transmitting 
the steganogram and for the key, which in turn is also a steganogram. In order not to 
transmit the key in such an explicit form, it is proposed to use only three numbers 
out of four, while reading them from right to left. In this case, the number can be 
odd with its standard reading from left to right. The fourth unused number can take 
any value. Thus, we can use only 16 of the 17 bits available in a packet. It is proposed 
to use the second bit in the “Flags” field—DF—as a specific label, the presence 
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as a label. Thus, to transfer the encrypted key, we allocate 12 bits of information avail-
able in the “Identifier” field, and in the remaining 4 bits, we enter a random number 
from 0 to 16 in the hexadecimal number system (from 1 to F) and use 1 bit as a label, 
necessary for more organization more flexible operation of the algorithm. Based on 
this, we can conclude that for transmitting specific information, we have 32 bits left 
in the “Sequence number” field, and 3 bits of secret information can be transmitted, 
which is encrypted in 32 bits of information hiding the secret.
2.1 Intercomputer exchange
The exchange of computer networks is based on the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) reference model.
Studying hidden information flows with computer interaction on networks of 
interest will include information about the services that are added to the network 
traffic data. As part of the protocol, headings are assessed at two levels: network 
and transport. We will address network protocols (IPv4 and IPv6) and transport 
protocols (TCP and UDP).
Further, we are considering the reports and the possibility of more detailed 
manipulation.
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IPv4 is the most popular protocol of network level; see more information in 
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The header size of IPv4 is 20 bytes; using specialized field in header—“Options” 
field—can increase it. When the amount of the header is less than 20 bytes, it is 
likely damaged and has to be discarded.
2.3 Header of IPv4
The format of IPv4 header is presented in Figure 1.
IPv4 header field analysis shows the following results:
1. “Internet Header Length” field. Ability to increase the size of the Internet 
Header Length field to extend the original header. This change allows you to 
add data to the next two “Options” and “Padding” fields.
2. “Type of Service” field
Bits from 0 to 2 are set for priority and 6 to 7 set to reserved.
-0-2:
 The value “111” should not appear on the networks of provider; it could be 
appearing only for local networks, which leads to the point that the capture of 
this value in the network provider is a mark of malicious information injection.
-6-7:
 By default, these bits are reserved and must be set to 0; the result is that the 
other value is possible injection information.
3. “Identification” field
 You can change the value of the identification field. The point is that the field 
is used to build correctly after fragmentation, but there is a DF flag that rejects 
fragment packets, so if the flag is set to “1” this ID is not required, and this field 
could be used to pass hidden information.
4. “Flags” field
 As the standard requires, the first bit is reserved and should be set to “0”; 
if the result is different, it is mark of injection information.
Figure 1. 
Header of IPv4.
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5. “Fragment Offset” field
 You can change the value of the “Fragment Offset” field. The best option is 
when the DF flag is set to “0,” since the fragmentation strategy is designed so 
that an unfragmented datagram in all fields related to fragmentation has zero 
values. This means, despite the fact that the flag prevents fragmentation, we 
can still implement it in the offset of the fragment, but the fact of identifica-
tion of the manipulation becomes more detectable.
6. “Source Address” field
You can change the “Source Address” field value.
7. It should be noted that manipulation is possible only on the condition that the 
package consists of hidden source data. Since the manipulation will not be 
caused by the source of the information, the receiving site could not properly 
build the packets.
8. “Destination Address” field
 IPv4-in IPv6 headers can be encapsulated using the IPv4 Destination Address 
field to insert information into it. In this case, the IPv6 header will be respon-
sible for delivering the package.
9. “Options” field
 The value of the options field is limited in the IPv4 header, and as a result of 
the analysis, we are trying to determine any field value that may appear in 
this type of field. So we may try to determine the incorrect significant of this 
field, the appearance of which indicates the possible malicious activity on the 
injection of information.
10. “Padding” field
 This field goes after value 0x00 of the “Options” field; the value is the EOL 
and takes up to 32-bit header boundaries. The interest in this manipulation 
is that after the optional EOL, the equipment does not examine headers on 
32-bit boundaries; this means that these bytes are invisible to network devices 
and sniffer. Although the analysis of this field is simple enough, the EOL up 
to 32-bit header boundaries must be set to “0” at the standard behind the 
“Options” field, causing any other value of this field to indicate that the data is 
being injected.
2.4 Injection’s result
The standard IPv4 header size with options and fields with padding is 320 bits. 
Two different options need to be considered:
1. IPv4 is a carrier and is responsible for packet addressing. Due to manipulation, 
182 bits can be used, which is 56.88% of the total number of bits. This volume 
allows you to insert 22 symbols from 8 bits in ASCII encoding into the header. 
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So after calculations we have got a value up to 4 bits. This remainder is part of 
the other 8 bits of the transmitted information.
2. IPv4 is a passenger, it’s an IPv4 encapsulated header in other headers, such as 
IPv6 or GRE. In this case, the method for implementing the target address can 
be used. As a result, handling bits 214, 66% of the total number of bits can be 
used. This volume allows you to implement a 26-character header with 8 bits 
in ASCII encoding. Thus, after calculations, a value of 6 bits is obtained. The 
treated residue was included in an additional 8 bits of the transmitted symbol.
2.5 IPv6
2.5.1 Header of IPv6
The header’s format of IPv6 is presented in Figure 2.
1. “Traffic Class” field
 You can change the “Traffic Class” value arbitrarily. This manipulation cannot 
be detected by analysis.
2. “Flow description” field
You can change the value of the “Flow Label” field.
This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet sniffer.
3. “Load Length” field
 It is possible to increase the size of this field when adding data to the end of 
the original IP packet, like IPv4. This modification cannot be detected by the 
packet sniffer.
Figure 2. 
Header format of IPv6.
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5. “Fragment Offset” field
 You can change the value of the “Fragment Offset” field. The best option is 
when the DF flag is set to “0,” since the fragmentation strategy is designed so 
that an unfragmented datagram in all fields related to fragmentation has zero 
values. This means, despite the fact that the flag prevents fragmentation, we 
can still implement it in the offset of the fragment, but the fact of identifica-
tion of the manipulation becomes more detectable.
6. “Source Address” field
You can change the “Source Address” field value.
7. It should be noted that manipulation is possible only on the condition that the 
package consists of hidden source data. Since the manipulation will not be 
caused by the source of the information, the receiving site could not properly 
build the packets.
8. “Destination Address” field
 IPv4-in IPv6 headers can be encapsulated using the IPv4 Destination Address 
field to insert information into it. In this case, the IPv6 header will be respon-
sible for delivering the package.
9. “Options” field
 The value of the options field is limited in the IPv4 header, and as a result of 
the analysis, we are trying to determine any field value that may appear in 
this type of field. So we may try to determine the incorrect significant of this 
field, the appearance of which indicates the possible malicious activity on the 
injection of information.
10. “Padding” field
 This field goes after value 0x00 of the “Options” field; the value is the EOL 
and takes up to 32-bit header boundaries. The interest in this manipulation 
is that after the optional EOL, the equipment does not examine headers on 
32-bit boundaries; this means that these bytes are invisible to network devices 
and sniffer. Although the analysis of this field is simple enough, the EOL up 
to 32-bit header boundaries must be set to “0” at the standard behind the 
“Options” field, causing any other value of this field to indicate that the data is 
being injected.
2.4 Injection’s result
The standard IPv4 header size with options and fields with padding is 320 bits. 
Two different options need to be considered:
1. IPv4 is a carrier and is responsible for packet addressing. Due to manipulation, 
182 bits can be used, which is 56.88% of the total number of bits. This volume 
allows you to insert 22 symbols from 8 bits in ASCII encoding into the header. 
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So after calculations we have got a value up to 4 bits. This remainder is part of 
the other 8 bits of the transmitted information.
2. IPv4 is a passenger, it’s an IPv4 encapsulated header in other headers, such as 
IPv6 or GRE. In this case, the method for implementing the target address can 
be used. As a result, handling bits 214, 66% of the total number of bits can be 
used. This volume allows you to implement a 26-character header with 8 bits 
in ASCII encoding. Thus, after calculations, a value of 6 bits is obtained. The 
treated residue was included in an additional 8 bits of the transmitted symbol.
2.5 IPv6
2.5.1 Header of IPv6
The header’s format of IPv6 is presented in Figure 2.
1. “Traffic Class” field
 You can change the “Traffic Class” value arbitrarily. This manipulation cannot 
be detected by analysis.
2. “Flow description” field
You can change the value of the “Flow Label” field.
This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet sniffer.
3. “Load Length” field
 It is possible to increase the size of this field when adding data to the end of 
the original IP packet, like IPv4. This modification cannot be detected by the 
packet sniffer.
Figure 2. 
Header format of IPv6.
Computer and Network Security
80
4. “Source Address” field
 You have the possibility to change the data of this field at IPv4 format, but 
international standards from the IPv6 community do not recommend using it 
as a source address.
5. “Destination Address” field
 In this protocol, you can use the IPv6 “Destination Address” field in the IPv4 
encapsulation header to load information into it. In this case, the IPv4 header 
will be responsible for the packet delivery.
This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet sniffer.
3. Result of injection
The standard IPv6 header size with options and fields with padding is 320 bits. 
Two different options need to be considered:
1. IPv6 is a carrier, that is, it is responsible for addressing the package. As a result 
of the manipulations described above, 156 bits can be used, which is 48.75% 
of the total number of bits. This volume allows you to insert a caption with 19 
characters from 8 bits into the ASCII character set. Thus, after calculations get 
a value of 4 bits. The treated residue was included in an additional 8 bits of the 
transmitted symbol.
2. IPv6 is a passenger and is transmitted by IPv6 encapsulation header to other 
headers, such as IPv4 or GRE. In this case, the method for implementing the 
target address can be used. As a result of the manipulations described above, it 
is possible to use 284 bits, which is 88.75% of the total number of bits. This vol-
ume allows you to implement a 35-character header with 8 bits in ASCII. Thus, 
after calculations, we get a possible value of 4 bits. The processed remainder 
will be added as an additional 8 bits of transmitted characters.
3.1 TCP
Transmission Control Protocol is a reliable protocol of transport layer. TCP is 
oriented to establish a logical connection, that is, the hosts negotiate and create a 
session and then begin to transfer data. Every time a package is sent, the sender is 
awaiting acknowledgement of delivery receipt. This protocol is standardized by 
RFC 793.
3.1.1 Header of TCP
Header’s format of TCP is presented in Figure 3.
“Source Port” field
1. You can change the “Source Port” field value. Processing is only possible 
when the package was a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations that 
occur on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly 
assemble the original packet. This manipulation cannot be detected by the 
packet sniffer.
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2. “Destination Port” field
 You can change the value of “Destination Port” field. Handling is only possible 
when the packet was a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations that occur 
on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly assemble the 
original packet. This modification cannot be detected by sniffer.
3. “Sequence Number” field
 We could modify the information in this field. Processing is only possible when 
the package was a source of hidden data. Because of the modification that had 
occurred at the source device, the receiving PC cannot correctly build the 
original packets. This modification cannot be observed by the network sniffer.
4. “Acknowledgment Number” field
 We could change the contents of this field. Modification is allowed provided 
that the package was made up source of hidden data. Due to the modification 
that occurred on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to prop-
erly assemble the original packet.
5. “Data Offset” field
 The manipulation is as follows: this increases the size of the “Data Offset” 
field, expands the TCP header, and adds a parameter field. In the options you 
can add data after byte 0x00 EOL.
 At standard byte 0x00 EOL, bytes with a value of “0” should be due to some 
other value that indicates that a data injection has occurred.
6. “Reserved” field
You can modify the value of this field.
 By default, the values of all standard bits must be set to “0” as a result of some 
other values that indicate that a data injection has been occurred.
Figure 3. 
Header format TCP.
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4. “Source Address” field
 You have the possibility to change the data of this field at IPv4 format, but 
international standards from the IPv6 community do not recommend using it 
as a source address.
5. “Destination Address” field
 In this protocol, you can use the IPv6 “Destination Address” field in the IPv4 
encapsulation header to load information into it. In this case, the IPv4 header 
will be responsible for the packet delivery.
This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet sniffer.
3. Result of injection
The standard IPv6 header size with options and fields with padding is 320 bits. 
Two different options need to be considered:
1. IPv6 is a carrier, that is, it is responsible for addressing the package. As a result 
of the manipulations described above, 156 bits can be used, which is 48.75% 
of the total number of bits. This volume allows you to insert a caption with 19 
characters from 8 bits into the ASCII character set. Thus, after calculations get 
a value of 4 bits. The treated residue was included in an additional 8 bits of the 
transmitted symbol.
2. IPv6 is a passenger and is transmitted by IPv6 encapsulation header to other 
headers, such as IPv4 or GRE. In this case, the method for implementing the 
target address can be used. As a result of the manipulations described above, it 
is possible to use 284 bits, which is 88.75% of the total number of bits. This vol-
ume allows you to implement a 35-character header with 8 bits in ASCII. Thus, 
after calculations, we get a possible value of 4 bits. The processed remainder 
will be added as an additional 8 bits of transmitted characters.
3.1 TCP
Transmission Control Protocol is a reliable protocol of transport layer. TCP is 
oriented to establish a logical connection, that is, the hosts negotiate and create a 
session and then begin to transfer data. Every time a package is sent, the sender is 
awaiting acknowledgement of delivery receipt. This protocol is standardized by 
RFC 793.
3.1.1 Header of TCP
Header’s format of TCP is presented in Figure 3.
“Source Port” field
1. You can change the “Source Port” field value. Processing is only possible 
when the package was a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations that 
occur on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly 
assemble the original packet. This manipulation cannot be detected by the 
packet sniffer.
81
Analysis of Network Protocols: The Ability of Concealing the Information
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88098
2. “Destination Port” field
 You can change the value of “Destination Port” field. Handling is only possible 
when the packet was a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations that occur 
on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly assemble the 
original packet. This modification cannot be detected by sniffer.
3. “Sequence Number” field
 We could modify the information in this field. Processing is only possible when 
the package was a source of hidden data. Because of the modification that had 
occurred at the source device, the receiving PC cannot correctly build the 
original packets. This modification cannot be observed by the network sniffer.
4. “Acknowledgment Number” field
 We could change the contents of this field. Modification is allowed provided 
that the package was made up source of hidden data. Due to the modification 
that occurred on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to prop-
erly assemble the original packet.
5. “Data Offset” field
 The manipulation is as follows: this increases the size of the “Data Offset” 
field, expands the TCP header, and adds a parameter field. In the options you 
can add data after byte 0x00 EOL.
 At standard byte 0x00 EOL, bytes with a value of “0” should be due to some 
other value that indicates that a data injection has occurred.
6. “Reserved” field
You can modify the value of this field.
 By default, the values of all standard bits must be set to “0” as a result of some 
other values that indicate that a data injection has been occurred.
Figure 3. 
Header format TCP.
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7. “Window” field
 You can modify the value of the “Window” field. Handling is only possible 
when the packet was built at a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations 
that occur on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly 
assemble the original packet
8. “Pointer Urgent” field
 You can modify the value of this field. This injection is only possible if all URG 
options are present.
 So, if the Urgent Pointer is filled in and the flag of URG is not setting, it means 
that the Urgent Pointer is not used correctly.
9. “Options” field
We could modify the data of this field. In the options, you can realize the data 
after value 0x00, but it is not considered after this byte header data.
TCP header option values are limited, and network analysis results in attempt-
ing to identify a possible option that attempts to identify incorrectly filled 
options or unknown options whose appearance indicates a possible injection of 
information.
10. “Padding” field
It is possible to fill the field of any padding.
 It should be noted that manipulation is only possible if the package is made up 
of hidden source data. Because of the manipulation that occurs at the source, 
the receiving party cannot properly collect packets.
Handling “Padding” is one of the most interesting. The “Padding” field starts 
after the 0x00 in the “Options” field; the value is the EOL option and takes up to 
32-bit header boundaries. Interest in this manipulation is contained in the following 
text after the EOL does not produce a 32-bit header, which means that these bytes 
are invisible to network devices and sniffer. Although the analysis of this field is 
simple enough, the EOL up to 32-bit header boundaries must be set to “0” at the 
standard behind the “Options” field, causing any other value of this field to indicate 
that the data is being injected.
4. Result of injection
The standard TCP header field with options and fall is 192 bits. As a result of 
the above actions, you can use up to 150 bits, which is 78.13% of the total number 
of bits in the original, unmodified header. This amount of data allows the use of 
18 characters in an 8-bit header in the standard ASCII character set. Therefore, 
after all the calculations, we get the maximum possible amount equal to 6 bits. The 
processed piece of information was included in the next 8 bits of the transmitted 
symbol.
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4.1 UDP
User Datagram Protocol is a connectionless transport layer protocol. No con-
nection setup is created before transferring between hosts. This protocol is less 
reliable than TCP, but gives a higher transfer rate with less overhead. This protocol 
is standardized by RFC 768.
4.1.1 Header field of UDP
Header’s format of UDP is presented in Figure 4.
“Source Port” field
1. You can change the “Source Port” field value. Processing is only possible when 
the package was a hidden data source. Because of the manipulation that had 
occurred at the source device, the receiving party cannot properly assemble 
the original packets. This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet 
sniffer.
2. “Destination Port” field
 You can change the “Target Port” field value. Processing is only possible when 
the package was created by a hidden data source. Due to the manipulation 
of the device generating the packages, the receiving party cannot correctly 
assemble the source packages. This modification cannot be detected by the 
network sniffer.
3. “Length” field
 We could change the significance of the “Length” field. Increasing the value of 
this field has also increased the size of the package, so we can change the fields 
of data octets by appending to the end of datagram.
So processing is possible when the package was a source of hidden data. So if the 
modification had occurred at the source device, the receiving host cannot properly 
assemble the original packets. This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet 
sniffer.
Figure 4. 
Header of UDP.
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7. “Window” field
 You can modify the value of the “Window” field. Handling is only possible 
when the packet was built at a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations 
that occur on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly 
assemble the original packet
8. “Pointer Urgent” field
 You can modify the value of this field. This injection is only possible if all URG 
options are present.
 So, if the Urgent Pointer is filled in and the flag of URG is not setting, it means 
that the Urgent Pointer is not used correctly.
9. “Options” field
We could modify the data of this field. In the options, you can realize the data 
after value 0x00, but it is not considered after this byte header data.
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ing to identify a possible option that attempts to identify incorrectly filled 
options or unknown options whose appearance indicates a possible injection of 
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of hidden source data. Because of the manipulation that occurs at the source, 
the receiving party cannot properly collect packets.
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after the 0x00 in the “Options” field; the value is the EOL option and takes up to 
32-bit header boundaries. Interest in this manipulation is contained in the following 
text after the EOL does not produce a 32-bit header, which means that these bytes 
are invisible to network devices and sniffer. Although the analysis of this field is 
simple enough, the EOL up to 32-bit header boundaries must be set to “0” at the 
standard behind the “Options” field, causing any other value of this field to indicate 
that the data is being injected.
4. Result of injection
The standard TCP header field with options and fall is 192 bits. As a result of 
the above actions, you can use up to 150 bits, which is 78.13% of the total number 
of bits in the original, unmodified header. This amount of data allows the use of 
18 characters in an 8-bit header in the standard ASCII character set. Therefore, 
after all the calculations, we get the maximum possible amount equal to 6 bits. The 
processed piece of information was included in the next 8 bits of the transmitted 
symbol.
83
Analysis of Network Protocols: The Ability of Concealing the Information
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88098
4.1 UDP
User Datagram Protocol is a connectionless transport layer protocol. No con-
nection setup is created before transferring between hosts. This protocol is less 
reliable than TCP, but gives a higher transfer rate with less overhead. This protocol 
is standardized by RFC 768.
4.1.1 Header field of UDP
Header’s format of UDP is presented in Figure 4.
“Source Port” field
1. You can change the “Source Port” field value. Processing is only possible when 
the package was a hidden data source. Because of the manipulation that had 
occurred at the source device, the receiving party cannot properly assemble 
the original packets. This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet 
sniffer.
2. “Destination Port” field
 You can change the “Target Port” field value. Processing is only possible when 
the package was created by a hidden data source. Due to the manipulation 
of the device generating the packages, the receiving party cannot correctly 
assemble the source packages. This modification cannot be detected by the 
network sniffer.
3. “Length” field
 We could change the significance of the “Length” field. Increasing the value of 
this field has also increased the size of the package, so we can change the fields 
of data octets by appending to the end of datagram.
So processing is possible when the package was a source of hidden data. So if the 
modification had occurred at the source device, the receiving host cannot properly 
assemble the original packets. This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet 
sniffer.
Figure 4. 
Header of UDP.
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5. Result of injection
The size of the UDP header of the datagram is 64 bits; as a result of the described 
changes, you can use 32 bits, which is 50% of the total number of bits in the header, 
which allows you to implement a 4–8-bit header in the ASCII character set.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we began to develop methods and special software for generating 
bitstreams in order to organize a secure connection.
This software method was implemented in software, ensuring secure network 
communication. The main part of the program model is a detector program for 
analyzing network traffic to search for possible hidden transmissions. The analysis 
is implemented by checking the header in compliance with the standards, which is 
needed to identify unauthorized values for specific areas of the PDU.
The surveys revealed possible vulnerabilities that could embed relevant infor-
mation in the puncture headers we reviewed. Table 2 presents the quantification of 
the study results, showing the remainder is the number of bits that are part of the 
next 8 bits of the transmitted symbol.
It should be noted that TCP was created as a reliable protocol for delivery, but 
after entering the hidden data by the TCP header proposed above, changes made to 
the header fields of the TCP lead to the loss of the functionality of a reliable proto-
col, making it similar to the UDP.
In the created model, the transmission of one packet is realized, that is, the full 
message is embedded in all possible of headers at only one datagram. In order to 
see the maximum feasible messaging, we chose the following protocols: IPv4, IPv6, 
and TCP. Note that for simplicity, TCP header data is not included in the fragment 
offset. Thus, thanks to the proposed manipulation, the programming model uses 
603 bits, which is 74.04% of the total number of bits in the order of three headers. 
This volume allows you to enter 75 characters out of 8 bits in ASCII encoding.
Protocol Size of injection 
information (bits)
Percentage of the total 
header size (%)
The number of 
symbols
Rest 
bits
IPv4 (carrier) 182 56.88 22 6
IPv4 (passenger) 214 66 26 6
IPv6 (carrier) 156 48.75 19 4
IPv6 (passenger) 284 88.75 35 4
TCP 150 78.13 18 6
UDP 32 50 4 0
Table 2. 
The quantification of the study results.
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Abstract
There are multiple techniques for users to authenticate themselves in software
applications, such as text passwords, smart cards, and biometrics. Two or more of
these techniques can be combined to increase security, which is known as multi-
factor authentication. Systems commonly utilize authentication as part of their
access control with the objective of protecting the information stored within them.
However, the decision of what authentication technique to implement in a system is
often taken by the software development team in charge of it. A poor decision
during this step could lead to a fatal mistake in relation to security, creating the
necessity for a method that systematizes this task. Thus, this book chapter presents
a theoretical decision framework that tackles this issue by providing guidelines
based on the evaluated application’s characteristics and target context. These
guidelines were defined through the application of an extensive action-research
methodology in collaboration with experts from a multinational software develop-
ment company.
Keywords: security, authentication scheme, multifactor authentication method,
action-research, decision framework
1. Introduction
Generally, to protect the personal information of users in software applications,
distinct authentication techniques are utilized to prevent intruders from accessing
to it. Authentication is, thus, the process of verifying the identity of a user as part of
a system’s access control to protect the information stored within them [1]. Various
authentication techniques have been proposed in literature, such as text passwords
[2, 3], smart cards [4, 5], and biometrics [6–8]. All of the mentioned techniques
belong to distinct authentication factors. An authentication factor is a piece of
information that can be used to verify the identity of a user [9]. There are three
main groups or factors of authentication techniques [10, 11]: (i) knowledge-based,
that is, based on something that the user knows, such as text passwords; (ii)
possession-based, that is, based on something that the user possesses, such as smart
cards; and (iii) inherence-based, that is, something that the user is, such as bio-
metrics. Two or more of these techniques can be combined to increase security,
which is known as multifactor authentication [1].
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There are multiple techniques for users to authenticate themselves in software
applications, such as text passwords, smart cards, and biometrics. Two or more of
these techniques can be combined to increase security, which is known as multi-
factor authentication. Systems commonly utilize authentication as part of their
access control with the objective of protecting the information stored within them.
However, the decision of what authentication technique to implement in a system is
often taken by the software development team in charge of it. A poor decision
during this step could lead to a fatal mistake in relation to security, creating the
necessity for a method that systematizes this task. Thus, this book chapter presents
a theoretical decision framework that tackles this issue by providing guidelines
based on the evaluated application’s characteristics and target context. These
guidelines were defined through the application of an extensive action-research
methodology in collaboration with experts from a multinational software develop-
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1. Introduction
Generally, to protect the personal information of users in software applications,
distinct authentication techniques are utilized to prevent intruders from accessing
to it. Authentication is, thus, the process of verifying the identity of a user as part of
a system’s access control to protect the information stored within them [1]. Various
authentication techniques have been proposed in literature, such as text passwords
[2, 3], smart cards [4, 5], and biometrics [6–8]. All of the mentioned techniques
belong to distinct authentication factors. An authentication factor is a piece of
information that can be used to verify the identity of a user [9]. There are three
main groups or factors of authentication techniques [10, 11]: (i) knowledge-based,
that is, based on something that the user knows, such as text passwords; (ii)
possession-based, that is, based on something that the user possesses, such as smart
cards; and (iii) inherence-based, that is, something that the user is, such as bio-
metrics. Two or more of these techniques can be combined to increase security,
which is known as multifactor authentication [1].
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In this book chapter, to differentiate between single-factor and multifactor
authentication techniques, the former will be referred to as authentication
schemes, whereas the latter will be referred to asmultifactor authentication
methods.
Nowadays, the decision of what authentication scheme or method to implement
in a software application resides within the software development team. However,
the experience of the involved developers can vary from team to team, which could
affect in the decision of what authentication technique to implement. Due to the
importance of security [12], selecting the wrong authentication technique could
potentially be a fatal mistake [13].
The above statement creates the necessity of a method that systematizes the task
of comparing and selecting the authentication schemes and methods. A few frame-
works in literature partially help to achieve this [14, 15]; however, they do not
present the adequate characteristics for their application in distinct application
contexts or do not consider all authentication techniques or multifactor authentica-
tion. Thus, this book chapter presents a decision framework that covers the
observed gap. This framework has been generated through the application of an
action-research methodology [16]. This action-research has been performed in col-
laboration with a multinational software development company and contemplates
the utilization of other research methodologies that support it.
The remainder of this book chapter is organized as follows. The methodology
utilized for the research is presented in Section 2. Section 3 is focused on obtaining
of the knowledge base utilized for the research. In Section 4, the generated decision
framework is presented. Section 5 consists on the validation of the framework.
Finally, the conclusions and future work of the research are given in Section 6.
2. Methodology
The realization of this research is within the scope of an action-research meth-
odology that was carried for over a year in collaboration with a software develop-
ment company. The objective of action-research is to provide a benefit for the
research’s “client” while also generating relevant “research knowledge” [16, 17].
This kind of collaboration allows to study complex social processes, such as the use
of information technologies in organizations, by introducing changes in them and
observing their effects [18].
There are four roles involved in action-research [19]. These roles are as follows:
• The researcher(s) who undertake(s) the action-research. In this case, the
researchers are the book chapter’s authors.
• The studied object, that is, the problem to solve. In this case, the
studied object is the comparison and selection of authentication schemes
and methods.
• The critical group of reference that has a problem that needs to be solved and
also participates in the research process. In this case, the critical group of
reference is composed by the employees of the partnered software
development company (PSDC).
• The beneficiary who can receive benefits from the research results, without
directly participating in its process. In this case, the main beneficiary is the
PSDC, but other software developers can also benefit from this research.
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During the realization of this action-research, multiple activities were
performed in conjunction with the PSDC. These activities helped to generate and
validate the proposed decision framework for solving the need of automatizing the
comparison and selection of authentication techniques. These activities were
performed utilizing the iterative process of action-research, which considers, for
every cycle, the following four phases [20]: (i) the planning phase, which considers
the elaboration of a research question to be answered through the iteration; (ii) the
action phase, where distinct research methodologies are applied to address the
posed research question; (iii) the observation phase, where the results of the inter-
ventions from the previous phase are processed; and (iv) the reflection phase,
where the researchers shares their finding with the group of reference to generate
feedback; it is also possible to transversely perform this phase instead of cyclically
[19], as it was done in this action-research through the realization of weekly pro-
gress meetings.
In this work, the action-research methodology was applied through three cycles.
The objective of the first cycle was to obtain the required knowledge base for
creating the framework. To achieve this, two strategies were applied: first, a sys-
tematic literature review (SLR) [21] was performed to obtain the existing knowl-
edge in literature, and secondly, a number of surveys and interviews [16, 22] were
conducted to learn the perceptions of the industry through the PSDC’s employees.
The second cycle was centered on the creation of the decision framework. During
this cycle, an expert panel [23] was held to validate the initial draft of the frame-
work. Finally, the third cycle focused on validating the final framework through the
application of case studies [24].
3. Identification of the knowledge base
To construct the decision framework, it was necessary to obtain an adequate
knowledge base regarding the topic at hand. To achieve this, two methodologies
were applied. The first was the realization of a systematic literature review to
identify the existing knowledge in related academic publications. The second cor-
responds to the application of a survey and interviews (S&I) to employees of the
PSDC to learn the perceptions of the industry. The combined usage of these
methods allowed the procurement of a knowledge base useful both for the academic
and industrial sectors.
3.1 Systematic literature review
A systematic literature review has been carried out with the objective of “iden-
tifying authentication schemes proposed in literature and their possible combina-
tions for their use as multifactor authentication methods, while also detecting
criteria used for their comparison and selection and the existence of frameworks
that handle such a task.” Based on this objective, the following four research ques-
tions were formulated:
1.Which are the main authentication schemes that exist in the literature?
2.What combinations of these schemes can be found that can be used as
multifactor authentication methods?
3.What criteria can be used to compare and/or to select between authentication
schemes and/or multifactor authentication methods?
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4.Are there frameworks that help to compare and/or to select authentication
schemes or multifactor authentication methods? What are their
characteristics?
The planning and results of the SLR have already been published in literature
[25]. Additionally, a list containing the publications accepted during the SLR can be
found in http://colvin.chillan.ubiobio.cl/mcaro/. Next, a brief summary of the main
results of the SLR for every research question is presented.
3.1.1 Authentication schemes
A total of 515 publications regarding the proposal of authentication schemes
were found. Their distribution among the authentication factors is as shown in
Figure 1. Additionally, the context for which these schemes were proposed was
recorded as well; this is presented in Table 1, including the publication’s origin
(journal article, conference article, or book chapter). It is important to mention that
only 233 of the publications indicated a context.
Figure 1.
Number of publications proposing authentication schemes for every authentication factor.
Context Journal Conference Book Total
Mobile environment 38 43 0 81
Remote authentication 31 11 0 42
Healthcare/telecare 23 1 0 24
Multi-server environment 15 2 0 17
Continuous authentication 9 2 0 11
Wireless sensor networks 8 2 0 10
Cloud computing 3 4 2 9
Banking and commerce 2 6 0 8
Smart environment 2 5 0 7
Login protocols 5 0 0 5
Web applications 4 1 0 5
Other contexts 7 7 0 14
Total 147 84 2 233
Table 1.
Number of publications proposing authentication schemes for every context.
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3.1.2 Multifactor authentication methods
Four hundred forty-two publications proposing the combination of two or more
authentication schemes in a multifactor manner were identified. Their distribution
among the distinct authentication factor combinations is as shown in Figure 2.
Similarly to the previous research question, the context for which these methods
were proposed was recorded as well; this is presented in Table 2, including the
publication’s origin (journal article, conference article, or book chapter). In this
case, 272 of the publications did indicate a context.
3.1.3 Comparison and selection criteria
Only 17 publications presented criteria for the comparison and selection of
authentication schemes and methods. The presented criteria in the distinct publica-
tions can be categorized based on the kind of criteria proposed. Every publication
Figure 2.
Publications proposing authentication methods for every factor combination.
Context Journal Conference Book Total
Remote authentication 52 12 0 64
Healthcare/telecare 45 3 0 48
Wireless sensor networks 29 4 0 33
Multi-server environment 22 7 0 29
Mobile environment 10 11 0 21
Cloud computing 12 5 0 17
Banking and commerce 6 5 0 11
Web applications 5 6 0 11
Wireless networks 6 2 0 8
USB devices 1 5 0 6
Insecure environment 3 2 0 5
Other contexts 15 3 1 19
Total 206 65 1 272
Table 2.
Number of publications proposing authentication methods for every context.
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schemes or multifactor authentication methods? What are their
characteristics?
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Figure 1. Additionally, the context for which these schemes were proposed was
recorded as well; this is presented in Table 1, including the publication’s origin
(journal article, conference article, or book chapter). It is important to mention that
only 233 of the publications indicated a context.
Figure 1.
Number of publications proposing authentication schemes for every authentication factor.
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Table 1.
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3.1.2 Multifactor authentication methods
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considered one or more criteria categories; however, only three of them could be
identified in more than one publication. The most identified categories of criteria
are usability, security, and costs. The first two were identified in nine publications
each, whereas the latter was found in five publications.
Moreover, it could be observed that most of these articles highly considered the
importance of the use context for comparing and selecting schemes and methods.
This was mainly done by the publication addressing specific contexts or considering
the context itself as another criterion.
3.1.4 Decision frameworks
Eight decision frameworks that help in the comparison and selection of authen-
tication schemes and methods were identified. Through the analysis of these
frameworks, it could be observed that multifactor authentication is not often con-
sidered, whereas proposals that do consider it utilize a limited number of criteria.
Thus, no decision framework that considered multifactor authentication and
enough criteria for a detailed comparison and selection of authentication schemes
and methods could be found.
3.2 Survey and interviews
A survey and interviews have been applied to the PSDC’s employees with the
objective of learning the perceptions of people from the industry regarding authen-
tication and the comparison and selection of distinct schemes and methods. The
interviews were realized as a pilot application of the survey. A total of 12 employees
were interviewed. In addition, 45 valid responses, out of a sample of 83 people
ranging from developers to project leads, were received through the survey. Out of
the 57 respondents, over two thirds of them held a senior position in the PSDC, as
well as having over 6 years of working experience.
Four main questions were posed to the respondents, whose contents can be
summarized as follows:
Q1. What authentication schemes do you know?
Q2. What multifactor authentication methods do you know?
Q3. What authentication schemes or multifactor authentication methods have
you implemented in applications that you have developed?
Q4. What is the importance that you give to distinct factors when deciding what
authentication scheme or method should be implemented in an application?
In http://colvin.chillan.ubiobio.cl/mcaro/ it is possible to find the questionnaire
used for the survey. A summary of the responses obtained for every question is
provided next.
3.2.1 Authentication schemes known by the respondents
For this question, respondents were asked to mark from a list the authentication
schemes that they knew. The most known schemes were text passwords, one-time
passwords (OTP, tokens), and mobile-based authentication. All respondents
answered this question. The complete results of this question can be observed in
Table 3, which shows the number of survey respondents and interviewed people
that know each authentication scheme.
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3.2.2 Multifactor authentication methods known by the respondents
For the second question, respondents were given a brief explanation about
multifactor authentication. Afterward, they were asked what multifactor authenti-
cation methods they knew. The combination of text passwords and OTP was the
most known among them. A total of 27 out of the 45 survey respondents answered
this question. The complete results of this question can be observed in Table 4,
which shows the number of survey respondents and interviewed people that know
each multifactor authentication method.
Authentication scheme Interviewees Survey respondents
Text passwords (TP) 10 40
Graphical passwords (GP) 1 20
Cognitive authentication (CA) 0 10
OTP (tokens) 7 38
Smart cards (SC) 3 24
Mobile-based (MB) 8 31
Biometrics (B) 5 30
Federated single sign-on (FSSO) 4 22
Proxy-based (PB) 1 8
Others 0 2
Table 3.
Number of respondents that know each authentication scheme.
Combination Method Interviewees Survey respondents
Knowledge + possession TP + OTP 7 15
TP + SC 2 8
TP + MB 6 6
Others 0 1
Total 15 30
Knowledge + inherence TP + B 0 15
Others 0 3
Total 0 18
Possession + inherence OTP + B 0 6
MB + B 0 3
SC + B 0 3
Total 0 12
Knowledge + possession + inherence TP + SC + B 0 7
TP + OTP + B 1 2
Others 0 2
Total 1 11
Grand total 16 71
Table 4.
Number of respondents that know each authentication method.
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3.2.3 Authentication schemes and methods implemented by the respondents
Next, the respondents were asked what authentication techniques they had
implemented in applications developed by them and the kind of application. Most
applications were either web-based or for banking and commerce. A total of 23 out
of the 45 survey respondents answered this question. The complete results of this
question can be observed in the graphs of Figures 3 and 4, which show the
implemented authentication schemes and methods and the contexts of the applica-
tions that were being developed, respectively.
3.2.4 Comparison and selection criteria used by the respondents
For the last question of the S&I, distinct strategies were applied between the
interviewees and the survey respondents. In the case of the former, they were
directly asked what criteria they utilized for the comparison and selection of
authentication schemes and methods. In the case of the latter, the responses from
the interviewees, coupled with the results of the previously performed SLR, were
used to generate a list of comparison and selection criteria that respondents were
asked to value from 1 to 5. A higher value meant that the respondent gave a higher
importance to the criterion. A total of 29 out of the 45 survey respondents answered
this question. The complete results of this question can be observed in Table 5 and
Figure 3.
Authentication schemes and methods implemented by the respondents.
Figure 4.
Contexts of the applications developed by the respondents.
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in Table 6, which show the responses given by the interviewees and the survey
respondents, respectively.
Finally, survey respondents were asked what other comparison and selection
criteria they would consider. The received answers include the ease of
authentication information recovery, the registration method, and the sensitivity
of the information.
3.3 Short survey
A second survey was later applied to nine employees of the PSDC. These
employees were selected among the most experienced developers of the company,
based on their years of experience and positions. The single aim of this survey was
to ascertain the importance that the respondents would assign to an application’s
security and usability based on the target context. The importance was valued in
percentages, with the sum of usability and security being 100% for every context.
Table 7 presents the results of this survey.
The obtained values were used afterward as part of the input for the decision
framework.
Criterion Interviewees that consider the criterion
Client’s requirements 11
Application context 11
Usability-related criteria 9
Security-related criteria 11
Cost-related criteria 8
Other criteria 2
Table 5.
Comparison and selection criteria considered by the interviewees.
Category Criterion Value
Usability Ease of use 3.31
Ease of learning 3.28
Need of using a device 3.10
Method’s reliability 4.10
Security Importance of security 4.41
Resistance to well-known attacks 4.21
Costs Implementation costs 4.07
Costs per user 4.00
Server compatibility 3.69
Need of acquiring licenses 3.86
Available technologies 3.93
Others Client’s requirements 4.17
Application context 4.41
Norms and legislation 3.90
Table 6.
Comparison and selection criteria valued by the survey respondents.
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4. The framework
This section describes the decision framework constructed through the knowl-
edge base acquired by using the methodologies presented above. It has been given
the name of Kontun framework, which means “to enter foreign property” in
Mapudungún, an indigenous language from Chile, which is what it aims to prevent.
Table 8 shows a summary of the main findings during the knowledge base gather-
ing and their origin (either the SLR or the S&I).
A summary of the constructed framework’s characteristics is provided next.
A complete description can be found in [26].
First, the framework considers a number of criteria obtained from the knowl-
edge base, divided among the three most observed categories: security, usability,
and costs. Each criterion is then given distinct possible importance values and a
weight based on the findings from the knowledge base. To illustrate the above
Context Importance of
security (%)
Importance of
usability (%)
Mobile environment 45.56 54.44
Remote authentication, multi-server environment,
cloud computing
64.44 35.56
Healthcare/telecare 57.78 42.22
Wireless sensor networks 63.33 36.67
Banking and commerce 73.33 26.67
Web applications 28.89 71.11
Table 7.
Importance given to security and usability in distinct contexts by the respondents.
Most reported knowledge-based
schemes
• Text passwords (SLR, S&I)
• Graphical passwords (SLR)
Most reported possession-based
schemes
• Smart cards (SLR)
• OTP (S&I)
• Mobile-based (S&I)
Most reported inherence-based
schemes
• Face biometrics (SLR, S&I)
• Behavioral biometrics (SLR)
• Palm print (SLR)
• Fingerprints (SLR, S&I)
• Vein biometrics (SLR)
• Iris biometrics (SLR, S&I)
Multifactor authentication • Prevalence of the combination of knowledge- and possession-based authentication
schemes (SLR, S&I)
Most observed application
contexts
• Mobile environment (SLR)
• Remote authentication (SLR)
• Multi-server environment (SLR)
• Cloud computing (SLR)
• Healthcare/telecare (SLR)
• Wireless sensor networks (SLR)
• Banking and commerce (S&I)
• Web applications (S&I)
Comparison and selection
criteria
• Criteria are mainly related to usability, security, and costs (SLR)
• Identified criteria are valued positively by the industry (S&I)
• High importance observed regarding application context (SLR, S&I)
Table 8.
Summary of the acquired knowledge base.
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criterion, Table 9 shows the usability-related criteria, their importance values, and
their weights.
Every criterion has two or more importance values between 20 and 100, and the
sum of all the weights of the criteria belonging to the same category is 100%. In this
manner, when using the framework, a person must select the importance values
that best describe their application and then calculate the average values of security
(S), usability (U), and costs (C) using the following equations:
S ¼
X
for each criterion of S
AssessmentValue ∗CriterionWeight (1)
U ¼
X
for each criterion of U
AssessmentValue ∗CriterionWeight (2)
C ¼
X
for each criterion of C
AssessmentValue ∗CriterionWeight (3)
The framework also considers a number of common contexts identified through
the knowledge base. These contexts were given distinct weights based on the
importance of security and usability in the context itself. Here, a term known as the
security/usability value (SUV) is presented. The knowledge base allowed to ascer-
tain the fact that, generally, the more secure an authentication scheme or method is,
it has a lower usability and vice-versa. The SUV is used to denotate this. Based on
the calculated average values of S, U, and C, coupled with the selected application
context (Ct), the SUV is calculated as follows:
SUV ¼ A ∗ Sþ B ∗ 100�Uð Þ (4)
A and B are constants defined based on the importance given to S and U,
respectively, in the selected context. A high SUV value thus indicates that more
Criterion Importance Value Weight
Ease of use
The method necessarily needs to be easy to use 100
25%The method preferably needs to be easy to use 60
It is not necessary for the method to be easy to use 20
Ease of learning
A user should not take longer than a day to get used 100
25%A user should not take longer than a week to get used 60
The time it takes to get used is not relevant 20
Authentication information
recovery
The recovery process should be simple 100
10%
The recovery process should be complex 20
Need of using a device
It does not need to use a device 100
10%It can use a possession or biometric device 60
It can use both a possession and a biometric device 20
Authentication method’s
reliability
It should never or hardly fail during authentication 100
30%
It should not fail occasionally during authentication 75
It can fail occasionally during authentication 45
It does not matter how often it fails 20
Table 9.
Criteria considered by the framework.
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secure authentication methods should be implemented in the application, whereas a
low SUV indicates that more usable authentication schemes or methods should be
implemented in the application.
Having calculated the SUV and also considering the average value given to C, the
framework is able to provide a suggestion on what authentication schemes or
methods to implement in the evaluated application. The recommendation is as
follows: for a SUV of 65 or higher, the framework will suggest the implementation
of highly secure authentication methods; for a SUV of 35 or lower, the framework
will suggest the implementation of highly usable authentication schemes; and for a
SUV between 35 and 65, the framework will suggest the implementation of aver-
agely secure and usable authentication methods. Moreover, for a value of C of 60
and above, the framework will suggest the implementation of more affordable
authentication schemes or methods; for a value of C below 60, the framework will
suggest the implementation of more expensive authentication schemes or methods.
The recommendations are also different based on the target Ct. Thus, for every Ct,
the framework will give six possible recommendations based on the calculated
SUV and C. Table 10 illustrates the above framework for the context of mobile
environment.
Finally, the person utilizing the framework must decide the authentication
scheme or method to implement in their application, taking into consideration the
recommendations given by the framework.
4.1 Tool prototype
To facilitate the use of the framework in software development environments,
a tool prototype has been constructed that allows its utilization in a semiautomatic
manner. This tool has also supported the validation process of the framework. With
the tool prototype, the person in charge only needs to indicate the evaluated appli-
cation’s features and target context through a radio form. Afterward, the tool proto-
type automatically calculates the values of average S, U, and C and the SUV. The tool
prototype is available for download in http://colvin.chillan.ubiobio.cl/mcaro/.
SUV ≥ 65
C< 60
Graphical passwords + smart cards + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + OTP + behavioral biometrics
Graphical passwords + OTP + behavioral biometrics
Graphical passwords + OTP + face biometrics
SUV ≥ 65
C ≥ 60
Text passwords + smart cards + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + smart cards + face biometrics
35< SUV < 65
C< 60
Graphical passwords + behavioral biometrics
OTP + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + palm print/fingerprints
Graphical passwords + OTP
35< SUV < 65
C ≥ 60
Text passwords + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + smart cards
SUV ≤ 35
C< 60
Behavioral biometrics
Graphical passwords
Face biometrics
Palm print/fingerprints
SUV ≤ 35
C ≥ 60
Behavioral biometrics
Text passwords
Graphical passwords
Table 10.
Recommendation given by the framework for the context of mobile environment.
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The tool prototype has been developed using the model view controller (MVC)
design pattern, with the Java programming language and supported by the Spring
Framework. PostgreSQL has been used as the database management system.
The main screens of the tool prototype can be observed in Figures 5–7.
They show the procedures for the criteria selection, the context selection, and the
framework’s recommendation, respectively.
Figure 5.
Criteria selection in the tool prototype.
Figure 7.
Framework’s recommendation in the tool prototype.
Figure 6.
Context selection in the tool prototype.
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secure authentication methods should be implemented in the application, whereas a
low SUV indicates that more usable authentication schemes or methods should be
implemented in the application.
Having calculated the SUV and also considering the average value given to C, the
framework is able to provide a suggestion on what authentication schemes or
methods to implement in the evaluated application. The recommendation is as
follows: for a SUV of 65 or higher, the framework will suggest the implementation
of highly secure authentication methods; for a SUV of 35 or lower, the framework
will suggest the implementation of highly usable authentication schemes; and for a
SUV between 35 and 65, the framework will suggest the implementation of aver-
agely secure and usable authentication methods. Moreover, for a value of C of 60
and above, the framework will suggest the implementation of more affordable
authentication schemes or methods; for a value of C below 60, the framework will
suggest the implementation of more expensive authentication schemes or methods.
The recommendations are also different based on the target Ct. Thus, for every Ct,
the framework will give six possible recommendations based on the calculated
SUV and C. Table 10 illustrates the above framework for the context of mobile
environment.
Finally, the person utilizing the framework must decide the authentication
scheme or method to implement in their application, taking into consideration the
recommendations given by the framework.
4.1 Tool prototype
To facilitate the use of the framework in software development environments,
a tool prototype has been constructed that allows its utilization in a semiautomatic
manner. This tool has also supported the validation process of the framework. With
the tool prototype, the person in charge only needs to indicate the evaluated appli-
cation’s features and target context through a radio form. Afterward, the tool proto-
type automatically calculates the values of average S, U, and C and the SUV. The tool
prototype is available for download in http://colvin.chillan.ubiobio.cl/mcaro/.
SUV ≥ 65
C< 60
Graphical passwords + smart cards + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + OTP + behavioral biometrics
Graphical passwords + OTP + behavioral biometrics
Graphical passwords + OTP + face biometrics
SUV ≥ 65
C ≥ 60
Text passwords + smart cards + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + smart cards + face biometrics
35< SUV < 65
C< 60
Graphical passwords + behavioral biometrics
OTP + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + palm print/fingerprints
Graphical passwords + OTP
35< SUV < 65
C ≥ 60
Text passwords + behavioral biometrics
Text passwords + smart cards
SUV ≤ 35
C< 60
Behavioral biometrics
Graphical passwords
Face biometrics
Palm print/fingerprints
SUV ≤ 35
C ≥ 60
Behavioral biometrics
Text passwords
Graphical passwords
Table 10.
Recommendation given by the framework for the context of mobile environment.
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The tool prototype has been developed using the model view controller (MVC)
design pattern, with the Java programming language and supported by the Spring
Framework. PostgreSQL has been used as the database management system.
The main screens of the tool prototype can be observed in Figures 5–7.
They show the procedures for the criteria selection, the context selection, and the
framework’s recommendation, respectively.
Figure 5.
Criteria selection in the tool prototype.
Figure 7.
Framework’s recommendation in the tool prototype.
Figure 6.
Context selection in the tool prototype.
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The tool prototype also has additional features that facilitate its use in software
development companies. Specifically, it has a user registration feature which allows
maintaining a registry of its usage and a functionality for adapting its preferences
based on the software development company’s needs.
5. Validation through the industry
Through the creation of the framework, its adequacy was repeatedly validated
using strategies associated to the application of the action-research methodology.
Specifically, the validation was ascertained through the realization of an expert
panel and the application of case studies. These are detailed in remainder of this
section.
5.1 Expert panel
An expert panel was held in collaboration with five experts from the PSDC that
consisted of four sessions with the aim of ascertaining their perceptions regarding
an initial draft of the framework, so that it was more adequate to the real require-
ments observed in a software development environment. The activities during
every session of the expert panel are described next.
5.1.1 Presentation of the initial draft of the framework
The first session consisted on the presentation of the initial draft of the frame-
work, with the purpose of helping the experts to have a general notion of the aim of
this research.
5.1.2 Validation of comparison and selection criteria
The preliminary list of criteria, their categorization, their values, and their
weights were presented to the experts for their validation. This allowed to discard
the least adequate ones and to generalize those that were too specific for the needs
of a software development team.
5.1.3 Validation of the considered contexts
The contexts considered by the framework were presented to the experts. Sim-
ilarly to the previous session, this allowed to make the appropriate modifications to
the currently selected contexts. Additionally, the SUV was presented to the experts,
who generally agreed to the adequacy of its use.
5.1.4 Validation of the framework’s recommendations
The authentication schemes and methods recommended for every situation
were presented to the experts. This allowed to ascertain the adequacy of every
recommendation. The experts were generally in agreement with the recommenda-
tions.
5.2 Case studies
After its construction, the validation of the framework’s recommendations was
realized through the application of a case study methodology in collaboration with
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the PSDC. Specifically, the framework’s recommendations were compared with the
authentication schemes or methods implemented in existing applications developed
by the PSDC or with the recommendations that their experts would give for hypo-
thetical situations. The case studies are described in detail in [26]. Next, a brief
summary of their application is provided.
The case studies are split in three categories: (i) those that were realized by
comparing the framework’s recommendation against the implemented scheme or
method on an existing application, (ii) those that were realized by comparing the
framework’s recommendation against the recommendations given by experts for
hypothetical applications, and (iii) those that were realized by comparing the
framework’s recommendation against the implemented scheme or method on an
existing application and also against the recommendation given by experts for
hypothetical applications with nearly the same features as the existing ones. These
case studies are presented in Tables 11–13, respectively, presenting the
implemented scheme or method in the existing application, the framework’s rec-
ommendation, the most recommended scheme or method by the experts, and the
acceptance rate of the framework’s recommendation, as appropriate.
In general, the results of the case studies are favorable for the framework. It is
important to mention that, where discrepancies are observed, there was often a
reasoning behind them. For example, for case study 3 (existing application), the
implemented scheme was demanded by the client and not selected by the software
development team.
ID Implemented scheme or method Framework’s recommendation
1 Two-factor authentication (text
passwords + smart cards)
Three-factor authentication (text
passwords + OTP + behavioral biometrics)
2 Two-factor authentication (text
passwords + mobile-based)
Two-factor authentication (text passwords + mobile-
based)
3 OTP (demanded by client) Behavioral biometrics
Table 11.
Case studies based on existing applications.
ID Implemented
scheme or method
Experts’
recommendation
Framework’s
recommendation
Acceptance rate of
framework’s recommendation
6 Two-factor
authentication
Text passwords Text passwords 100%
7 Text passwords Two-factor
authentication
Two-factor
authentication
90%
Table 13.
Case studies based on existing applications with a hypothetical counterpart.
ID Experts’ recommendation Framework’s
recommendation
Acceptance rate of framework’s
recommendation
4 Two- or three-factor
authentication
Three-factor
authentication
100%
5 Text passwords Two-factor
authentication
80%
Table 12.
Case studies based on hypothetical applications.
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6. Conclusions
The research presented in this book chapter summarizes the definition of a
theoretical framework. This framework will help in the comparison and selection of
the most appropriate authentication schemes or multifactor authentication methods
for applications created by software developers. It has been created through the
application of an action-research methodology that considered the utilization of
various other research methodologies that helped to contribute in distinct ways to
the research objective.
On the one hand, a systematic literature review, coupled with surveys and
interviews, was performed to obtain the required knowledge base for generating the
framework. The utilization of these two methodologies allowed to ascertain the
perceptions on authentication from both the academy and the industry.
On the other hand, an expert panel and several case studies were realized to
validate the adequacy of the framework. This permitted to obtain feedback from the
end users of the framework so that it would provide adequate authentication
scheme or method recommendations and have an appropriate usability.
Thus, this experience allowed to observe the usefulness of performing a research
in collaboration with the industry, as it permits obtaining results that align more
adequately with their needs while also providing more refined academic results.
Several future work lines can be followed based on this research. Namely, the
framework could be adapted to work as a recommendation system so that its
recommendations get refined through its usage. For the industry, it would be of
interest that the framework not only recommends an authentication technique but
that it also provides the required code for its implementation. Finally, the last cycle
of the action-research, that is, the realization of case studies, could be replicated in
other software development companies to further validate the adequacy of the
framework.
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Chapter 7
Secure Communication Using 
Cryptography and Covert Channel
Tamer S.A. Fatayer
Abstract
The keys which are generated by cryptography algorithms have still been 
compromised by attackers. So, they extra efforts to enhance security, time con-
sumption and communication overheads. Encryption can achieve confidentiality 
but cannot achieve integrity. Authentication is needed beside encryption technique 
to achieve integrity. The client can send data indirectly to the server through a 
covert channel. The covert channel needs pre-shared information between parties 
before using the channel. The main challenges of covert channel are security of 
pre-agreement information and detectability. In this chapter, merging between 
encryption, authentication, and covert channel leads to a new covert channel 
satisfying integrity and confidentiality of sending data. This channel is used for 
secure communication that enables parties to agree on keys that are used for future 
communication.
Keywords: encryption, authentication, dynamically, covert channel,  
confidentiality, algorithm, undetectability, fake key
1. Introduction
Encryption is considered the main key factor of security to achieve confi-
dentiality and to protect data from disclosure [1]. Encryption is not efficient to 
achieve integrity. It needs another factor called authentication [2]. Covert channel 
is created to transfer data indirectly between client and server; it was created by 
Lampson [3].
Before the client and server use the covert channel, they must agree on a pre-
agreement knowledge. Also, they agree on how to send that knowledge. A good 
example is they agree on even word meaning “00” and odd word meaning “11.” If 
the client sends “communication channels,” the server will know that the client’s 
message is “1100” [4, 5].
Covert channel cannot be detected if the following two factors exist: plausi-
bility and bit distribution. Plausibility deceives the attacker who thinks that  the 
channel is normal channel and it is not used to send secret information. On the 
other hand, the bit distribution of normal channel must same distribution of 
covert channel [5].
The technique is worked as shown in Figure 1, where it shows the general idea of 
the proposed technique. Covert channel needs shared information. In my protocol, 
it is considered as a table shared between the client and server. This table contains 
characteristics of the client such as the name which represents the original key. Each 
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original key has fake keys. I used encryption algorithm to guarantee the confidenti-
ality. HMAC is used to check integrity. Finally, the time that is needed for the client 
and server to agree on secret information (e.g., secret keys) is measured.
In this chapter, secure communication channel for transferring data is imple-
mented. The channel between the client and server is considered a covert channel 
that depends on authentication and encryption.
2. Background
Lampson was the first to introduce the idea of a covert channel [3]. Transferring 
data between two entities indirectly through a channel is called a covert channel. 
Before the client and server use the channel to transfer data, they must agree on 
a pre-agreement knowledge (e.g., shared memory, table). For example, a word 
containing “mm” means bit “0” other than this means bit “1.” So, if the client wants 
to send “10” to the server indirectly, the client will send “secure communication” to 
the server. The attacker hardly breaks the covert channel and it is considered to be 
more secure if it is undetectable [3, 4].
2.1 Covert channel characteristics and properties
Although a covert channel transfers information in a hidden way, it has the same 
characteristics as other communication channels. These characteristics are:
• Capacity: the amount of data that can be transmitted through the channel. 
From security viewpoint, increasing channel capacity leads to more informa-
tion leakage. The covert channel capacity is measured in bits/second. To obtain 
maximum bandwidth through a covert channel, encoding schemes must be 
chosen between the sender and receiver.
• Noise: transmitted data through a covert channel are exposed to an amount of 
perturbations that makes the transmitted and received information between 
two entities not the same.
• Transmission mode: the transmission of information in covert channels (as 
in normal channels) can be synchronous or asynchronous. The sender and 
receiver in synchronous mode should manage their transmission based on a 
condition or a specific event. On the other hand, in asynchronous mode, the 
transmission occurs without a prior condition.
Figure 1. 
Secure communication using covert channel, encryption, and authentication.
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2.2  The covert channel is more private and undetectable if it satisfies  
the following
1. Plausibility: the TCP is usually used for Internet traffic, and it always employs 
using time stamp option. As a result, TCP using time stamp is a plausible 
covert channel because the majority of users using TCP will not use it for send-
ing covert data. So, the adversary will believe that TCP time stamps will not be 
used for sending data covertly.
2. Undetectability: in order for a channel to be more undetectable, the channel 
must satisfy that the distribution of bits with covert data must be similar to 
the distribution of the normal channel. If an adversary notices that there are 
differences (using statistical tests) in bit distribution, then he will detect that 
the channel is a covert channel. Also, to achieve undetectability, the channel’s 
bits must be random; otherwise, it will be noticed by the adversary.
3. Indispensability: Lampson [3] reports that a communication channel is a 
covert channel if it is neither designed nor intended to transfer information at 
all. The channel should introduce several benefits to the users besides sending 
data covertly; thus, the adversary cannot or will not close off that channel.
2.3 Covert channel classification
Covert channels can be classified as storage or timing channels, noisy or noise-
less channels, and program-flow channels.
2.3.1 Storage channels and timing channels
The covert storage channel depends on a shared variable or a storage location, 
whereby one process (sender) can be allowed to write directly or indirectly to the 
storage location and the other process (receiver) reads from that storage location. 
On the other hand, the covert timing channel enables senders to send informa-
tion to the receiver through signals, whereby the sender manages the time that is 
needed to perform some operation in such a way that when the receiver observes the 
time, it will understand a special event or a special piece of information. The main 
disadvantage of the timing channel is that it is considered very noisy because of the 
several external factors that affect the execution time of a process. Covert storage 
channels and timing channels need a synchronization process, which enables the 
sender and receiver to synchronize with each other to send and receive information. 
The storage covert channel uses a data variable to enable the sender and receiver 
to communicate. Therefore, a synchronization variable, called sender-receiver, is 
needed by the sender to notify the receiver that he has completed reading or writing 
a data variable. The covert channel uses another synchronization variable, called 
receiver-sender. To distinguish between storage and timing channels, if a chan-
nel uses a storage variable to transfer data between the sender and receiver, it is 
considered a storage channel. On the other hand, a covert timing channel uses time 
reference (e.g., a clock) to transfer data between the sender and receiver, whereby 
the sender and receiver use a common time reference.
2.3.2 Noisy and noiseless channels
I discussed previously that the characteristics of the covert channel are similar to 
any communication channel. One of these characteristics is that the channel may be 
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original key has fake keys. I used encryption algorithm to guarantee the confidenti-
ality. HMAC is used to check integrity. Finally, the time that is needed for the client 
and server to agree on secret information (e.g., secret keys) is measured.
In this chapter, secure communication channel for transferring data is imple-
mented. The channel between the client and server is considered a covert channel 
that depends on authentication and encryption.
2. Background
Lampson was the first to introduce the idea of a covert channel [3]. Transferring 
data between two entities indirectly through a channel is called a covert channel. 
Before the client and server use the channel to transfer data, they must agree on 
a pre-agreement knowledge (e.g., shared memory, table). For example, a word 
containing “mm” means bit “0” other than this means bit “1.” So, if the client wants 
to send “10” to the server indirectly, the client will send “secure communication” to 
the server. The attacker hardly breaks the covert channel and it is considered to be 
more secure if it is undetectable [3, 4].
2.1 Covert channel characteristics and properties
Although a covert channel transfers information in a hidden way, it has the same 
characteristics as other communication channels. These characteristics are:
• Capacity: the amount of data that can be transmitted through the channel. 
From security viewpoint, increasing channel capacity leads to more informa-
tion leakage. The covert channel capacity is measured in bits/second. To obtain 
maximum bandwidth through a covert channel, encoding schemes must be 
chosen between the sender and receiver.
• Noise: transmitted data through a covert channel are exposed to an amount of 
perturbations that makes the transmitted and received information between 
two entities not the same.
• Transmission mode: the transmission of information in covert channels (as 
in normal channels) can be synchronous or asynchronous. The sender and 
receiver in synchronous mode should manage their transmission based on a 
condition or a specific event. On the other hand, in asynchronous mode, the 
transmission occurs without a prior condition.
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all. The channel should introduce several benefits to the users besides sending 
data covertly; thus, the adversary cannot or will not close off that channel.
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Covert channels can be classified as storage or timing channels, noisy or noise-
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whereby one process (sender) can be allowed to write directly or indirectly to the 
storage location and the other process (receiver) reads from that storage location. 
On the other hand, the covert timing channel enables senders to send informa-
tion to the receiver through signals, whereby the sender manages the time that is 
needed to perform some operation in such a way that when the receiver observes the 
time, it will understand a special event or a special piece of information. The main 
disadvantage of the timing channel is that it is considered very noisy because of the 
several external factors that affect the execution time of a process. Covert storage 
channels and timing channels need a synchronization process, which enables the 
sender and receiver to synchronize with each other to send and receive information. 
The storage covert channel uses a data variable to enable the sender and receiver 
to communicate. Therefore, a synchronization variable, called sender-receiver, is 
needed by the sender to notify the receiver that he has completed reading or writing 
a data variable. The covert channel uses another synchronization variable, called 
receiver-sender. To distinguish between storage and timing channels, if a chan-
nel uses a storage variable to transfer data between the sender and receiver, it is 
considered a storage channel. On the other hand, a covert timing channel uses time 
reference (e.g., a clock) to transfer data between the sender and receiver, whereby 
the sender and receiver use a common time reference.
2.3.2 Noisy and noiseless channels
I discussed previously that the characteristics of the covert channel are similar to 
any communication channel. One of these characteristics is that the channel may be 
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noisy. The covert channel can be noiseless if the transmitted data by the sender and 
received data by the receiver are the same with probability 1; otherwise, the channel 
is noisy. Usually, data transmitted through a covert channel is represented by bit 
“0” or “1.” Nevertheless, if the receiver decodes every bit transmitted by the sender 
correctly, then the covert channel is considered noiseless. Thus, to reduce error rate, 
which is produced by noise, correction codes are used [6].
2.3.3 Program-flow channels
I present a new type of covert channel, which is program-flow. The program-flow 
covert channel depends on the flow of program execution to convey information. 
In our proposed covert channel, the sender tries to guess the correct delta_mmap 
(encoded information) of the vulnerable server program. The server code which 
executes in case of successful guess differs from which executes in a failed guess. The 
receiver distinguishes between server code executed in successful and failed guesses.
2.4 Authentication and key exchange
Authentication process identifies entities that are attempting to access some 
resources. Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm is used as method of public key 
exchange.
2.4.1 Authentication process
Authentication is a process of checking whether someone or something is autho-
rized or not to access some resources. Authentication can be computer to computer 
or process to process and mutual in both directions [7, 8]. Bob can authenticate 
Alice’s identity depending on four factors [7, 9], which are:
2.4.1.1 Something you know
Alice sends a request to the server to access some resources; Bob authenticates 
Alice by asking her about a secret thing that she knows, such as password. If Alice 
issues a correct password, then Bob will accept her request for accessing some 
resources. Fortunately, a password is needed to login into the system and access its 
resources. Yet, unfortunately, the user is always asked to reuse the password when 
he wants to log into the system, which gives attackers opportunities to hack the 
password and reuse it. The solution for this problem is to use a onetime password 
(OTP) so that the user each time she logs into a system needs a new password.
2.4.1.2 Something you have
One of the disadvantages of the first authentication factor (something you 
know) is that the user may forget his password. Thus, the second authentication 
factor (something you have) overcomes this problem, whereby the user has an 
object (e.g., automatic teller machine (ATM) cards, OTP cards [7], and smart cards 
[9]) to access the system. Unfortunately, the objects may get stolen by attackers.
2.4.1.3 Something you are
The third authentication factor is based on the measurements of the user’s 
physical characteristics such as the fingerprints, iris, and voice. The techniques that 
measure the behavioral characteristics of the user are called biometrics [7, 8]. This 
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factor overcomes the problems of the previous factors because it does not depend 
on a password or a token.
2.4.1.4 Somebody you know
Brainard et al. [9] proposes a fourth factor of authentication that is dependent 
on emergency authenticator, and it is used when the primary authenticator is 
unavailable to a user. A good example for emergency system is email; thus, when 
a user forgets his password, he often has the option of having password reset 
instructions. A system called “vouching” is introduced. A voucher system permits 
swapping of the roles of the token and PIN to deal with the case when the user has 
forgotten his PIN but still has his token.
2.4.2 Message authentication
When Alice and Bob want to exchange messages, they do not want an attacker 
to modify the contents of their messages. This can be achieved by using message 
authentication odes (MACs), where the MAC is a tag, attached to the message 
by Alice to Bob or vice versa. If Bob validates this tag, the request of Alice will be 
accepted by Bob; otherwise, it is rejected [7]. MAC that is based on cryptographic 
hash functions is called HMAC [10]. There are many hash functions, such as 
message digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1). When HMAC is 
used with MD5, it is called Hashed Message Authentication Code-Message Digest 
5 (HMAC-MD5), and when it is used with SHA1, it is called Hashed Message 
Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (HMAC-SHA1) [7, 10, 11]. In our 
dissertation, we use the secure hash algorithm SHA256 with pre-shared key to form 
HMAC-SHA256, where the secure hash algorithm SHA256 takes a message of 512-
bit blocks as input and returns a digest message with 256 bits as output [7].
2.4.3 Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange algorithm
Key exchange algorithms are cryptographic methods that generate crypto-
graphic shared keys that are shared among users. After Alice and Bob agree on a 
shared key, they can use it in HMAC, and they can also use it in symmetric encryp-
tion algorithms to encrypt or to decrypt files. Alice encrypts file using one of the 
symmetric algorithms and sends it to Bob. Bob in turn uses the same symmetric 
algorithm to decrypt the file. Note that Alice and Bob must agree on a shared key 
before using symmetric algorithm. Many key agreement protocols have been 
proposed. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm [12] is a very popular example that 
introduces a key exchange protocol using the discrete logarithm problem [13]. DH 
algorithm enables Alice and Bob to exchange secure keys over an insecure channel.
Figure 2 shows the mechanism of DH. The values g and p are public parameters 
known to Alice and Bob, whereby p is a prime number and g (generator of p) is an 
integer less than p. This means that for all every number n between 1 and p-1, there 
is a power k of g such that n = gk mod p. Both Alice and Bob choose a secret random 
integer number, a and b, respectively. After that, Alice sends to Bob (gb mod p), 
and Bob sends to Alice (gb mod p). Finally, they agree on a secret key by using this 
formula ((ga)b mod p).
Figure 3 shows that a “man-in-the-middle” (Mallory) can listen and modify 
the conversation messages between Alice and Bob. In so doing, she can convince 
Alice and Bob that they are communicating with each other while in fact both are 
communicating with Mallory [7]. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the main vulner-
ability in the DH protocol is that it does not have an authentication process. Several 
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noisy. The covert channel can be noiseless if the transmitted data by the sender and 
received data by the receiver are the same with probability 1; otherwise, the channel 
is noisy. Usually, data transmitted through a covert channel is represented by bit 
“0” or “1.” Nevertheless, if the receiver decodes every bit transmitted by the sender 
correctly, then the covert channel is considered noiseless. Thus, to reduce error rate, 
which is produced by noise, correction codes are used [6].
2.3.3 Program-flow channels
I present a new type of covert channel, which is program-flow. The program-flow 
covert channel depends on the flow of program execution to convey information. 
In our proposed covert channel, the sender tries to guess the correct delta_mmap 
(encoded information) of the vulnerable server program. The server code which 
executes in case of successful guess differs from which executes in a failed guess. The 
receiver distinguishes between server code executed in successful and failed guesses.
2.4 Authentication and key exchange
Authentication process identifies entities that are attempting to access some 
resources. Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm is used as method of public key 
exchange.
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Authentication is a process of checking whether someone or something is autho-
rized or not to access some resources. Authentication can be computer to computer 
or process to process and mutual in both directions [7, 8]. Bob can authenticate 
Alice’s identity depending on four factors [7, 9], which are:
2.4.1.1 Something you know
Alice sends a request to the server to access some resources; Bob authenticates 
Alice by asking her about a secret thing that she knows, such as password. If Alice 
issues a correct password, then Bob will accept her request for accessing some 
resources. Fortunately, a password is needed to login into the system and access its 
resources. Yet, unfortunately, the user is always asked to reuse the password when 
he wants to log into the system, which gives attackers opportunities to hack the 
password and reuse it. The solution for this problem is to use a onetime password 
(OTP) so that the user each time she logs into a system needs a new password.
2.4.1.2 Something you have
One of the disadvantages of the first authentication factor (something you 
know) is that the user may forget his password. Thus, the second authentication 
factor (something you have) overcomes this problem, whereby the user has an 
object (e.g., automatic teller machine (ATM) cards, OTP cards [7], and smart cards 
[9]) to access the system. Unfortunately, the objects may get stolen by attackers.
2.4.1.3 Something you are
The third authentication factor is based on the measurements of the user’s 
physical characteristics such as the fingerprints, iris, and voice. The techniques that 
measure the behavioral characteristics of the user are called biometrics [7, 8]. This 
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factor overcomes the problems of the previous factors because it does not depend 
on a password or a token.
2.4.1.4 Somebody you know
Brainard et al. [9] proposes a fourth factor of authentication that is dependent 
on emergency authenticator, and it is used when the primary authenticator is 
unavailable to a user. A good example for emergency system is email; thus, when 
a user forgets his password, he often has the option of having password reset 
instructions. A system called “vouching” is introduced. A voucher system permits 
swapping of the roles of the token and PIN to deal with the case when the user has 
forgotten his PIN but still has his token.
2.4.2 Message authentication
When Alice and Bob want to exchange messages, they do not want an attacker 
to modify the contents of their messages. This can be achieved by using message 
authentication odes (MACs), where the MAC is a tag, attached to the message 
by Alice to Bob or vice versa. If Bob validates this tag, the request of Alice will be 
accepted by Bob; otherwise, it is rejected [7]. MAC that is based on cryptographic 
hash functions is called HMAC [10]. There are many hash functions, such as 
message digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1). When HMAC is 
used with MD5, it is called Hashed Message Authentication Code-Message Digest 
5 (HMAC-MD5), and when it is used with SHA1, it is called Hashed Message 
Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (HMAC-SHA1) [7, 10, 11]. In our 
dissertation, we use the secure hash algorithm SHA256 with pre-shared key to form 
HMAC-SHA256, where the secure hash algorithm SHA256 takes a message of 512-
bit blocks as input and returns a digest message with 256 bits as output [7].
2.4.3 Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange algorithm
Key exchange algorithms are cryptographic methods that generate crypto-
graphic shared keys that are shared among users. After Alice and Bob agree on a 
shared key, they can use it in HMAC, and they can also use it in symmetric encryp-
tion algorithms to encrypt or to decrypt files. Alice encrypts file using one of the 
symmetric algorithms and sends it to Bob. Bob in turn uses the same symmetric 
algorithm to decrypt the file. Note that Alice and Bob must agree on a shared key 
before using symmetric algorithm. Many key agreement protocols have been 
proposed. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm [12] is a very popular example that 
introduces a key exchange protocol using the discrete logarithm problem [13]. DH 
algorithm enables Alice and Bob to exchange secure keys over an insecure channel.
Figure 2 shows the mechanism of DH. The values g and p are public parameters 
known to Alice and Bob, whereby p is a prime number and g (generator of p) is an 
integer less than p. This means that for all every number n between 1 and p-1, there 
is a power k of g such that n = gk mod p. Both Alice and Bob choose a secret random 
integer number, a and b, respectively. After that, Alice sends to Bob (gb mod p), 
and Bob sends to Alice (gb mod p). Finally, they agree on a secret key by using this 
formula ((ga)b mod p).
Figure 3 shows that a “man-in-the-middle” (Mallory) can listen and modify 
the conversation messages between Alice and Bob. In so doing, she can convince 
Alice and Bob that they are communicating with each other while in fact both are 
communicating with Mallory [7]. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the main vulner-
ability in the DH protocol is that it does not have an authentication process. Several 
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versions of DH protocol exist to overcome this problem, for example, by using DH 
with digital signature [11]. Diffie et al. [14] enhance a Diffie-Hellman protocol with 
an authentication process, whereby Alice and Bob must authenticate themselves 
using a digital signature. Alice and Bob must have a pair of keys (public key and pri-
vate key) and a certificate for the public key. So, during execution of DH protocol, 
Alice and Bob transmit massages with signature; Mallory cannot forge the signature 
because she needs to share Alice’s private key and Bob’s private key.
The DH algorithm relies on heavy computation, which may not be suitable to 
resource-constrained platforms.
3. Related work
There are many researches that target covert channel undetectability [15–17], 
but most of the works have drawbacks and lack in channel detectability (Girling 
[18] in 1987). He creates three covert channels through a local area network (LAN): 
two of them are storage channels, and the third is a timing channel. The two storage 
channels depend on “what-is-sent” strategy, whereby one of them depends on the 
frame size, which is sent by the sender. If the frame size equals to 256, the amount 
of covert information decoded by receiver, who monitors the sender activity on the 
LAN, would be 8 bits. On the other hand, the timing channel depends on the time 
that represents the time interval between successive sends. The time difference 
between successive sends may be odd or even, and the prior agreement between 
the sender and receiver (who monitors the time between successive sends) is such 
Figure 2. 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. Alice and Bob agree on a secret key over an insecure channel. The 
secret key that they agree on is computed as (ga)b mod p.
Figure 3. 
A Diffie-Hellman weakness. A man-in-the-middle (e.g., Mallory) impersonates Alice to agree on a shared key 
with Bob. Also, she impersonates Bob to agree on a shared key with Alice.
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that the odd time means bit “0” and even time means bit “1.” So, the timing channel 
obviously depends on “when-is-sent” strategy.
TCP/IP protocol is used to create covert channel that is targeted by many 
researchers, where they used TCP to hide information [19–22]. Zhang et al. [6] 
propose covert channel to transfer messages to control (increasing or decreasing) 
the period of silence in traffic of VoLTE traffic. Create covert channel through 
hiding information in IP fields [20, 23]. Mead et al. [24] propose timing covert 
channel for wireless communication; they developed android application to com-
municate through local area network and mobile network. The results show that 
the channel is very undetectable in spite of the existence of malware and intrusion 
detection system.
Some researches, Fatayer et al. [15–17], try to use covert channel as benign chan-
nel, and it can be used to send legal information between the client and server. They 
used gaps in memory to create covert channel. Also, they used the channel to send 
text and audio files in acceptable time. The proposed technique depends on pre-
agreement database which consists of original keys and its corresponding fake keys. 
Each original key has multiple fake keys. The database consist of the characteristics 
of clients; each feature represents an original key, and it has multiple fake keys. 
Figure 4 figures out the pre-agreement between the client and server before using 
covert channel.
Customer asks cloud provider to access his resources. The summarization of 
approach is as follows. First, pre-agreement between the server and client is shown 
in Figure 4. Second, the customer sends a packet which contains “Fakei” attribute 
belongs to a specific customer (e.g., name) to the cloud provider. Third, the cloud 
provider will analyze the packet and make sure that the “Fakei” belongs to which 
customer. If yes, the provider goes to next step. Fourth, the cloud provider will 
ask for extra information to verify the customer and then he sends a packet that 
contains another fake key to the customer. Fifth, the customer receives the packet 
and he verifies the packet. The customer will send the required information to cloud 
provider such as one of the  fake keys of email. Seventh, the cloud provider will 
analyze the packet to make sure that the “Fakei” (email) belongs to which customer. 
If yes, the cloud provider will accept the request. Eight, steps from 4 to 7 are consid-
ered the first level of security, so if these steps are repeated more than one time, it 
can achieve multilevel of security.
A new detection approach of covert timing channel is proposed by Fahimeh 
et al. [25], where this approach enables to detect covet time channel through traffic 
distribution. They used statistical test to measure the network traffic online.
Figure 4. 
Database as pre-agreement between the client and server.
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versions of DH protocol exist to overcome this problem, for example, by using DH 
with digital signature [11]. Diffie et al. [14] enhance a Diffie-Hellman protocol with 
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that the odd time means bit “0” and even time means bit “1.” So, the timing channel 
obviously depends on “when-is-sent” strategy.
TCP/IP protocol is used to create covert channel that is targeted by many 
researchers, where they used TCP to hide information [19–22]. Zhang et al. [6] 
propose covert channel to transfer messages to control (increasing or decreasing) 
the period of silence in traffic of VoLTE traffic. Create covert channel through 
hiding information in IP fields [20, 23]. Mead et al. [24] propose timing covert 
channel for wireless communication; they developed android application to com-
municate through local area network and mobile network. The results show that 
the channel is very undetectable in spite of the existence of malware and intrusion 
detection system.
Some researches, Fatayer et al. [15–17], try to use covert channel as benign chan-
nel, and it can be used to send legal information between the client and server. They 
used gaps in memory to create covert channel. Also, they used the channel to send 
text and audio files in acceptable time. The proposed technique depends on pre-
agreement database which consists of original keys and its corresponding fake keys. 
Each original key has multiple fake keys. The database consist of the characteristics 
of clients; each feature represents an original key, and it has multiple fake keys. 
Figure 4 figures out the pre-agreement between the client and server before using 
covert channel.
Customer asks cloud provider to access his resources. The summarization of 
approach is as follows. First, pre-agreement between the server and client is shown 
in Figure 4. Second, the customer sends a packet which contains “Fakei” attribute 
belongs to a specific customer (e.g., name) to the cloud provider. Third, the cloud 
provider will analyze the packet and make sure that the “Fakei” belongs to which 
customer. If yes, the provider goes to next step. Fourth, the cloud provider will 
ask for extra information to verify the customer and then he sends a packet that 
contains another fake key to the customer. Fifth, the customer receives the packet 
and he verifies the packet. The customer will send the required information to cloud 
provider such as one of the  fake keys of email. Seventh, the cloud provider will 
analyze the packet to make sure that the “Fakei” (email) belongs to which customer. 
If yes, the cloud provider will accept the request. Eight, steps from 4 to 7 are consid-
ered the first level of security, so if these steps are repeated more than one time, it 
can achieve multilevel of security.
A new detection approach of covert timing channel is proposed by Fahimeh 
et al. [25], where this approach enables to detect covet time channel through traffic 
distribution. They used statistical test to measure the network traffic online.
Figure 4. 
Database as pre-agreement between the client and server.
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4. Covert channel with authentication leads to secure communication
The proposed technique is responsible for creating secure communication chan-
nel using covert channel, encryption, and authentication. In the first step before 
using covert channel, the client and server must agree on pre-agreement table as 
shown in Figure 4, where it depicts out the pre-agreement table consisting of origi-
nal key (OK) and its corresponding fake keys. The key point here is that the fake key 
is used in communication channel and the original key is kept secret in both sides 
(client and server). Figure 5 illustrates the proposed technique, where the network 
consists of the client and server. The client agrees on shared information (e.g., table 
as database) with the server.
The client wants to send to the server a message. Then, he encrypts the message 
using the original key. After that the encrypted message is attached with the fake key 
to be a parameter to HMAC function. HMAC depends on shared key between the 
client and server. Then the client sends (HMAC + encrypted message + fake key) to 
the server. Where, HMAC is used for integrity and fake key for server to know the 
Figure 5. 
Technique for transferring secure data through covert channel using covert channel, encryption, and 
authentication.
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original key to decrypt the encrypted message. On the other hand, the server receives 
the client’s message. After that he separates the message to the HMAC, encrypted 
message, and fake key. Then, he checks the integrity of the message. After that he gets 
the original key from its corresponding fake key to decrypt the encrypted message.
5. Performance discussion
The implementation of technique is done by: first create a network as client and 
server with implemented java application. Client and server machines are 32 bit 
×86, CPU Core (TM) i5 2.40 GHz, and Ram 4GB. Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [26] algorithm is used in the implementation. Hashed message authentica-
tion code (HMAC) is used to guarantee the integrity [7, 11, 12]. The following issues 
are satisfying in this technique:
1. Confidentiality: the technique guarantees that the messages are protected from 
disclosure, which is done by encrypting the messages with original keys that do 
not send through communication channel. Instead, the original keys are sent 
encrypted by fake keys.
2. Integrity: the information is protected from being changed by unauthorized 
parties through using HMAC function which checks if the content of the mes-
sage is altered or not.
3. Undetectability: undetectability is achieved depending on two conditions: 
first, plausibility, the messages that are sent through the covert channel are 
protected from adversary by making the covert channel appear like a normal 
channel through sending normal encrypted messages, and, second, hiding the 
fake key inside the message which does not affect bit distribution, especially 
when the size of the fake key is small.
4. Comparative analysis: My technique is used in two ways, malicious and benign 
usages. Also, encryption and authentication are used that differ from other 
techniques.
5. Dynamically: the generating keys between the client and server have a flexible 
length. Because when you repeat the scenario in Figure 5 several times, you get 
new keys with different sizes. If you repeat the technique four times and each 
time generates key with 16-bit size, then you will get a key with 64-bit size.
Figure 6. 
The technique can handle multiple users in acceptable time.
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The time that is needed by the server to serve the client is measured. The tech-
nique can handle several clients with acceptable time as shown in Figure 6. The 
server needs less than 0.25 s to deal and handle 30 clients.
6. Conclusion and future work
Encryption is used to achieve confidentiality to protect data from stealing from 
the third party (e.g., attacker). If users use encryption, they cannot achieve integ-
rity. They need authentication and covert channel besides encryption technique to 
achieve integrity. In this chapter, we used encryption, authentication, and covert 
channel to produce a secure communication between eligible parties. This technique 
satisfies confidentiality through encryption and integrity using authentication 
algorithm. Finally, this technique generates undetectability covert channel through 
normal distribution of bits. Secure communication channel between the client and 
server that enables them to transfer data securely and to agree on keys that are used 
for future communication. The technique needs pre-shared table that consists of 
original and fake keys.
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Chapter 8
High-Speed Area-Efficient 
Implementation of AES Algorithm 
on Reconfigurable Platform
Altaf O. Mulani and Pradeep B. Mane
Abstract
Nowadays, digital information is very easy to process, but it allows unauthorized 
users to access to this information. To protect this information from unauthorized 
access, cryptography is one of the most powerful and commonly used techniques. 
There are various cryptographic algorithms out of which advanced encryption 
standard (AES) is one of the most frequently used symmetric key cryptographic 
algorithms. The main objective of this chapter is to implement fast, secure, and area-
efficient AES algorithm on a reconfigurable platform. In this chapter, AES algorithm is 
designed using Xilinx system generator, implemented on Nexys-4 DDR FPGA devel-
opment board and simulated using MATLAB Simulink. Synthesis results show that the 
implementation consumes 121 slice registers, and its maximum operating frequency is 
1102.536 MHz. Throughput achieved by this implementation is 14.1125 Gbps.
Keywords: cryptography, AES, FPGA, VLSI, system generator
1. Introduction
NIST has started a development process of FIPS for AES algorithm stat-
ing that this is the replacement for data encryption standard (DES) algorithm. 
Alternatively, this algorithm is also known as Rijndael algorithm. Rijndael algorithm 
has the advantages like resistance against all recognized attacks, code and speed 
compactness, and simple design. Cryptography is a process in which the informa-
tion to be sent is added with secret key so as to transmit the data securely at the 
destination. There are two types of cryptography based on the type of key applied: 
symmetric key cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography. In symmetric key 
cryptography, equal key is utilized for encryption as well as decryption, whereas 
in asymmetric key cryptography, different keys are required in encryption and 
decryption. AES algorithm is selected for implementation because it is secure and 
its components and design principles are completely specified. AES is a symmetric 
key block cipher. The design of AES algorithm is based on linear transformation. 
Due to the use of Rijndael algorithm, different block and key sizes can be selected 
which was not possible in DES algorithm. Block and key size can be selected from 
128/160/192/224/256 bits and need not be the same. According to AES standard, 
this algorithm can only accept 128 bits of block, and key size can be selected from 
128/192/256 bits. Based on the key size, the number of rounds will vary. For exam-
ple, if key size is 128, 192, or 256, then the number of rounds will be 10, 12, and 14, 
respectively. The structure of AES algorithm is shown in Figure 1. In this chapter, 
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Nowadays, digital information is very easy to process, but it allows unauthorized 
users to access to this information. To protect this information from unauthorized 
access, cryptography is one of the most powerful and commonly used techniques. 
There are various cryptographic algorithms out of which advanced encryption 
standard (AES) is one of the most frequently used symmetric key cryptographic 
algorithms. The main objective of this chapter is to implement fast, secure, and area-
efficient AES algorithm on a reconfigurable platform. In this chapter, AES algorithm is 
designed using Xilinx system generator, implemented on Nexys-4 DDR FPGA devel-
opment board and simulated using MATLAB Simulink. Synthesis results show that the 
implementation consumes 121 slice registers, and its maximum operating frequency is 
1102.536 MHz. Throughput achieved by this implementation is 14.1125 Gbps.
Keywords: cryptography, AES, FPGA, VLSI, system generator
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ing that this is the replacement for data encryption standard (DES) algorithm. 
Alternatively, this algorithm is also known as Rijndael algorithm. Rijndael algorithm 
has the advantages like resistance against all recognized attacks, code and speed 
compactness, and simple design. Cryptography is a process in which the informa-
tion to be sent is added with secret key so as to transmit the data securely at the 
destination. There are two types of cryptography based on the type of key applied: 
symmetric key cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography. In symmetric key 
cryptography, equal key is utilized for encryption as well as decryption, whereas 
in asymmetric key cryptography, different keys are required in encryption and 
decryption. AES algorithm is selected for implementation because it is secure and 
its components and design principles are completely specified. AES is a symmetric 
key block cipher. The design of AES algorithm is based on linear transformation. 
Due to the use of Rijndael algorithm, different block and key sizes can be selected 
which was not possible in DES algorithm. Block and key size can be selected from 
128/160/192/224/256 bits and need not be the same. According to AES standard, 
this algorithm can only accept 128 bits of block, and key size can be selected from 
128/192/256 bits. Based on the key size, the number of rounds will vary. For exam-
ple, if key size is 128, 192, or 256, then the number of rounds will be 10, 12, and 14, 
respectively. The structure of AES algorithm is shown in Figure 1. In this chapter, 
Computer and Network Security
120
this algorithm is designed with 128 bits of block size and key size, respectively, that 
is, AES generates cipher text of 128 bits for 128 bits of plaintext. After the initial 
round, plaintext processes through ten rounds. Each round contains processes like 
byte substitution, shift rows, mix columns, and add round key.
1.1 Byte substitution
The 16 input bytes are substituted by using fixed lookup table known as s-box. 
Figure 2 shows s-box of AES algorithm. This s-box consists of all possible combina-
tions of 8-bit sequence. The resulting new 16 bytes are organized in a matrix having 
four rows and four columns.
Figure 3 shows byte substitution stage in AES algorithm.
Figure 2. 
S-box of AES algorithm.
Figure 1. 
Structure of AES algorithm.
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1.2 Shift row
Each row from the matrix generated from the byte substitution is cyclically 
shifted to the left. Any entry that is dropped off is reinserted to the right side. The 
first row is kept as it is, the second row is shifted by one-byte position to the left, the 
third row is shifted by two-byte position to the left, and the fourth row is shifted by 
three-byte position to the left. The resultant matrix consists of same 16 bytes but at 
different position. Figure 4 shows shift row stage in AES algorithm.
1.3 Mix column
Each column of four bytes is now transformed using special arithmetical function 
of Galois field (GF) 28. This function takes four bytes of the column as input and 
Figure 3. 
Byte substitution stage.
Figure 4. 
Shift row stage.
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outputs completely new four bytes that replaces the original four bytes. Figure 5 shows 
mix column stage in AES algorithm.
1.4 Add round key
The 16 bytes of the resultant matrix generated from mix column stage are then 
considered as 128 bits. In add round key stage, 128 bits of state are bitwise EX-ORed 
with 128 bits of round key. If this result belongs to the last round, then the output is 
cipher text else the resulting 128 bits is considered as 16 bytes, and another round 
is started with new byte substitution process. This is a column-wise operation 
between four bytes of state column and one word of round key. In the last round, 
there is no mix column step. Figure 6 shows add round key stage in AES algorithm.
Decryption of cipher text, generated from AES encryption, contains all the 
stages in encryption but in reverse order. AES decryption starts with inverse initial 
round. The remaining nine rounds in decryption consist of processes like add round 
key, inverse shift rows, inverse byte substitution, and inverse mix columns.
Add round key: Add round key has its own inverse function since XOR functions 
its own inverse and the round keys should be selected in reverse order.
Inverse shift rows: Inverse shift rows functions exactly in the same way as shift 
row stage but in opposite direction. The first row is kept as it is, the second row is 
shifted by one-byte position to the right, the third row is shifted by two-byte posi-
tion to the right, and the fourth row is shifted by three-byte position to the right. 
The resultant matrix consists of same 16 bytes but at different position. Figure 7 
shows inverse shift row stage in AES algorithm.
Inverse byte substitution: Inverse byte substitution is done using predefined substitu-
tion table known as inverse s-box. Figure 8 shows inverse s-box in AES algorithm.
Inverse mix column: Transformation in inverse mix column is done using 
polynomials of degree less than 4 over Galois field (GF) 28 in which coefficients are 
the elements from the column of the state.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the survey based on the various kinds of implementation of 
AES algorithm on reconfigurable platform. In Section 3, implementation of AES 
algorithm using the proposed approach is discussed. In Section 4, experimental 
results achieved using the proposed method along with the comparative analysis 
with existing methods are discussed.
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outputs completely new four bytes that replaces the original four bytes. Figure 5 shows 
mix column stage in AES algorithm.
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2. Literature survey
In this section, focus is given on the work done by various researchers on FPGA-
based implementation of AES algorithm. There are various researchers which have 
either concentrated on area optimization or speed optimization. Mulani and Mane [1] 
discussed integrating of DWT and AES algorithm for implementation of watermark-
ing on FPGA. The design was implemented on xc6vcx75t-2ff484, and it utilizes 2117 
slices at maximum operating frequency of 228.064 MHz. Ratheesh and Narayanan 
[2] proposed implementation of AES algorithm with low-power MUX LUT-based 
s-box on FPGA. This design achieved total power distribution of 0.55 W. Agarwal 
et al. [3] suggested implementation of AES algorithm using Verilog on Spartan-3E 
FPGA. This design utilizes 1464 slices. Farooq and Faisal Aslam [4] discussed imple-
mentation of AES algorithm on FPGA device using five different techniques which 
are suitable for area critical applications and speed critical applications. This design 
was implemented on Spartan-6 FPGA device, and it utilizes 161 slices at maximum 
operating frequency which is 886.64 MHz. The throughput of this system is 113.5 
Gbps. Sai Srinivas and Akramuddin [5] proposed less complex hardware imple-
mentation of AES Rijndael algorithm on Xilinx Virtex-7 XC7VX90T FPGA. In the 
proposed design, synthesis tool was set to optimize speed, area, and power. Mathur 
and Bansode [6] proposed a cryptosystem, which is a combination of AES algorithm 
and ECC. This is a hybrid encryption scheme and the key size is 192 bits and there 
are 12 numbers of iterations in this system. Kalaiselvi and Mangalam [7] proposed a 
low-power and high-throughput FPGA implementation of AES algorithm using key 
expansion technique. This design accepts key size of 256 bits for both encryption and 
decryption. This design utilizes 5493 slices, and its maximum operating frequency is 
277.4 MHz. The throughput of this system is 0.06 Gbps. Deshpande et al. [8] sug-
gested BRAM-based and FPGA-based implementation of AES algorithm. Due to 
the use of BRAMs for implementing s-box, this design utilizes less number of slices. 
The design was implemented on XC3S1400AN and it utilizes 3376 slices. Ibrahim [9] 
presented FPGA implementation of AES encryption core that is suitable for limited 
resource-limited applications. This design was implemented on Spartan-3, and it 
utilizes 150 slices at maximum operating frequency of 90 MHz. Khose and Raut [10] 
proposed implementation of AES algorithm on FPGA in order to achieve high speed 
of data processing and also to reduce time for generating key. This design utilizes 201 
slices and 2 BRAMs at maximum operating frequency of 70 MHz. Mulani and Mane 
[11] proposed FPGA implementation of DES algorithm. The design was implemented 
on XC2S200, and it utilizes 2118 slices and 97 IOBs. Yewale Minal and Sayyad [12] 
proposed implementation of AES encryption using VHSIC hardware description lan-
guage VHDL) and decryption using Visual Basic. With this approach, 1403 slices are 
utilized at maximum operating frequency of 160.875 MHz, and it has a throughput of 
2.059 Gbps. Deshpande et al. [13] discussed FPGA-based optimized architecture that 
utilizes less area. This design was intended for plaintext of 128 bits and key of 128 bits. 
Tonde and Dhande [14] discussed FPGA-based implementation of AES algorithm 
using iterative looping approach for 128 bits of block and key size. Varhade and Kasat 
[15] proposed a FPGA-based AES algorithm, which utilizes 1746 logic elements and 
32,768 memory bits. This design was synthesized on Cyclone-II using Altera. Wadi 
and Zainal [16] proposed some modifications like decreasing number of rounds and 
replacing S-box with new s-box to reduce hardware requirements in order to enhance 
the performance of AES algorithm in terms of time ciphering and pattern appear-
ance. Wang et al. [17] suggested high-speed implementation of AES algorithm on 
FPGA to transmit the data securely using pipelining and parallel processing methods. 
Shylashree et al. [18] focused on various novel FPGA architectures of AES algorithm. 
Borkar et al. [19] proposed iterative design approach for FPGA implementation 
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of AES algorithm using VHDL. This design utilizes 1853 slices, and its operating 
frequency is 140.390 MHz. Deshpande et al. [20] presented very low complexity 
FPGA-based architecture for integrated AES encryptor and decryptor. This design is 
synthesized on Spartan-3 XC3S400 FPGA. Kaur and Vig [21] suggested an efficient 
implementation of AES algorithm on FPGA in which multiple rounds are processed 
simultaneously. Due to this implementation, speed is increased but it increases 
area. This design utilizes 6279 slices and 5 BRAMs, and its operating frequency is 
119.954 MHz. Samanta [22] proposed fast and efficient reconfigurable platform-
based implementation of AES algorithm using pipelining. This design utilizes 1051 
slices and 11 BRAMs, and its operating frequency is 76.699 MHz. Good and Benaissa 
[23] discussed hardware implementation of fastest and slowest AES algorithm which 
utilizes 16,693 slices at maximum operating frequency of 184.8 MHz.
From the literature survey, it is clear that many researchers have either worked 
on optimizing the area or speed. Few researchers have concentrated on optimizing 
the speed as well as area.  Implementation of AES algorithm, which is optimized in 
speed as well as area, is discussed in this chapter.
3. Implementation of AES algorithm
The proposed design is implemented with the aim to achieve both area and 
speed optimization. In the proposed design, keys for each round are initially gener-
ated by using MATLAB code, and then those keys are used in the design. Due to this 
approach, the design occupies less number of slices, and also the speed is faster than 
the normal approach. The design is implemented using Xilinx system generator. 
Figure 9 shows Xilinx system generator-based model for AES algorithm.
Figure 9. 
System generator model for AES algorithm.
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Figure 9 shows Xilinx system generator-based model for AES algorithm.
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System generator model for AES algorithm.
Computer and Network Security
126
Figure 10. 
System generator-based model of round function.
3.1 AES encryption
A plaintext of 128-bit is processed through 10 rounds. Each round contains pro-
cesses like byte substitution, shift rows, mix columns, and add round key. As keys 
are generated using MATLAB code, only remaining system generator-based models 
like byte substitution, shift rows, and mix columns are discussed in this section.
Round function is one of the important processes in AES algorithm. Figure 10 
shows system generator-based model for implementing round0 function.
Round function consists of s-box, shift row, and mix column as shown in Figure 11.
Figure 12 shows implementation of s-box.
Figure 13 shows implementation of shift row.
Figure 14 shows implementation of mix column.
127
High-Speed Area-Efficient Implementation of AES Algorithm on Reconfigurable Platform
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82434
Mix column consists of group_1, group_2, group_3, and group_4. Figure 15 
shows implementation of group. Further each group consists of four multiplica-
tion blocks such as mul_blk, mul_blk1, mul_blk2, and mul_blk3. Figure 16 shows 
implementation of multiplication block.
3.2 AES decryption
A cipher text of 128-bits is processed through 10 inverse rounds. Each round 
contains processes like inverse byte substitution, inverse shift rows, inverse mix 
columns, and add round key.
Figure 17 shows implementation of inverse round function.
Inverse round function consists of inverse s-box, inverse shift row, and inverse 
mix column as shown in Figure 18.
Figure 19 shows implementation of inverse mix column.
Inverse mix column consists of four groups, i.e., group_1, group_2, group_3, and 
group_4. Figure 20 shows implementation of group. Each group consists of multi-
plication blocks like mul_blk, mul_blk1, mul_blk2, and mul_blk3. Figure 21 shows 
implementation of multiplication block.
Each multiplication block consists of three multipliers mul_2, mul_4, and mul_8 
and EX-OR operations. Figure 22 shows implementation of multipliers.
Figure 11. 
Round0.
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Figure 12. 
Implementation of s-box.
Figure 23 shows implementation of inverse shift row.
Figure 24 shows implementation of inverse s-box.
3.3 Tools utilized
3.3.1 Software utilized
For implementing the proposed design, MATLAB 2013a and Xilinx ISE Design 
Suite are used. MATLAB is used for generating the keys and also to get the results in 
terms of images, whereas Xilinx ISE Design Suite is used to get the synthesis result, 
RTL schematic, and throughput of this implementation.
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3.3.2 Hardware utilized
Nexys-4 DDR development board is used for implementation. This board has 
the following features:
a. Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA XC7A100T-1CSG324C
b. 15,850 logic slices, each with four 6-input LUTs and 8 flip-flops
c. 4860 Kbits of fast block RAM
Figure 13. 
Implementation of shift row.
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Figure 12. 
Implementation of s-box.
Figure 23 shows implementation of inverse shift row.
Figure 24 shows implementation of inverse s-box.
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Figure 14. 
Implementation of mix column.
d. Six clock management tiles, each with phase-locked loop (PLL)
e. 240 DSP slices
f. Internal clock speeds exceeding 450 MHz
g. On-chip analog-to-digital converter (XADC)
h. 128 MiB DDR2
i. Serial Flash
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j. Digilent USB-JTAG port for FPGA programming and communication
k. MicroSD card connector
l. Ships with rugged plastic case and USB cable
m. USB-UART Bridge
n. 10/100 Ethernet PHY
o. PWM audio output
p. 3-axis accelerometer
q. 16 user switches
Figure 15. 
Implementation of group.
Figure 16. 
Implementation of multiplication block.
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Figure 17. 
System generator-based model of inverse round function.
Figure 18. 
Inverse round0.
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Figure 19. 
Inverse mix column.
Figure 20. 
Implementation of group.
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Figure 17. 
System generator-based model of inverse round function.
Figure 18. 
Inverse round0.
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Figure 19. 
Inverse mix column.
Figure 20. 
Implementation of group.
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Figure 21. 
Implementation of multiplication block.
Figure 22. 
Implementation of multipliers.
Figure 23. 
Implementation of inverse shift row.
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r. 16 user LEDs
s. Two tri-color LEDs
t. PDM microphone
u. Temperature sensor
v. Two 4-digit 7-segment displays
w. USB HID Host for mice, keyboards, and memory sticks
x. PMOD for XADC signals
y. 12-bit VGA output
z. Four PMOD ports
Figure 24. 
Implementation of inverse s-box.
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Figure 21. 
Implementation of multiplication block.
Figure 22. 
Implementation of multipliers.
Figure 23. 
Implementation of inverse shift row.
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4. Experimental results
4.1 RTL schematic
Figure 25 shows detailed RTL schematic of the proposed implementation of 
AES algorithm.
4.2 Synthesis result
The design is synthesized using Xilinx XST synthesizer. In the proposed design, 
an optimized and synthesizable very high speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) hard-
ware description language (VHDL) code for the implementation of image as well as 
128-bit data encryption is developed so as to utilize less area and increase the speed. 
Table 1 shows design utilization summary of the proposed design.
From the synthesis results of the proposed design, it is clear that this system uti-
lizes only 121 slice registers, and its maximum operating frequency is 1102.536 MHz. 
The throughput of the system is calculated using the following formula:
  (Throughput) of the system =   128 bits × Clock frequency  _______________________________Cycles per Encrypted block (1)
By substituting the values in Eq. (1), throughput of the systems is 14.1125 Gbps.
4.3 Simulation result
Figure 26 shows simulation result when an image is applied as an input.
4.4 Performance analysis
Performance analysis is a must to compare the performance of the proposed 
implementation with existing methods. The performance is compared on the basis 
of area and operating frequency. Till date various researchers have worked on FPGA-
based implementations of AES algorithm; some of them have optimized speed and 
Figure 25. 
Detailed RTL schematic of AES algorithm.
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Sr. No. Authors Slices Operating freq. (MHz)
1 Proposed work 121 1102.536
2 [3] 1464 —
3 [4] 161 886.64
4 [7] 5493 277.4
5 [8] 3376 —
6 [9] 150 90
7 [10] 201 70
8 [12] 1403 160.875
9 [15] 1746 —
10 [19] 1853 140.390
11 [21] 6279 119.954
Table 2. 
Performance comparison of the proposed system with previous work.
Design utilization summary
Logic utilization Used Available % utilization
Number of slice registers 121 126,800 0.00095
Number of slice LUTs 4782 63,400 7
Number of bonded IOBs 25 210 11
Table 1. 
Design utilization summary.
Figure 26. 
Simulation result (a) Original image, (b) Encrypted image, and (c) Decrypted image.
Computer and Network Security
136
4. Experimental results
4.1 RTL schematic
Figure 25 shows detailed RTL schematic of the proposed implementation of 
AES algorithm.
4.2 Synthesis result
The design is synthesized using Xilinx XST synthesizer. In the proposed design, 
an optimized and synthesizable very high speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) hard-
ware description language (VHDL) code for the implementation of image as well as 
128-bit data encryption is developed so as to utilize less area and increase the speed. 
Table 1 shows design utilization summary of the proposed design.
From the synthesis results of the proposed design, it is clear that this system uti-
lizes only 121 slice registers, and its maximum operating frequency is 1102.536 MHz. 
The throughput of the system is calculated using the following formula:
  (Throughput) of the system =   128 bits × Clock frequency  _______________________________Cycles per Encrypted block (1)
By substituting the values in Eq. (1), throughput of the systems is 14.1125 Gbps.
4.3 Simulation result
Figure 26 shows simulation result when an image is applied as an input.
4.4 Performance analysis
Performance analysis is a must to compare the performance of the proposed 
implementation with existing methods. The performance is compared on the basis 
of area and operating frequency. Till date various researchers have worked on FPGA-
based implementations of AES algorithm; some of them have optimized speed and 
Figure 25. 
Detailed RTL schematic of AES algorithm.
137
High-Speed Area-Efficient Implementation of AES Algorithm on Reconfigurable Platform
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82434
Sr. No. Authors Slices Operating freq. (MHz)
1 Proposed work 121 1102.536
2 [3] 1464 —
3 [4] 161 886.64
4 [7] 5493 277.4
5 [8] 3376 —
6 [9] 150 90
7 [10] 201 70
8 [12] 1403 160.875
9 [15] 1746 —
10 [19] 1853 140.390
11 [21] 6279 119.954
Table 2. 
Performance comparison of the proposed system with previous work.
Design utilization summary
Logic utilization Used Available % utilization
Number of slice registers 121 126,800 0.00095
Number of slice LUTs 4782 63,400 7
Number of bonded IOBs 25 210 11
Table 1. 
Design utilization summary.
Figure 26. 
Simulation result (a) Original image, (b) Encrypted image, and (c) Decrypted image.
Computer and Network Security
138
© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
Author details
Altaf O. Mulani* and Pradeep B. Mane
AISSMS Institute of Information Technology, Pune, Maharashtra, India
*Address all correspondence to: aksaltaaf@gmail.com
some have optimized area. In the proposed system, both area and speed are optimized. 
Table 2 shows performance comparison of the proposed system with previous work.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, fast, area-efficient, and secure implementation of AES algorithm 
on FPGA is suggested. As per the literature survey, it is clear that Farooq and Faisal 
Aslam [4] achieved better performance in terms of speed, whereas Ibrahim [9] 
achieved better performance in terms of area. In this design, due to better Xilinx 
system generator-based design, the system is optimized, and it utilizes only 121 slice 
registers at maximum operating frequency of 1102.536 MHz. Also, throughput of 
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Abstract
This chapter introduces two new approaches to block cipher—one is DNA
hybridization encryption scheme (DHES) and the other is hybrid graphical encryp-
tion algorithm (HGEA). DNA cryptography deals with the techniques of hiding
messages in the form of a DNA sequence. The key size of data encryption standard
(DES) can be increased by using DHES. In DHES, DNA cryptography algorithm is
used for encryption and decryption, and one-time pad (OTP) scheme is used for
key generation. The output of DES algorithm is passed as an input to DNA hybrid-
ization scheme to provide an added security. The second approach, HGEA, is based
on graphical pattern recognition. By performing multiple transformations, shifting
and logical operations, a block cipher is obtained. This algorithm is influenced by
hybrid cubes encryption algorithm (HiSea). Features like graphical interpretation
and computation of selected quadrant value are the unique features of HGEA.
Moreover, multiple key generation scheme combined with graphical interpretation
method provides an increased level of security.
Keywords: DNA hybridization encryption scheme (DHES), hybrid graphical
encryption algorithm (HGEA), DNA cryptography, data encryption standard
(DES), one-time pad (OTP), hybrid cube encryption algorithm (HiSea),
block cipher
1. Introduction
There exist a number of cryptographic techniques for secure data communica-
tion [1], but many are vulnerable to attacks. With the failure of cryptographic
algorithms like data encryption standard (DES), new approaches to cipher security
are needed [2, 3]. A cryptographic scheme can be made more secure by combining
it with relatively secure techniques. Theoretically, this hybridization method can be
applied to any cryptographic scheme but block ciphers provide more rounds for
working in terms of permutation and combination.
DNA-based method [4, 5] is one such approach that along with one-time pad
(OTP) scheme can be applied to DES. OTP is the only unbreakable encryption that
uses polyalphabetic randomness for the key [6]. So, OTP can be combined with
DNA cryptography by taking longer message and key size (≥ 64 bit) so as to make
brute force attack difficult and impractical [7].
As the first part of this chapter, DNA hybridization encryption scheme (DHES)
is described, in which an improved algorithm named DDHO (that stands for DES
and DNA-based hybridization with OTP) is proposed.
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1. Introduction
There exist a number of cryptographic techniques for secure data communica-
tion [1], but many are vulnerable to attacks. With the failure of cryptographic
algorithms like data encryption standard (DES), new approaches to cipher security
are needed [2, 3]. A cryptographic scheme can be made more secure by combining
it with relatively secure techniques. Theoretically, this hybridization method can be
applied to any cryptographic scheme but block ciphers provide more rounds for
working in terms of permutation and combination.
DNA-based method [4, 5] is one such approach that along with one-time pad
(OTP) scheme can be applied to DES. OTP is the only unbreakable encryption that
uses polyalphabetic randomness for the key [6]. So, OTP can be combined with
DNA cryptography by taking longer message and key size (≥ 64 bit) so as to make
brute force attack difficult and impractical [7].
As the first part of this chapter, DNA hybridization encryption scheme (DHES)
is described, in which an improved algorithm named DDHO (that stands for DES
and DNA-based hybridization with OTP) is proposed.
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Another technique that can be combined with DES is “hybrid graphical encryp-
tion algorithms (HGEA), which is based on graphical interpretation by pattern
recognition and transformation like hybrid cubes encryption algorithm (HiSea)
[8, 9]. Most of the graphical encryption algorithms use mono-alphabetic or poly-
alphabetic substitution and their range of input values is limited. But, HGEA uses a
range of characters consisting of 256 possible values. It also produces output of 256
characters for single-input plaintext. Moreover, HGEA can be used by software as
well as realized by implementing hardware devices.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes DNA hybrid-
ization encryption scheme in detail. This section also presents performance analysis
of algorithms and methods used by DHES. Similarly, Section 3 presents hybrid
graphical encryption with illustrations. This section also presents performance
analysis of encryption and decryption algorithms used by HGEA by comparing it
with that of DES.
2. DNA hybridization encryption scheme (DHES)
2.1 DNA cryptography
DNA cryptography is an emerging field of cryptography that deals with hiding
data in terms of DNA sequences [10, 11]. It can be implemented by using modern
biological techniques as tools and DNA as information carrier to fully exert the
inherent advantage of high storage density and high parallelism to achieve encryp-
tion [12]. The DNA cryptography uses the concept of molecular approach in tradi-
tional cryptographic technique to make the system more secure.
Some terminologies used in biochemical operations of DNA cryptography are
annealing, melting, ligation, amplification, cutting, gel electrophoresis, oligonucle-
otides, etc. [13, 14].
2.2 DNA hybridization
DNA hybridization is a process in which two single-stranded DNAs (ssDNAs)
are combined together to produce a single DNA sequence [15]. The two ssDNAs are
complementary to each other and are of same length. That means: if one strand of
DNA is 30 to 50, then the other strand must be 500. If not, then the hybridization of
the pairs fails and fragmentation occurs. To remove such fragmentation, fragment
assembly has to be done [16].
2.2.1 OTP scheme
OTP is the only potentially unbreakable encryption method. Plaintext encrypted
using an OTP cannot be retrieved without the encryption key. The key generated by
an OTP must be random and generated by a non-deterministic, non-repeatable
process. The key also must be never re-used. In OTP scheme, the length of the key
must be greater than or equal to the length of the plaintext.
2.2.2 Key generation
OTP is used for key generation. The generated key is unique and only the sender
and receiver know the key and that generated key is destroyed once it is used. The
key generated by computers is not truly random; so, a pseudorandom number gen-
erator function is used for generating the key and the generated key is in the DNA.
The size of ssDNA key is greater than the original size of the message, which results in
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a longer size of the encrypted message and that makes it difficult to break. The length
of the key is the result of multiplication of the number of bits required to represent
each character and total number of bits in the input message.
2.2.3 Encryption
The encryption process consists of the following steps (Figure 1):
1. Choose the plaintext to be sent.
2. Replace each letter in the text with its opposite alphabetical character
excluding “A” and “a” (replacement algorithm), numerical values and
symbols. Then, convert the plaintext into ASCII code and then into binary
code.
3. The ssDNA OTP key is generated. (The length of the key depends on (i) the
length of binary plaintext and (ii) the number of bits required to represent
each nucleotide.)
4.Scan the binary sequence from left to right to find the occurrences of 0 and 1 s.
• If the first digit of binary bit is 1, then this bit is compared with last n
bases of OTP key and complementary data of DNA form are produced as
the encrypted message where n is the number of bits required to
represent the nucleotides.
Figure 1.
Flow chart of DNA hybridization encryption.
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3. The ssDNA OTP key is generated. (The length of the key depends on (i) the
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• If the first digit of binary bit is 0, then no operation is carried out and
the next n bases in the OTP key from reverse order are ignored where n
is the number of bits required to represent nucleotides.
5. Repeat step 3 for all the occurrences of 1 and 0 s and put them all together to
obtain the resulting ciphertext.
2.2.4 Decryption
The decryption process consists of the following steps (Figure 2):
1. Take n leftmost bits from the ciphertext and compare with the last n bits of
the OTP key.
• If they are found to be complementary, then binary bit “1” is formed;
else, a binary “0” is formed.
2. Repeat step 1 for the subsequent n-bit sequence in the ciphertext till the end
and put them all together to obtain the binary digit.
3.Apply reverse replacement algorithm.
4.Arrange the binary digits (in n bits form) and convert the value into ASCII code.
5. Convert the ASCII code to plaintext.
Figure 2.
Flow chart of DNA hybridization decryption.
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2.2.5 DDHO algorithm
Here, the proposed algorithm DDHO (combination of DES algorithm and DNA-
based hybridization and OTP scheme) is explained in detail. First, the DES algo-
rithm is performed on the given plaintext and key and the resultant ciphertext is
taken as an input to the DNA hybridization and OTP scheme. Further, the algo-
rithm proceeds as per the above illustrated DNA hybridization and OTP scheme.
The encryption algorithm for DDHO is as follows:
1. A block of 64 bits is permutated by an initial permutation called IP.
2. Resulting 64 bits are divided into two equal halves, each containing 32 bits,
left and right halves.
3. The right half goes through a function F (Feistel function)
4.The left half is XOR-ed with output from the F function obtained in the
above step.
5. The left and right halves are swapped (except the last round).
6. In the last round, apply an inverse permutation (IP-1) on both halves that is
the last step which produces a ciphertext in binary form.
7. The ssDNA OTP key is generated and the length of this key depends upon
the length of binary plaintext and the number of bits required to represent
each nucleotide.
8.Start scanning the binary sequence, obtained in step 6, from left to right to
find the occurrences of 0 and 1 s.
• If first digit of binary bit is 1, then this bit is compared with last n bases
of OTP key and complementary data of DNA form are produced as the
encrypted message where n is the number of bits required to represent
the nucleotides.
• If the first digit of the binary bit is 0, then no operation is carried out
and the next n bases in the OTP key from reverse order are ignored
where n is the number of bits required to represent nucleotides.
9.Repeat step 8 for all the occurrences of 1 and 0 s and put them all together
to obtain the resulting ciphertext.
The decryption algorithm of DDHO is the reverse process of DDHO
encryption algorithm.
2.2.6 Analysis of DDHO
The plaintexts chosen for encryption and decryption using the DDHO algor-
ithm are highly diverse. They include short and long texts, purely alphabetical text
and text containing alphabets and many other characters. The plaintexts of diverse
types are selected, so that they are very representative. With regard to difference of
the lengths of the text, four plaintexts with increasing size are selected (Table 1).
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to obtain the resulting ciphertext.
The decryption algorithm of DDHO is the reverse process of DDHO
encryption algorithm.
2.2.6 Analysis of DDHO
The plaintexts chosen for encryption and decryption using the DDHO algor-
ithm are highly diverse. They include short and long texts, purely alphabetical text
and text containing alphabets and many other characters. The plaintexts of diverse
types are selected, so that they are very representative. With regard to difference of
the lengths of the text, four plaintexts with increasing size are selected (Table 1).
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The first plaintext contains only alphabetical and digital characters, the second
plaintext contains only non-alphabetical and non-digital characters, and the third
and the fourth plaintexts contain a combination of characters.
By applying the above test dataset to the DDHO algorithm, the original plaintext
size, the resulting ciphertext size and the key size are examined, together with the
encryption and decryption time. The encryption and decryption processes are
performed five times for each plaintext and the average system time is obtained and
listed to make the evaluation of time fair.
The results obtained are shown in the Table 2.
The number of bits needed to store the plaintext in ASCII format is eight times
that of the length of the plaintext. For the output of DES in binary form, the
number of nucleotides used to represent each bit is 10 so that the total size of key is
10 times the length of binary bits (i.e. output of DES). For instance, consider a
plaintext of length 64 bits. The output of DES algorithm is also 64 bits, so the length
of OTP key is equal to 64  10 bits = 640 bits. The length of ciphertext is 260 bits
means that there are only 26 occurrences of number 1 in the output of DES algo-
rithm (i.e. plaintext of DDHO) and the remaining 64  26 = 38 bits are 0 s.
Similarly, consider a plaintext of length 400 bits, the output of DES algorithm is
equal to 400∕64 = 6.25 blocks of 64 bits. However, this length of plaintext is not an
exact multiple of 64 bits. Therefore, it adds 48 bits 0 s at the end of plaintext and
makes 7 blocks of 64 bit. The output of 7 blocks of 64 bits of DES is equal to 7  64
bits = 448 bits and hence the length of OTP key in DDHO algorithm is equal to
448  10 bits = 4480 bits. Similarly, there are only 102 occurrences of 1 s in the
output of DES algorithm (i.e. plaintext of DDHO) and remaining bits have 0 s. The
length of ciphertext depends upon how many 1 s (binary bit) are present in the
plaintext. The more the number of 1 s, the more the length of the ciphertext.
As shown in Table 2, the ciphertext lengths are proportional to the
corresponding plaintext lengths. The size of key increases hugely as the size of
plaintext increases. The length of ciphertext is small as compared to the size of the
Dataset Description
Test 1 Only alphabetical and digital characters
Test 2 Only non-alphabetical and non-digital characters
Test 3 Combination of characters
Test 4 Combination of characters
Table 1.
Plaintext of different contents for DDHO algorithm.
Dataset Length of
plaintext (bits)
Length of
ciphertext
(bits)
Size of
key (bits)
Encryption time
(milliseconds)
Decryption time
(milliseconds)
Test 1 64 260 640 234 413
Test 2 400 1020 4480 244 426
Test 3 800 2330 8320 290 465
Test 4 1600 3740 16,000 517 703
Table 2.
Performance of DDHO with plaintexts of different lengths and contents.
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key; this is because the length of ciphertext depends upon the number of 1 s present
in the input plaintext.
The encryption and decryption times shown in Table 2 and Figure 3 show that
the DDHO algorithm’s encryption and decryption times for the different lengths of
plaintext increase slower with the changes in the length of plaintext. This reveals
that the processing time can be very fast even for relatively very long plaintext.
3. Hybrid graphical encryption
The hybrid graphical encryption algorithm (HGEA) is a unique graphical
encryption algorithm based on mathematical transformations and graphical pattern
realization. It is a symmetric key encryption in which a single 64-bit key is shared
between two parties for encryption and decryption of data.
3.1 Hybrid cubes encryption algorithm (HiSea)
As the HGEA is inspired from hybrid cubes encryption algorithm (HiSea), it is
explained here in brief.
Hybrid cubes encryption algorithm (HiSea) is the symmetric non-binary block
cipher. The encryption and decryption keys, plaintext, ciphertext and internal
operation in the encryption or decryption processes are based on the integer num-
bers. HiSea encryption algorithm was developed by Sapiee Jamel in 2011. The
plaintext size for the encryption process is 64 bytes ASCII characters. Hybrid cube
(HC) is generated based on the inner matrix multiplication of the layers between
the two magic cubes (MCs). HC of order 4  4 is a matrix Hi,j, i {1, 2, 879} and
j {1, 2, 3, 4}, defined as follows: Hi,j = MCi,j MCi + 1,j where the MCi,j is a jth layer
of ith magic cube [17–19].
3.2 Hybrid graphical encryption algorithm (HGEA)
HGEA performs the operation, like in HiSea, of generating 4  4 matrix, then
mixing it with key and again mixing of rows and column. Further, the algorithm
obtains decision parameters based on remainder value and exploit the
correlation between distributions of two graphical patterns for manipulation of
intermediate data.
Figure 3.
Analysis of encryption and decryption times of DDHO algorithm.
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realization. It is a symmetric key encryption in which a single 64-bit key is shared
between two parties for encryption and decryption of data.
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explained here in brief.
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bers. HiSea encryption algorithm was developed by Sapiee Jamel in 2011. The
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The main concept of hybrid graphical encryption algorithm cipher is to
realize the input data into 8  8 bit matrix pattern. Then, divide it into four
4  4 matrices by putting it up against XY axis quadrant graph. Again, each
quadrant 4  4 matrix is expanded into four possible 16-bit 4  4 matrices by
XOR operation with four 4  4 subkeys. Further quadrant selection operation
selects one 4  4 bit matrix output for further processing. Finally, after the
final XOR operation, each set of 4  4 bit matrix is plotted into XY axis plot
(Figure 4).
3.3 The encryption illustrated
The binary conversion of data and its graphical representation are the key
aspects of hybrid graphical encryption algorithm cipher. The five steps involved in
the encryption process are: (1) conversion and arrangement, (2) transformation,
(3) selection, (4) plotting, and (5) arrangement and conversion.
3.3.1 Step 1: conversion and arrangement
This encryption algorithm can process any “n” plaintext ASCII characters from
input file. The input string is split into 8 bytes of m parts. Then, the input ASCII
message bit is put up against the standard ASCII table. The plaintext value is then
replaced by its ASCII value according to the table. This encryption encompasses
numbers, special characters and even spaces.
Figure 4.
System architecture diagram of HGEA.
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Since this algorithm will be using the entire ASCII table for referencing, the case
sensitivity of the message will play a very crucial part in output ciphertext.
After tabulating the plaintext in comparison with the ASCII table, ASCII and
decimal values of the plaintext can be derived. Now, the decimal value has to be
converted to binary value to move on to the next step. For binary values that do not
reach the 8-bit mark, 0 s are added to the back. The obtained binary value is then
tabulated in the form of an 8  8 matrix as shown in Table 3.
Since HGEA is a symmetric key encryption, a 64-bit binary key is shared for
both encryption and decryption processes. These keys are also tabulated in the form
of an 8  8 matrix of message bits.
Consider key bits as 64 random bits tabulated in an 8  8 matrix form, similar to
message bits.
3.3.2 Step 2: transformation
In this step, initially the 8  8 matrix is divided into quadrant form as shown
in Table 4(a). The 8  8 matrix formed from plaintext is divided into four 4  4
matrices, that is, quarters named as M1, M2, M3 and M4 and generalized as Mi
Similarly, the 8  8 matrix form key is also divided into four quarters named as
K1, K2, K3 and K4, generalized as Ki.
Again, Mi which is a 4  4 matrix is converted into 8  8 matrix by
performing XOR operation of Mi with K1, K2, K3 and K4. M1 is XOR-ed with K1,
K2, K3 and K4 and obtained value is populated to 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quadrants,
respectively, as shown in Table 4(b).
Table 3.
Conversion of plaintext to binary.
Table 4.
Reference XY axis and sample conversion of 8  8 matrix into 4  4 matrix.
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Then shifting operation is performed as follows:
For M1 ⊕ K1, M2 ⊕ K1, M3 ⊕ K1 and M4 ⊕ K1
1st row, R1 no shift
2nd row, R2 1 bit
3rd row, R3 2 bits
4th row, R4 3 bits
For M1 ⊕ K2, M2 ⊕ K2, M3 ⊕ K2 and M4 ⊕ K2
1st row, R1 3 bit
2nd row, R2 no shift
3rd row, R3 1 bit
4th row, R4 2 bits
For M1 ⊕ K3, M2 ⊕ K3, M3 ⊕ K3 and M4 ⊕ K3
1st row, R1 2 bits
2nd row, R2 3 bits
3rd row, R3 no shift
4th row, R4 1 bit
For M1 ⊕ K4, M2 ⊕ K4, M3 ⊕ K4 and M4 ⊕ K4
1st row, R1 1 bit
2nd row, R2 2 bits
3rd row, R3 3 bits
4th row, R4 no shift
3.3.3 Step 3: selection
As its name suggests, first quadrant selection operation is performed, which
gives the selected quadrant value for further processing. In this step, only one 4 � 4
matrix value is selected for further processing for each Mi value. Thus, step. 2 and 3
via series of confusion and logical operations propose four possible 4 � 4 matrix
values for further processing, and finally, the selection step selects only one 4 � 4
matrix value for further processing. For this purpose, counters are deployed, which
will count the number of 1 s in each quadrant of subkeys K1, K2, K3 and K4 for M1’,
M2’, M3’ and M4’, respectively. Then, the total number of 1 s in corresponding Ki is
divided by 4 and the remainder is found.
Remainder Rið Þ ¼ Total_no_of_1s_in_Ki4 (1)
Depending upon the total number of 1 s in Ki for corresponding Mi, the selected
quadrant value will be decided.
Qs ¼ Ri þ 1 (2)
For instance, let us consider that for M1, the total number of 1 s in K1 is
calculated (consider 7, for example) and divided by 4. Now, considering the
remainder which will be 3, hence Q s = 4, the fourth quadrant is selected for further
processing and denoted as Mis.
After this, we pass the Ki via permutation box “P,” which will shift the bit
position of standard matrix as per bit position of randomly selected transposition
matrix shown in the Table 5.
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Finally, Mi’ XOR Ki’ is performed and Mi” is generated. Thus, matrices M1*, M2*,
M3* and M4* matrix are generated.
Mi∗  Mis⊕Ki’ (3)
3.3.4 Step 4: plotting
Now, consider the standard matrix distribution of any 4 � 4 matrix as shown in
Table 6. Each of the four M1*, M2*, M3* and M4* values will have different trans-
formations when plotted in XY graph. Values of M1” will be populated to 1st
quadrant as per graph position, which can be realized by permutation as shown in
Tables 7 and 8.
In this way, the values of M1”, M2”, M3” and M4” are populated to the reference
XY graph.
3.3.5 Step 5: arrangement and conversion
Finally, we have M1”, M2”, M3” and M4” plotted in 8 � 8 matrix form. Now,
each row of the matrix is converted from binay to decimal and then to plaintext
Table 5.
Reference standard 4 � 4 transposition matrix distribution.
Table 6.
Plotting the values to standard XY axis graph.
Table 7.
Permutations P1 and P2 for M1 and M2.
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Finally, Mi’ XOR Ki’ is performed and Mi” is generated. Thus, matrices M1*, M2*,
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characters by referring the standard ASCII table, as illustrated in Table 9, and this is
our ciphertext.
3.4 The decryption process
Decryption is also performed in the same manner as encryption but in reverse
order. The steps involved in decryption are: (1) conversion and arrangement,
(2) plotting, (3) selection, (4) transformation and (5) arrangement and conversion.
3.5 The algorithms
In this section, the algorithms of HGEA encryption and decryption are explained
step by step. First, the encryption algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 1: HGEA encryption
Input: Plaintext p, which is divided into n 8-bit characters. Each 8-bit value ASCII character is
converted into 64-bit binary values in 8 � 8 matrix Mp, which is the input for the algorithm. Similarly,
64-bit random key (K) is used.
Output: Ciphertext C, where C can be decrypted using key K to its corresponding plain-text P.
1: Mp a(i, j); where 0 < (i, j) < 7
2: Split 8 � 8 matrix into M1, M2, M3, M4, 4 � 4 matrix.
3: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
Table 8.
Permutations P3 and P4 for M3 and M4.
Table 9.
Example conversion of ASCII cipher into binary.
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4: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
5: M1 [i] [j] Mp;
6: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
7: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
8: l = j + 4;
9: M2 [i] [j] Mp;
10: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
11: k = i + 4:
12: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
13: M3 [i] [j] Mp;
14: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
15: k = i + 4:
16: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
17: l = j + 4;
18: M4 [i] [j] Mp;
19: Generate K1, K2, K3, K4 from K similar to plaint text.
20: Compute:
21: M1 ⊕ K1, M1 ⊕ K2, M1 ⊕ K3, M1 ⊕ K4;
22: M2 ⊕ K1, M2 ⊕ K2, M2 ⊕ K3, M2 ⊕ K4;
23: M3 ⊕ K1, M3 ⊕ K2, M3 ⊕ K3, M3 ⊕ K4;
24: M4 ⊕ K1, M4 ⊕ K2, M4 ⊕ K3 and M4 ⊕ K4;
25: Perform Right Shift Operation circularly:
26: With M1 ⊕ K1, M2 ⊕ K1, M3 ⊕ K1 and M4 ⊕ K1
27: 1st row no shift
28: Right circular shift the 2nd row by 1 bit
29: Right circular shift the 3rd row by 2 bits
30: Right circular shift the 4th row by 3 bits
31: With, M1 ⊕ K2, M2 ⊕ K2, M3 ⊕ K2 and M4 ⊕ K2
32: Right circular shift the 1st row by 3 bits
33: 2nd row no shift
34: Right circular shift the 3rd row by 1 bit
35: Right circular shift the 4th row by 2 bits
36: With M1 ⊕ K3, M2 ⊕ K3, M3 ⊕ K3 and M4 ⊕ K3
37: Right circular shift the 1st row by 2 bits
38: Right circular shift the 2nd row by 3 bits
39: 3rd row no shift
40: Right circular shift the 4th row by 1 bit
41: With M1 ⊕ K4, M2 ⊕ K4, M3 ⊕ K4 and M4 ⊕ K4
42: Right circular shift the 1st row by 1 bit
43: Right circular shift the 2nd row by 2 bits
44: Right circular shift the 3rd row by 3 bits
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characters by referring the standard ASCII table, as illustrated in Table 9, and this is
our ciphertext.
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64-bit random key (K) is used.
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4: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
5: M1 [i] [j] Mp;
6: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
7: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
8: l = j + 4;
9: M2 [i] [j] Mp;
10: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
11: k = i + 4:
12: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
13: M3 [i] [j] Mp;
14: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
15: k = i + 4:
16: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
17: l = j + 4;
18: M4 [i] [j] Mp;
19: Generate K1, K2, K3, K4 from K similar to plaint text.
20: Compute:
21: M1 ⊕ K1, M1 ⊕ K2, M1 ⊕ K3, M1 ⊕ K4;
22: M2 ⊕ K1, M2 ⊕ K2, M2 ⊕ K3, M2 ⊕ K4;
23: M3 ⊕ K1, M3 ⊕ K2, M3 ⊕ K3, M3 ⊕ K4;
24: M4 ⊕ K1, M4 ⊕ K2, M4 ⊕ K3 and M4 ⊕ K4;
25: Perform Right Shift Operation circularly:
26: With M1 ⊕ K1, M2 ⊕ K1, M3 ⊕ K1 and M4 ⊕ K1
27: 1st row no shift
28: Right circular shift the 2nd row by 1 bit
29: Right circular shift the 3rd row by 2 bits
30: Right circular shift the 4th row by 3 bits
31: With, M1 ⊕ K2, M2 ⊕ K2, M3 ⊕ K2 and M4 ⊕ K2
32: Right circular shift the 1st row by 3 bits
33: 2nd row no shift
34: Right circular shift the 3rd row by 1 bit
35: Right circular shift the 4th row by 2 bits
36: With M1 ⊕ K3, M2 ⊕ K3, M3 ⊕ K3 and M4 ⊕ K3
37: Right circular shift the 1st row by 2 bits
38: Right circular shift the 2nd row by 3 bits
39: 3rd row no shift
40: Right circular shift the 4th row by 1 bit
41: With M1 ⊕ K4, M2 ⊕ K4, M3 ⊕ K4 and M4 ⊕ K4
42: Right circular shift the 1st row by 1 bit
43: Right circular shift the 2nd row by 2 bits
44: Right circular shift the 3rd row by 3 bits
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45: 4th row no shift
46: Compute selected quadrant value (Qs):
47: Remainder (Ris) ∑1’s in Ki/4, for corresponding Mi respectively.
48: For Qis = Ri + 1.
49: Generate K1’, K2’, K3’ and K4’
50: Ki’ = πi(Ki),where π = fixed permutation Table.
51: Compute: Mi* Mis ⊕ Ki’
52: Mi cipher = π (Mi*)
53: M cipher (M1cipher + M2cipher) (M4cipher + M3cipher)
54: Convert each row of 8 � 8 matrix binary into ciphertext
Next, the decryption algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 2: HGEA decryption
Input: Ciphertext C which is divided into n 8-bit characters. Each 8-bit value ASCII character is
converted into 64-bit binary values in 8 � 8 matrix Mc, which is the input for the algorithm. Similarly,
64 bit random key (K) is used.
Output: Plaintext P, where P is decrypted to plaintext using key K.
1: Mc a(i, j); where 0 < (i, j) < 7
2: Split 8 � 8 matrix into M1”, M2”, M3”, M4” 4 � 4 matrix.
3: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
4: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
5: M1” [i] [j] Mc;
6: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
7: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
8: i = j + 4;
9: M2” [i] [j] Mc;
10: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
11: k = i + 4:
12: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
13: M3” [i] [j] Mc;
14: for, (i = 0; i < 4; i++);
15: k = i + 4:
16: for, (j = 0; j < 4; j++);
17: l = j + 4;
18: M4” [i] [j] Mp;
19: Generate K1, K2, K3, K4 from K similar to plaint text.
20: Mi cipher = π (Mi*)
21: Generate K1’, K2’, K3’ and K4’
22: Ki’ = πi(Ki),where π = fixed permutation table.
23: Compute: Mi* Mis ⊕ Ki’
24: Compute selected quadrant value (Qs):
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25: Remainder(R) ∑1’s in Ki / 4, for corresponding Mi respectively.
26: For Ri = n, Qis = n + 1.
27: Perform Right Shift Operation circularly:
28: If Qs = 1
29: 1st row no shift
30: Left circular shift the 2nd row by 1 bit
31: Left circular shift the 3rd row by 2 bits
32: Left circular shift the 4th row by 3 bits
33: If Qs = 2
34: Left circular shift the 1st row by 3 bits
35: 2nd row no shift
36: Left circular shift the 3rd row by 1 bit
35: Left circular shift the 4th row by 2 bits
37: If Qs = 3
38: Left circular shift the 1st row by 2 bits
39: Left circular shift the 2nd row by 3 bits
40: 3rd row no shift
41: Left circular shift the 4th row by 1 bit
42: if Qs = 4
43: Left circular shift the 4th row by 1 bit
44: Left circular shift the 4th row by 2 bits
45: Left circular shift the 4th row by 3 bits
46: 4th row no shift
47: Selected quadrant value (Kis) Qs
48: Mi Mi’ ⊕ Kis
49: Generate M1, M2, M3 and M4.
50: Mp (M1cipher + M2cipher) (M4cipher + M3cipher)
51: Convert above result to string to get plaintext.
3.6 Performance evaluation
Performance measurement criterion is the time taken by the algorithms to
perform encryption and decryption of the input text file, that is, the encryption
computation time and decryption computation time. [20]
3.6.1 Computation time for encryption and decryption
The encryption computation time of the encryption algorithm is the time taken
by the algorithm to produce the ciphertext from the plaintext. The encryption time
can be used to calculate the encryption throughput of the algorithms.
The decryption computation time is the time taken by the algorithms to produce
the plaintext from the ciphertext. The decryption time can be used to calculate the
decryption throughput of the algorithms.
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25: Remainder(R) ∑1’s in Ki / 4, for corresponding Mi respectively.
26: For Ri = n, Qis = n + 1.
27: Perform Right Shift Operation circularly:
28: If Qs = 1
29: 1st row no shift
30: Left circular shift the 2nd row by 1 bit
31: Left circular shift the 3rd row by 2 bits
32: Left circular shift the 4th row by 3 bits
33: If Qs = 2
34: Left circular shift the 1st row by 3 bits
35: 2nd row no shift
36: Left circular shift the 3rd row by 1 bit
35: Left circular shift the 4th row by 2 bits
37: If Qs = 3
38: Left circular shift the 1st row by 2 bits
39: Left circular shift the 2nd row by 3 bits
40: 3rd row no shift
41: Left circular shift the 4th row by 1 bit
42: if Qs = 4
43: Left circular shift the 4th row by 1 bit
44: Left circular shift the 4th row by 2 bits
45: Left circular shift the 4th row by 3 bits
46: 4th row no shift
47: Selected quadrant value (Kis) Qs
48: Mi Mi’ ⊕ Kis
49: Generate M1, M2, M3 and M4.
50: Mp (M1cipher + M2cipher) (M4cipher + M3cipher)
51: Convert above result to string to get plaintext.
3.6 Performance evaluation
Performance measurement criterion is the time taken by the algorithms to
perform encryption and decryption of the input text file, that is, the encryption
computation time and decryption computation time. [20]
3.6.1 Computation time for encryption and decryption
The encryption computation time of the encryption algorithm is the time taken
by the algorithm to produce the ciphertext from the plaintext. The encryption time
can be used to calculate the encryption throughput of the algorithms.
The decryption computation time is the time taken by the algorithms to produce
the plaintext from the ciphertext. The decryption time can be used to calculate the
decryption throughput of the algorithms.
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For evaluation, files of sizes 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 100 and 200 KB were used as
input data files. For the sake of comparison, same input files have been set as input
to both HGEA and DES. [14] DES has also been implemented in the same environ-
ment, JAVA version 8 and simulated in IntelliJ IDEA v.2018.1.4 on the same
machine (Tables 10 and 11).
The same data set was encrypted via both DES and HGEA algorithms. Each
sample data set was encrypted with five randomly chosen passwords, and the
encryption execution time and decryption execution time were listed as shown in
Table 12.
The whole test was performed very carefully. During the test, it was observed
that sometimes, when new input data are fed into the computation model, the test
results returned false encryption and decryption time values; for example, the test
model resulted in very high encryption and decryption execution time values or the
test model’s decryption execution time was very high compared to encryption
computation time and the decrypted plaintext differed from input plaintext. So to
resolve this issue, a new terminal was generated in Intellij whenever the input value
was changed.
The average values of execution time for encryption and decryption were com-
puted and are tabulated in Tables 12 and 13.
Table 10.
Execution time of DES.
Table 11.
Execution time of HGES.
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The above tabulated values represent the computation time of various sizes of
sample data sets being processed by DES and HGEA. Results show that for the
proposed HGEA, execution time is 26, 49 and 62 for 1, 5 and 10 KB of data,
respectively. HGEA has a much slower execution time compared to DES. The
execution time of the proposed algorithm increases with an increase in data size.
Further, by using the values of Tables 12 and 13, various graphs showing the
encryption execution and decryption execution times for DES and HGEA with
different input sizes were generated as shown in Figure 5(a)–(c).
The above graph shows that the throughput of DES is considerably better than
HGEA for small-size input files and it increases with an increase in file size com-
pared to HGEA. It also shows that encryption time for both algorithms is more than
decryption time.
The variation in encryption time and decryption time in HGEA is due to steps
followed during decryption. During encryption process in the transformation step,
Table 12.
Computation time of encryption for various input sizes.
Table 13.
Computation time of decryption for various input size.
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each Mi is XOR-ed with all of the possible subkeys and only one of four possible
4  4 matrices is chosen for further processing. However, during decryption in the
transformation step, only one 4  4 matrix is directly generated depending upon
selected quadrant value. So, the generation of all of the possible intermediate values
is one of the reasons for variation of encryption and decryption times in HGEA.
4. Conclusion
The DNA cryptosystem containing DNA hybridization technique and secure key
generation technique OTP are studied, explained and implemented by taking input
from the DES algorithm output. The output of DES-based DNA cryptography
algorithm has encrypted message in the form of DNA sequences and the decrypted
message is the original plaintext.
The DDHO algorithm is tested on different types of plaintext; the encryption
and decryption times are calculated; the analysis of length of plaintext, length of
ciphertext and size of key is done and found that the length of ciphertext is pro-
portional to the corresponding plaintext length. The encryption and decryption
times increase slower with the changes in the length of plaintext.
From the process of analyzing various cryptographic algorithms, a unique
encryption algorithm “hybrid graphical encryption algorithm” has been proposed.
The algorithm was based on hybrid cubes encryption algorithm (HiSea). The fea-
tures like graphical interpretation and computation of selected quadrant value are
the unique features of this algorithm, which is different from existing standard
Figure 5.
File size vs. execution time of DES and HGEA.
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encryption algorithms. Also, the multiple transformation, multiple key generation
provides, combined with graphical interpretation provided added security to the
algorithm. The realization of computation model proved the proposed encryption
algorithm is practically realizable. Further comparative analysis of computation
time of realized model was made.
Although the comparative analysis of proposed model is proven to be more
secure, the model was slower than DES. However, the processing units of modern
day computer system are extremely high and developing rapidly, the implementa-
tion of HGEA possible.
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